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Abstract
This thesis presents three papers that contribute to the measurement and under­
standing of the process of economic development. In particular, I deal with issues of 
significant importance in the current literature in development economics: the provi­
sion and regulatory institutions of infrastructure, firms and industries’ behaviour and 
performance, and the process of human capital accumulation and its link to gender 
issues.
In Chapter 2 I investigate the effect of electricity provision on industrialization 
using a panel of Indian states from 1965-1984. To address the endogeneity of invest­
ment in electrification, I use the introduction of a new agricultural technology intensive 
in irrigation (the Green Revolution) as a natural experiment. As electric pumpsets are 
used to provide formers with cheap irrigation water, I use the uneven availability of 
groundwater to predict divergence in the expansion of the electricity network and, ul­
timately, to quantify the effect of electrification on industrial outcomes. I present a se­
ries of tests to rule out alternative explanations that could link groundwater availability 
to industrialization directly or through other means than electrification. Overall, the 
uneven expansion of the electricity network explains between 10 and 15 percentage 
points of the difference in manufacturing output across states in India.
In Chapter 3 I explore how firms in India cope with the erratic and expensive pro­
vision of electricity. In a model that combines upstream regulation with downstream 
heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic competition framework, I investigate the role of 
the electricity regulator’s preferences and the economic environment (i.e. regulation 
and openness) in determining the decision to adopt a captive generator of electricity 
and industries’ aggregate productivity. I show that a firm’s productivity, the electricity 
regulator’s disregard for the well-being of industrial producers consuming electricity 
and greater industry protection from competition are associated with greater adoption 
of captive power. The mechanisms I propose are present for a representative repeated 
cross-section sample of Indian firms in the 1990s, with heterogeneous effects along 
dimensions such as location.
In Chapter 4 I investigate the effect of the Green Revolution on rural literacy 
and rural women’s employment and literacy levels, using a panel of 254 districts for 
census years, before and after the introduction of the high yield variety (HYV) seeds. 
Even though the new technology has been shown to increase returns to education, ag­
gregate effects on literacy are ambiguous a priori, if claims are correct that the process 
excluded most poor formers and that mechanization replaced women labour and their 
effects are strong. I find robust evidence that the increase in adoption of the new seeds 
is associated with increases of around 2 percentage points in literacy levels. The ef­
fects are only present for treated cohorts. Additionally, I find no evidence of a Green- 
Revolution related increase in the gender gap: even though results indicate that the
percentages of working and literate women in rural India fall over time, a greater 
tensity in HYV is shown to mitigate this trend.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1
The accumulation of physical and human capital remains a fundamental yet 
difficult task in the objective of reducing poverty and increasing standards of liv­
ing in most of the developing world. Individuals in developing countries do face 
an economic environment full of constraints, such as the absence or imperfection of 
credit markets. However, in many cases, the decision not to invest in physical and 
human capital can be explained by low private returns. In particular, in this thesis 
I investigate two sources: the lack of adequate infrastructure, that hinders the birth 
and growth of firms, and the prevalence of traditional farming technologies with low 
returns to education. The economic structure of a large number of underdeveloped 
countries suggests the relevance of these sources of low private returns. For exam­
ple, the regions of Sub-Saharan African and South Asia where-out of the combined 
population of 2 billion people-more than 30% live with less than a dollar a day, 70% 
live in rural areas and around 30% of GDP comes from the agricultural sector (World 
Bank (2005; 2007)). Both infrastructure and human capital indicators depict a bleak 
outlook even when compared to other developing regions, such as Latin America: 
only 24% of people in Africa and 43% in South Asia have access to electricity (vs. 
89% in Latin America), around 35% in both areas have access to sanitation (vs. 74% 
in Latin America), 34% and 65% of the rural population in Africa and South Asia, 
respectively, live within 2 kilometres of paved roads (vs. 54% in Latin America) and
2fixed lines and mobile connections reach around 6% of the population on average 
(vs. 42% in Latin America). The picture looks very similar for human capital indica­
tors: according to the Millennium Development Goals, in 2003 only 61% of children 
in the relevant age group in Sub-Saharan Africa and 87% in South Asia had com­
pleted primary school (vs. 96% in Latin America). Similarly, illiteracy among youth 
aged 15 to 24 in 2003 was above 30% in both regions, while in Latin America, it was 
below 10%.
Even though these indicators are conclusive indicators of underdevelopment, 
the understanding of the underlying drivers of economic failure and the prescription 
for successful policies are still a work in progress. This is due to the feet that the si­
multaneity of phenomena makes it very hard to disentangle causal mechanisms and 
the identification of causal effects. The objective of this thesis is to address some 
of these analytic challenges. In doing so, we can learn about issues of significant 
importance in the current literature in development economics, including the provi­
sion and regulatory institutions of infrastructure, firms and industries’ behaviour and 
performance, and the process of human capital accumulation and its link to gender 
issues.
More specifically, the main issues I discuss in the following three chapters 
revolve around two main features that have characterised the economy of India in the 
last fifty years but could be used to understand the process of economic development 
more generally. The first one is the electricity sector, an important input in industrial
3and agricultural production that has been underperforming for a long time in India, as 
highlighted by the World Bank (2000) and by the US Department of Energy (2003) 
(among others) as one of the main constraints to development in India. For example, 
the Investment Climate Survey done by the Asian Development Bank and the World 
Bank in 2002 reports information for around 1800 firms and shows that, on average, 
firms face a power outage or a power surge every other day and that more than 60% of 
firms have turned to captive power generators. This phenomenon of self-generation 
of electricity is recurrent in other developing countries in South Asia and Africa. For 
example, similar surveys in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Kenya show that more than 
70% of surveyed firms use a captive generator. In Pakistan, the rate is around 40%; 
in Tanzania, 55%; and in Uganda, 36%. In all of these countries, including India, 
the inadequacy of electricity is considered an important constraint for firms (Asian 
Development Bank (2002)).
The second recurrent phenomenon highlighted in this thesis is the Green Revo­
lution, i.e. the introduction of a new agricultural technology in India in the mid 1960s 
consisting of seeds intensive in the use of irrigation and fertilizers. In the following 
chapters, I make use of two features of this technological change: the increase of 
electricity provision in rural areas to provide the required timely irrigation (chapters 
2 and 3) and the technology’s complementarity with human capital (chapter 4). The 
lessons learned from the transformations associated with the Green Revolution in In­
dia can shed light on some of the benefits and hazards of adopting similar techniques
4in the many developing countries where the agricultural sector employs more than 
60% of the work force, its share of GDP is around 30% on average, and where il­
literacy rates are in most cases above 30% (for the “agricultural-based countries” as 
defined by the World Development Report (2007)).
In Chapter 2 ,1 investigate the effect of electricity provision on industrial devel­
opment by looking at a panel of Indian states between 1965 and 1984. An interesting 
feature in that period is that each state in India has its own State Electricity Board 
(SEB)-politically dependent on the state government and independent of the cen­
tral govemmerit-that is in charge of expanding the electricity network. This allows 
me to compare the industrial performance of different states and link it to their elec­
trification efforts. But the econometric identification of this effect is subject to the 
endogeneity concerns of reverse causality and unobserved time varying effects that 
might produce spurious results. To deal with these issues I make use of the start of 
the Green Revolution in the mid 1960s, where the successful introduction of High 
Yield Variety (HYV) seeds was determined by geographical characteristics such as 
groundwater availability, allowing farmers to pump water so as to provide timely 
irrigation to the new seeds (see Foster and Rosenzweig (2008), for example). As 
electric pumpsets were employed to provide farmers with cheap irrigation water, I 
use the uneven availability of groundwater to predict diveigence in the expansion 
of the electricity network and, ultimately, to quantify the effect of electrification on 
industrial outcomes. That means that I can link the time varying effects of a time
5invariant characteristic (groundwater availability) to the expansion of the electricity 
network to address the endogeneity concerns that would bias least squares estimates. 
Additionally, I present a series of tests to mitigate concerns about alternative explana­
tions that could link groundwater availability to industrialization directly or through 
other means than electrification, such as an increase in urbanization, expenditure in 
manufacturing goods and credit availability. This chapter contributes to the growing 
literature on infrastructure, reinforcing the idea that geographic characteristics can 
be used to instrument for investment in infrastructure projects, as in Duflo and Pande 
(2007).
Chapter 3 explores how firms in India cope with the erratic and expensive pro­
vision of electricity. I develop a model that combines monopoly regulation of the 
provider of a public utility, as in Laffont and Tirole (1993), with downstream hetero­
geneous firms that use the infrastructure good as an input in a monopolistic competi­
tion framework. As in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006), I assume firms differ 
exogenously in their productivity. In particular, I investigate the role of the electric­
ity regulator’s preferences (i.e. the importance attributed to industrial consumers in 
the objective function) in determining the quality adjusted price charged to indus­
trial consumers and its effect on firms’ decisions to adopt a captive power generator 
(presented as a cost reducing device). The existence of this technology changes the 
configuration of the industry, since the exposure to high price or low quality is differ­
ent for firms that have adopted and those who have not. I show that higher electricity
6tariffs increase the rate of adoption by two means: the productivity level of the mar­
ginal adopting firm is lower and the productivity level of the marginal surviving firm 
is greater. I subsequently show that the economic environment (i.e. openness and 
regulation) also plays a part in determining the decision to adopt a captive generator. 
A more protected environment translates into higher final good prices, allowing less 
productive firms to recoup the fixed cost of the electricity generator. I test the mech­
anisms I propose in the model using a repeated cross-section representative sample 
of Indian firms for the years 1990, 1994 and 1997, combined with data at the state 
and industry level. I first analyse the role of a regulator’s preferences in pricing de­
cisions and check whether industries face higher electricity tariffs in states where the 
agricultural sector’s need for electricity is greater (i.e. where the Green Revolution 
is more prevalent). The evidence suggests that states with greater intensity in HYV 
are associated with industries paying significantly more for their network electric­
ity. I subsequently show that the probability of adopting a captive power generator is 
greater in states that charge industries more for their electricity and provide a more 
unreliable service (as measured by outages and network energy losses). In line with 
the model, I find evidence that the more protected the industry, the more likely the 
adoption of captive power is. Adopting firms are also on average bigger and more 
productive.
In Chapter 4 ,1 investigate the relationship between the Green Revolution, rural 
literacy and gender status using a panel of 254 Indian districts for the census years
7of 1961 (before the introduction of the new technology), 1971 and 1981. There is a 
general consensus that the benefits of the Green Revolution were more likely to be 
reaped by more prosperous and more educated households, and that returns to educa­
tion increased with the adoption of the new high yield varieties (HYV), as shown by 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996). However, many authors (see Dhanagare (1989), for 
example) argue that only relatively well-off farmers and large landowners benefited 
from this new technology while the many poor and small farmers, tenants or agricul­
tural labourers might have not experienced any benefits. The inequality associated 
with the technical change raises the concern as to whether the increased returns to 
education generated effects of any significance at the aggregate level. I am also in­
terested in the concern expressed by many authors (see Sridhar (2004) for a review) 
that the Green Revolution has worsened the status of women, because mechaniza­
tion has reduced the demand for women labour and their returns to education. To 
test the whether HYV adoption is associated with more rural literacy, I use a sim­
ilar identification strategy to Duflo (2001) and compare the change in literacy for 
rural cohorts that were in primary schooling age during the Green Revolution (ac­
cording to districts’ HYV intensity) with respect to the same cohort in 1961. I find 
that literacy has increased in all districts on average, but a district at the mean of the 
HYV adoption distribution would have produced an extra increase in rural literacy of 
around 2 percentage points per cohort. The identifying assumption is that there are 
no omitted time-varying district characteristics correlated with HYV adoption and
8rural literacy that would generate spurious results. To deal with this concern in the 
identification strategy I use two control groups, for which I find no effects: older rural 
cohorts to capture pre-Green Revolution trends in literacy and same cohorts in urban 
areas, to capture contemporaneous district-wide trends in literacy. Results are ro­
bust to the inclusion of channels other than HYV that could explain the divergence in 
literacy rates, such as migration, strong presence of population belonging to Sched­
uled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (groups recognized by the Constitution of India as 
previously disadvantaged), and state trends and state-wide investments in primary 
schools. Additionally, I show that there is an average increase in the literacy gender 
gap and a decrease in female labour participation in all of India. HYV intensity mit­
igates these effects, but it does not reverse them: female participation in the labour 
force, employment in the agricultural sector and literacy gap for treated cohorts fare 
better in districts with greater adoption of HYV seeds. These findings reconcile con­
flicting evidence in the literature regarding gender issues and the Green Revolution. 
I suggest that not taking into account the negative trend for all of rural India in fe­
male labour and educational outcomes might lead to misleading conclusions when 
analysing gender status in HYV-intensive districts.
9Chapter 2 
Electricity Provision and Industrial 
Development: Evidence from India
2.1 Introduction
The adequate supply of infrastructure goods is increasingly acknowledged as one key 
factor in generating a conducive environment for industrial and economic develop­
ment. The World Bank currently directs 35% of their lending portfolio to infrastruc­
ture projects with the idea that "infrastructure has a central role in the development 
agenda and is a major contributor to growth, poverty reduction and achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals" (World Bank (2005)). However, average 
expenditure on infrastructure for developing countries is only around 3% of GDP. 
Among developing countries, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa perform particu­
larly poorly in a range of infrastructure goods, such as water and sanitation, telecoms 
and electricity access. The latter, according to investment climate surveys, is one of 
the greatest obstacles to industrial development in India and the rest of southern Asia: 
around 43% of the population have access to the electricity network, compared to at 
least a 90% access in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia.
India’s poor infrastructure in general, and the power sector in particular, is seen 
as one of the reasons behind India’s slow export growth during the 1990s, limiting
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their comparative advantage in labour intensive products (World Bank (2000)). Pub­
lic agencies, economic journalists and sector analysts1 are among those who point to 
the electricity sector’s poor performance as heavily affecting the growth and devel­
opment possibilities of the Indian economy since independence, to the point that "the 
poor quality of electricity has been the single greatest deterrent to India’s economic 
growth and development" (US DoE (2003)). Yet the history of Indian electrification 
is not one of uniform failure. For example, around 10% of villages on average were 
electrified by 1965, with some states like Tamil Nadu close to 50% and others such 
as Assam or West Bengal less than 3%. In 1984, the average increased to over 75% 
and some states like Punjab achieved full village electrification.
I use this variation across regions and over time within India to investigate the 
effect of electricity provision on industrial development, by examining a panel of In­
dian states between 1965 and 1984. India’s federal political organization gives each 
state full responsibility for creating, expanding and administrating the electricity net­
work, from electricity generation to retail. This provides significant variation in the 
extent of the physical network and industrial outcomes, allowing me to test whether 
the gap in infrastructure provision is associated with unequal industrialization levels.
Assessing and quantifying the impact of investment in electrification on eco­
nomic outcomes in the long run is a difficult task, since it is hard to determine the 
underlying driving force. The resulting endogeneity concerns arise because of re­
1 For ex a m p le ,e lectr ic ity  is unusable for industry and of such poor quality that power surges 
wreck equipment." (The Economist, 22/9/2005). See also TERI (1999).
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verse causality and unobserved state characteristics-such as the business or political 
climate-that might explain why some states are better prepared to provide a better 
electricity network than others. In such cases, OLS estimates would be biased. To 
overcome this problem, my empirical strategy aims to find and use appropriate instru­
ments for the expansion of the electricity network in order to consistently estimate 
its impact on industrial development in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy. 
For this purpose, I use the start of the Green Revolution-an agricultural technology 
intensive in irrigation introduced in India in the mid 60s-as a natural experiment. 
The successful introduction of High Yield Variety (HYV) seeds was determined by 
geographical characteristics such as soil characteristics and groundwater availability, 
that allowed farmers to pump water so as to provide timely irrigation to the new seeds 
(see Foster and Rosenzweig (2008), for example). As electric pumpsets were used to 
provide cheap irrigation water, the uneven availability of groundwater across states 
was subsequently followed by an expansion of the electricity network. That means 
that I can link the time-varying effects of a time invariant characteristic (groundwater 
availability) to the expansion of the electricity network to address the endogeneity 
concerns that would bias OLS estimates. After testing for the power and validity 
of the instruments, I find that 2SLS estimates provide a more credible estimate than 
least squares for this empirical question. This paper contributes to the growing litera­
ture on infrastructure, reinforcing the idea that geographic characteristics can be used 
to explain differential investments in expensive infrastructure projects. For example,
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Duflo and Pande (2007) instrument dams placement in India using information on 
rivers’ gradients and Dinkelman (2008) instruments electrification in South Africa 
with land gradients. My strategy exploits the complementarity between groundwa­
ter and electrified pumpsets after the start of the Green Revolution to address the 
endogenous placement of rural electricity.
The main concern regarding my empirical strategy is that groundwater or HYV 
adoption could affect industrial outcomes through channels other than electrifica­
tion. For example, greater rural incomes can increase the demand for manufacturing 
goods2 or savings that translate into credit availability. An alternative story is that 
positive shocks to agricultural productivity release cheap labour to be employed in 
the manufacturing sector (see Matsuyama (1992)) where an urbanization process fol­
lows. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) show that returns to education increased with 
the Green Revolution and it could be the case that an increase in overall levels of hu­
man capital or state expenditure in development projects (such as health and educa­
tion) might be driving the uneven industrialization process rather than electrification. 
To see whether the time varying effect of groundwater availability could be linked to 
these alternative mechanisms, I reproduce the 2SLS specification, instrumenting for 
variables such as credit, expenditure, urbanization rates, literacy and development 
expenditure. For a series of different specifications, none of these channels shows
2 See for example VoigtlSnder and Voth (2006) where positive agricultural shocks are associated 
with increases in the share of expenditure in manufacturing goods if consumers have non-homothetic 
preferences.
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robust results, reducing the concerns that my strategy captures confounding effects. 
The electrification link remains the most powerful of all.
Another concern is that abundant groundwater can have a direct effect on in­
dustrialization, if firms require water for production. Using district level data within 
states, I show that there is no link between employment in the manufacturing sector 
and groundwater availability once power availability has been controlled for. I also 
deal with the concern that groundwater availability is spuriously correlated with elec­
trification and that a "lucky draw" in the groundwater measure is driving the results. 
I carry out a placebo experiment where I randomly assign values to my measure of 
groundwater availability and show that the probability that my results are driven by 
a lucky draw is very low (i.e. 0.4%). Results are robust to these alternative explana­
tions and suggest that a standard deviation difference in the reach of the grid explains 
between 10 and 15 percentage points difference in industrial output, in addition to 
more factories and greater output among smaller firms. Magnitudes are substantial 
and underline the potential economic benefits of investing in the expansion of the 
electricity network.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides some 
background of the electricity sector in India and its relation to the Green Revolution. 
Section 2.3 develops the empirical strategy where I identify the set of instruments and 
test their power and validity. Subsequently, I show results of the effect of electricity
14
indicators on manufacturing outcomes. Section 2.4 deals with alternative explana­
tions and Section 2.5 presents additional robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Electrification in India and the Green Revolution
The empirical contribution of this paper, i.e. to quantify the effect of electrification in 
industrial development, draws both from the organisation of the electricity sector in 
India and from the uneven introduction of an agricultural technology that increased 
the demand for powered irrigation. From a theoretical perspective, Murphy et al. 
(1989b) show that infrastructure can be an important component of a "big push" in­
dustrialization process. By overcoming coordination problems that arise because in­
frastructure goods are used by many sectors at the same time, the public provision of 
infrastructure contributes to the development of other markets, since it has the effect 
of reducing the total production costs of the other sectors. In particular, infrastruc­
ture can reduce costs in producing and marketing (i.e. transporting) goods. In this 
paper, by focusing on the provision of electricity, the reduction in production costs 
becomes the underlying mechanism that links infrastructure to industrialization. In 
general, electrification could lower prices and induce more consumption of manu­
facturing goods3. In a setting with heterogeneous firms, a selection effect might be
3 A look at the input-output coefficient matrix for industries in the early 1990s India shows that for 
many industries, such as heavy chemicals, cement or non-ferrous metal, electricity is more than 10% 
of their total costs and can be as high as 17% (Ministry of Industry, Government of India (1993)).
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present, wherein smaller and less productive firms can break even only when elec­
tricity is available.
With these mechanisms in mind, I investigate the effect of electricity infrastruc­
ture on industrial development, by looking at a panel of Indian states between 1965 
and 1984. The cross-state variation in electricity provision in India has been used to 
explain differences in productivity, return and investment rates (Dollar et al. (2002), 
(2003)), and divergence in growth rates and income levels (Bandyopadhyay (2003); 
Sachs et al. (2002)). To the best of my knowledge, mine is the first attempt to quantify 
the long run effects of electrification on industrialization by addressing the endogene­
ity of network expansion. The provision of electricity is analysed at the state level, 
since there is a constitutional arrangement in India that ensures state independence 
from the central government in designing electricity policies. The Indian Constitu­
tion establishes in a handful of articles the distribution of legislative powers between 
the Central Government and the States, specifying a concurrent list of activities where 
both levels of government have the power to intervene. These shared competencies 
include non-economic legislation (e.g., criminal law) and economic regulation (e.g., 
labour markets or price controls). The electricity sector falls in this last category. 
The Electricity Supply Act created in 1948 fully vertically integrated State Electric­
ity Boards (SEB), in charge of coordinating electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution and commercialization at the state level, whose Board members are ap­
pointed by the state government (Electricity Supply Act, Chapter III, 5.2).
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Figure 1 shows a correlation between changes in agricultural electrification 
and manufacturing output in the analysed period for 15 Indian states. Note that states 
where HYV seeds overtook traditional seeds (Punjab, Haryana and Tamil Nadu) are 
amongst the faster growing states and have experienced a larger expansion of their 
electricity network.
This correlation between Green Revolution and electrification is at the heart of 
the identification strategy. The Green Revolution followed persistent food shortages 
in newly independent India, where farming activity was mainly for subsistence, char­
acterized by the use of primitive techniques and was rainfed (Chakravarti (1972)). 
The Third Five Year Plan laid out by the Planning Commission, covering the years 
from 1961-2 to 1965-6, set ambitious taigets in terms of agricultural production: e.g. 
foodgrains should grow by 30%, other products like jute, by 55%, all in the belief 
that "with the achievement of these taigets, the economy will become self-sufficient 
in the supply of foodgrains". After the failure of some programmes such as the In­
tensive Agricultural District Programme (LADP) and the Intensive Agricultural Ar­
eas Programme (IAAP) in 1966-7 the introduction of the High Yielding Variety Seed 
Programme provided the expected breakthrough, by providing fanners with hybrid 
seeds scientifically adapted to India’s domestic conditions. The Green Revolution-in 
order to become a "revolution'-depended on a series of factors, especially the ad­
equate and timely supply of water. In 1961, only around 20% of the total cropped 
area was under some form of irrigation. In the following twenty years, the increase
17
in irrigated areas was more than 50%, with very uneven distribution across regions. 
In the period under consideration, Haryana and Punjab-states at the forefront of the 
Green Revolution-achieved a share of irrigated area around 60% and 90% respec­
tively, while other relatively rich states like Gujarat and West Bengal were around 
the 25% mark.
The nature and the depth of irrigation development constitutes the fundamen­
tal argument in my empirical strategy. Its expansion goes hand in hand with HYV 
seeds adoption, meaning that states that were trying harder to introduce the new tech­
nology were creating a demand for irrigation. Irrigation could be provided by using 
canals supplying water from a dam or reservoir or the installation of deep or shallow 
powered tubewells. Bharadway (1990) notes that "the rate of increase of irrigation 
by wells/tubewells was higher than that by canals, and accelerated remarkably during 
the period 1969-1980 when there was a spurt in private tubewells, especially in the 
late sixties". McGuirk and Mundlak (1991) emphasize this point further by show­
ing that in Punjab government-provided canal irrigation dominated only until 1968; 
afterwards, private wells and tanks became more important in terms of land cover­
age. As a matter of fact, this acceleration in the usage of tubewells is closely related 
to the availability of electricity in rural areas. As Bharadway explains, "a tubewell 
uses diesel or electricity operated pumps to lift the water (from the water table) and 
can manage greater depths and irrigate bigger commands (than dug wells.)" It has to 
be noted that electricity was the cheapest option for farmers: the National Commis­
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sion on Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of India (1976) estimated 
that operating diesel pumpsets was two times more expensive. As the efficient uti­
lization of the tubewells was conditional on electricity availability, states that were 
to deepen the Green Revolution had an incentive to expand their electricity network 
simultaneously. McGuirk and Mundlak show an example by mentioning that "from 
1965/6 to 1979/80, power generation in Punjab increased by over 240% and by 1976 
all villages had access to electricity. (...) The fastest-growing source of demand for 
electricity during this period was agriculture. A large part of this increase (from 
14.5% in 1960/1 to 47% in 1979/80 of the total available electricity) was as a source 
of power for the growing numbers of tubewells."
A natural question to ask is why farmers’ demand for electricity was satisfied in 
HYV intensive states. Two mechanisms could explain why farmers’ need of electric­
ity was satisfied by their state governments. The first one is linked to the preferences 
of the median voter. In the period analysed, rural population in any given state is 
at least 65% of total population, and almost 80% on average (topping 90% in three 
states), in a country that has been democratic and federal since its independence in 
1947. There is some evidence that voters in states intensive in HYV like Punjab, 
Haryana and Tamil Nadu moved away from the Congress Party and voted for re­
gional parties. However, the salience of other issues (e.g., religion) and the fact that 
incumbent parties could adapt their policies to the new needs of the rural population 
makes this case harder to support. A second mechanism is supported by anecdotal
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evidence: the endogenous formation of lobbies. The first circumstance that seems 
important to note is that "increasing food shortages and mounting concern for im­
mediate gain in production led to the shift in developmental priorities" (Sharma and 
Dak, (1989)), such that expanding the production possibilities in the agricultural sec­
tor was deemed fundamental. That circumstance gave formers, in particular big ones, 
an unprecedented political clout over state governments. Dhanagare (1989) estimates 
that "the prosperity unleashed by the Green Revolution was distributed differentially, 
putting the small and marginal fanners at a relative disadvantage. The high cost/high 
yield technology called for capital investments beyond the means of a majority of 
small and marginal farmers." It might be the case that a stronger economic position 
translated into political leverage. Tongia (2003), for example, stresses that rural elec­
trification "has swayed in strong political winds." Gulati and Narayanan (2003) also 
show that what they call "the subsidy syndrome in Indian agriculture" after the in­
troduction of the new seeds in the late 1960s became a fundamental instrument of 
economic policy where available electricity was one of its main channels. In the 
case of Punjab, Simms (1988) describes a situation in which "farmers are aware of 
the power they hold due to their strategic importance in the national economy (...) 
Political action has led to extensive changes in rural Indian Punjab".
Even though the importance of the political economy of infrastructure provi­
sion cannot be understated, this chapter does not enquire into its details. Rather, it 
relies on the identification of geographic characteristics, such as groundwater avail-
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ability, that facilitated the expansion of the electricity network with the start of the 
Green Revolution. I turn to this analysis in the next section.
2.3 Identification Strategy
The main objective of this paper is to quantify the effect of electricity provision on 
industrial outcomes using a panel of fifteen Indian states4 where consistent informa­
tion on the electricity network is available over the period 1965-1984. That is, by 
obtaining a consistent estimate of A in equation (2.1), where an indicator of indus­
trial performance (yst) is expressed as a function of an indicator of electricity supply
(& st)-
Vat — OiQs +  O iu  + Aest +  o t ^ X - s t  +  fiat (2.1)
The regression includes time varying state controls (X st), state fixed effects 
included to control for persistent and constant features within states, and year fixed 
effects to control for shocks common to all states. To control for serial correlation, 
standard errors are clustered at the state level5. The explained variable, yst, captures 
industrial development or performance per state and year. If infrastructure reduces
4 Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maha­
rashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
5 As pointed out by Wooldridge (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2004), clustering standard errors might 
not be appropriate when the number of states is not large enough. Results shown throughout are robust 
to a variety of standard error corrections (e.g. collapsing time series information, bootstrap or GMM 
methods to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.)
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costs or improves productivity, an increase in electricity availability should have a 
positive impact on manufacturing output and fixed capital per capita. Additionally, 
electrification could provide the boost that new or small firms need to survive. I can 
test this by using data on the number of factories and on the small sector (e.g. value 
added and fixed capital).
Different variables are represented by eat to capture the reach and network 
development in states’ electricity supply at a point in time. The total number of 
consumers per type (farmers and factories) connected to the network relative to the 
state population and the average connected load (i.e. the maximum electrical power 
consumption per user) measure the depth of the network.
To control for demographic features and human capital, I include the log of 
population density and the proportion of rural and literate population. In order to in­
vestigate whether the infrastructure variable is actually picking up the effect of more 
credit availability (thus allowing more manufacturing firms to start up), I control for 
financial development by including indicators such as the log of real per capita total 
credit. As noted by Laffont (2005), government inefficiencies and corruption in­
crease the marginal cost of raising funds and constrains the ability of the executive to 
invest in infrastructure. It follows that the indicators of electricity network develop­
ment might actually be capturing these political economy variables that could drive 
both dependent and independent variables. To address this concern, state controls 
include political party outcomes (party allegiance of the Chief Minister and votes
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for the Congress Party in parliamentary elections) and real per capita expenditure 
on development sectors such as health and education. The latter is not only aimed 
at capturing states’ investment in human capital, but also the ability and/or willing­
ness of the state government to enhance the economic environment. All variables and 
sources are described in Appendix 2.A.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 for all main variables used in the 
regression analysis. In particular, I focus on the number of agricultural units con­
nected to the network, manufacturing output, and the incidence of HYV at the state 
level. Table 1 shows that there is significant variation in all three, with high values 
of standard deviations relative to the mean and substantial differences between mini­
mum and maximum. Of particular interest is the number of agricultural connections 
to the electricity network, whose mean increases tenfold during the period analysed. 
Additionally, states show substantial variation in geographic characteristics and ini­
tial conditions, a fact that will be exploited in the next section.
In the estimation of the coefficient of interest, A, endogeneity is a major con­
cern for quantifying the effect of infrastructure on output. The presence of corre­
lation between the error term and the explanatory variable could be explained by 
reverse causality (e.g. more industrialized states can afford investments in expanding 
the electricity network) or omitted variables (e.g. unobserved changes in the insti­
tutional environment that drive both industrialization and electrification), and would 
introduce a bias to the estimation. At this point I am agnostic about the sign of the
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bias, since alternative stories could work in both directions. For example, phenomena 
such as a pro-business environment could explain a positive correlation with both the 
outcome and the explanatory variable, biasing the estimate upwards. Alternatively, 
the formation of a strong pro-rural electrification lobby clashing with urban indus­
trialists, for example, could explain a positive correlation with electrification and a 
negative correlation with industrialization, resulting in a negative bias.
The challenge is to find a set of instruments that can explain the differential 
pattern of investment in infrastructure that is not correlated with industrial output 
by other means. I aigue in this paper that the introduction of High Yielding Va­
rieties (HYV) in Indian agriculture in the mid-60s is at the root of the dissimilar 
development of the electricity network across states, without being related to con­
temporaneous or potential industrial development. HYV seeds needed reliable irri­
gation and access to electricity was a fundamental input for farmers to pump wa­
ter. Because some concerns about the endogeneity of HYV adoption remain, I will 
first investigate how geo-climatic characteristics and some initial conditions-such as 
groundwater availability and irrigation prior to the Green Revolution, respectively- 
have affected the diffusion of the new agricultural technology6. Subsequently, by 
exploiting the fact that states followed either a path of adoption of the new agri­
cultural technology-creating a demand for rural electricity, or a path of traditional 
farming without creating the need for expansion of the electricity network, I will ex­
6 A similar idea was already discussed by Evenson and McKinsey (1999) where the authors analyse 
the viability of HYV seeds as a function of the interaction between climatic and technological (e.g., 
infrastructure) variables.
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plore whether the proposed instruments satisfy the assumptions that validate the IV 
strategy. That is, I will investigate whether state specific characteristics leading to the 
uneven introduction of new seeds starting in 1966 is correlated with the development 
of the electricity network (i.e. power of the instruments) and whether this relation 
can be used to assess the differential impact in manufacturing outcomes (i.e. validity 
of the instruments). The underlying idea is that as the electricity network expanded 
to satisfy farmers’ needs, industrial producers have benefited.
2.3.1 Instruments
The adoption of HYV seeds in rural India has been subject to a number of studies. 
As noted by Sharma and Dak (1989) or Kohli and Sing (1997), among others, there 
are many institutional factors that may claim a share of responsibility in the adoption 
of this new technology. A list would include credit availability or price incentives (to 
buy the new seeds, fertilizers, pesticides or new machinery), land matters (titling, dis­
tribution and size) or human capital. The fact that these variables might be correlated 
with (or determined by) industrial output calls for an exogenous source of variation 
that explains HYV successful adoption. The answer lies in geographic and climatic 
characteristics.
In a paper analysing the importance of human capital, Foster and Rosenzweig 
(1996) point out that the technological change could be considered exogenous, given 
the fact that the innovation industries were different from the beneficiaries of the new
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seeds and that "a feature of the Green Revolution in India is that the ability to exploit 
the new seeds profitably was substantially different across India because of exoge­
nous differentials in local soil and weather conditions". On a similar note, Evenson 
and McKinsey (1999) show that climatic and soil conditions, when combined with 
basic investments in infrastructure, resulted in the diffusion of HYV seeds. In this 
section I further investigate these claims by looking at the evolution of HYV adop­
tion as a function of initial conditions, soil and climate characteristics (in particular, 
groundwater) and their interaction.
HYV adoption drivers: geography and initial characteristics
To investigate whether soil or climate characteristics can be linked to the adop­
tion of the new agricultural technology when the Green Revolution started in 1966,1 
run a regression of the following form:
1984
HYV,t =  p 0l +  p u +  £  ■yk( S ,* T k) +  5 X , t +  e,t (2.2)
fc=1966
where HYVat is the proportion of cultivated land with HYV seeds in state s at 
time t, Ss captures states’ time-invariant geographic characteristics, and Tk is a year 
dummy equal to 1 whenever k =  t. State controls, X at, are included to control for 
the above mentioned characteristics suspected to be correlated with the diffusion of 
HYV seeds, such as the proportion of literate population, the log of real per capita 
development expenditure, the log of real per capita credit availability and population 
density. Additionally, state and time fixed effects are included and errors are clustered
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at the state level to deal with serial correlation. The coefficients of interest in equation 
(2 .2 ) are 7 fc, where positive and significant values would indicate that states with 
more adequate S8 adopted a greater proportion of HYV seeds. Increasing values 
of 7 t would also indicate that the difference was growing over time. Intuitively, the 
appropriate characteristics for seeds to grow would trigger a path of divergence across 
states in HYV adoption.
Three different state characteristics are used for Sa: to account for the avail­
ability of abundant groundwater that could be obtained with electric pumpsets and 
used to provide timely and adequate irrigation, I use the proportion of districts at the 
state level that have an aquifer thicker than 150 metres. This measure is the most im­
portant for my empirical strategy, since groundwater availability has been the major 
source of electrified irrigation after the Green Revolution (see, for example, Foster 
and Rosenzweig, (2008)). Other geographic characteristics include the quality of the 
land, where I use the proportion of districts per state with a topsoil depth of at least 
3 metres. Finally, to account for aridness, I use the average annual rainfall at the 
state level. Sharma and Dak (1989) maintain that "HYV was directed towards areas 
that were irrigated and not areas that relied on rainfall. The rainfed areas comprising 
70% as against 30% of irrigated areas remained outside the fold of green revolution." 
That means that HYV was directed towards drier areas, leaving states with abundant 
rainfall to specialise (relatively) on rainfed crops.
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Sharma and Dak (1989) also claim t h a t t h e  new technology was tilted to­
wards areas with better quality lands, assured irrigation facilities and more developed 
infrastructure". Before the Green Revolution started, all agriculture was rainfed and 
farmers in drier states had to rely on irrigation, like canals or pumpsets. This initial 
"curse" that induced a state to look for alternative sources of water might explain why 
some states, who were better prepared to reliably irrigate their crops, ended up in­
troducing these new high-yielding but sensitive water-dependent seeds. Chakravarti 
(1972) notes that "farmers under HYV cannot afford to take chances with erratic 
rainfall, but 70% of the cropped area in India has rainfall too low or too unreliable to 
permit their use even during the main cropping season, and only 2 0 % of the area is ir­
rigated. Even where the annual rainfall is heavy, the available moisture is insufficient 
for crop production during winter and premonsoonic seasons. The HYV has been 
adopted mainly in areas with well developed irrigation facilities." To account for this 
interaction between geographic characteristics and initial levels of infrastructure, I 
also run a regression of the form:
1984
HYV,t =  /J0, + 0 l t +  E  7 u (S .* /C .59* rO  + 7 j(Sf. * T t )
fc=1966
+ 7 3 ( ^ s 59 * T*;) +  <5(Xa59 * Tfc) +  eat (2.3)
where ICa59 is a measure of infrastructure at least 5 years before the new seeds 
were introduced, captured by two variables: proportion of irrigated land and agricul­
tural electricity connections per capita, both measured in 1959. The main distinction
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in the specification of equations (2.2) and (2.3) is related to the introduction of state 
controls. In the latter case, as I am testing the effect of initial conditions such as 
irrigation, I am concerned that variation across states in the initial values of other 
characteristics are driving the results. For example, it might be the case that what 
mattered for HYV adoption was the initial level of human capital (e.g., literacy). In 
the former regression, I am focusing on time invariant characteristics, so I want to 
control for changes in potentially relevant variables. Also note that equation (2.3) 
also includes Ss and ICs59, implying that lower levels of interactions are included 
and results captured by vectors 7 2 and 7 3 . This means that values of j lk would 
now represent the marginal levels of adoption for states whose more appropriate ge­
ographical characteristics for HYV diffusion were complemented with better initial 
infrastructure.
The estimation of regression (2.2) provides point estimates of the yearly impact 
of groundwater availability on HYV adoption, as captured by the coefficients 7 t. Re­
sults are shown in Figure 2 for specifications with and without state controls. All
estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level and show that states with bet-
\
ter access to groundwater have become relatively more intensive in the use of HYV 
seeds7. Figure 2 also plots estimates for 7 U in equation (2.3), where I use die mea­
sure of groundwater availability interacted with initial levels of irrigation. A similar
result is obtained when using initial incidence of electricity in rural areas as a mea­
7 Unreported results show a similar pattern for the measure of soil quality and average rainfall, even 
though significance levels drop to 5%. For the latter, coefficients are negative, sustaining the previous 
point that arid areas attracted more HYV adoption.
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sure of initial conditions (unreported). The positive, significant and increasing coeffi­
cients show a maiginal effect for states that on top of having groundwater availability 
also had greater initial agricultural facilities. This is consistent with the idea that a 
combination of good geo-climatic conditions and investment in infrastructure fosters 
the adoption of technological change in the agricultural sector. Additionally, the in­
creasing gap over time suggests that initial characteristics triggered a self-reinforcing 
process of HYV seeds adoption.
Instruments power
The last section provided evidence that the depth in the diffusion of the Green 
Revolution can in part be attributed to geographic characteristics, in particular to the 
measure of groundwater availability. The empirical strategy here will exploit their 
role in the differential adoption and success of HYV seeds in Indian states as a shock 
to their decision to expand their electricity grid, exogenous to the needs or the per­
formance of their industrial sector. If the instrument is not perfectly uncorrelated 
with the error term, the consistency of the IV estimator relative to OLS hinges on the 
power of the instrument, i.e. on how important the correlation between the instru­
ments (namely, Sa *Tk and ICs59* Ss * Tk), and the instrumented variable, electricity 
provision (est), is8. To test the power of the instrument, I exploit the time dimen­
sion of the panel to test whether the timing at which some states have improved their 
electricity reach significantly coincides with the start of the Green Revolution.
8 Note that at this point I am only using variation of geographical characteristics and not of HYV 
adoption.
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A first specification looks only at the time dimension and tests whether there is 
a structural change in the provision of electricity with the start of the Green Revolu­
tion, using data on the electricity network that starts in 1950. To do this, I run
eJt =  Ah + A(i -  1950) +  $2(t -  1966) +  s , t (2.4)
where the estimated Qi and 62 provide information on whether the evolution 
of electricity provision before and after 1966, respectively, increases significantly. 
Additionally, I introduce a test of the power of the instruments by interacting them 
with the time terms as follows:
eb‘t =  ebt +  0i(t -  1950) * S. +  S2(t -  1966) * S. (2.5)
Additionally, I run (2.4) and (2.5) using state controls, available only from 
1958. Finally, to check whether there is first hand evidence of the instruments having 
explanatory power for the evolution of the variable of interest in the second stage-i.e. 
industrialization-I run similar reduced form regressions using the log of manufactur­
ing output per capita on the left hand side (available only after 1960). Even though 
the pre-Green Revolution period is very short, these regressions might provide valu­
able information on subsequent evolution, when states are divided along geographical 
characteristics linked to HYV adoption.
Table 2 shows results for six different specifications. In column (1), there is 
no apparent change in electrification between 1950 and 1966. A different pattern 
emerges after 1966, where the number of agricultural connections increases with
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time. Column (2) interacts the measure of groundwater availability with both pre and 
post Green Revolution time trends. Before 1966 there was no significant difference 
between states with high and low levels of groundwater availability, and neither coef­
ficient is statistically different from 0. After the Green Revolution started, however, 
both sets of states increased their number of agricultural connections to the electric­
ity network, even though the trend was considerably greater in magnitude for states 
with higher groundwater availability. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce these results 
when controlling for time-varying state characteristics. Column (4) suggests that in 
the build up to 1966 states with abundant groundwater were on a slightly positive 
trend of electrification, but then accelerated after 1966. Otherwise, coefficient mag­
nitudes remain similar to results in columns (1) and (2). When analysing changes in 
industrial output, columns (5) and (6) show interesting results. There is no apparent 
change before and after the Green Revolution when all states are put together, as in 
column (5). However, in column (6) it becomes apparent that the industrial output in 
states with thick aquifers was falling behind before 1966, but that this trend turned 
around with the Green Revolution. These results suggest that when states are divided 
along the dimension of characteristics adequate for HYV adoption, a wedge in both 
electrification and industrialization emerges, adding confidence to the suitability and 
power of the chosen instruments.
The second test consists of a difference-in-difference regression to see whether 
states with better characteristics Ss have observed a differential expansion of their
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electricity network after the Green Revolution started in 1966. The regression is of 
the form:
e st =  f io 3 +  /?li +  7 (S a  * f*66) +  £ s t (2.6)
where Pm is a dummy equal to 1 for all years after 1966. This regression pro­
vides a simple before-and-after analysis, without looking at time trends. As in the 
previous table, time-varying state controls (Xat) are included for specifications af­
ter 1958 only. A positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term Sa * Pm 
would mean that states whose characteristics are associated with greater HYV adop­
tion have also, on average, observed a greater expansion of their electricity network 
after 1966.
Additionally, a specification without fixed effects of the form
e st =  fis&s + PpPm +  l ( S 3 * P 36) +  est (2.7)
would add some relevant information to the picture of the electricity expansion 
across states. The coefficient (3a represents the difference across groups before the 
Green Revolution started. A result where the coefficient is not significantly differ­
ent from zero would suggest that electricity availability was not statistically different 
across states before the introduction of the new seeds. The coefficient (3P captures 
how states with relatively lower values of Sa performed after the start of die Green
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Revolution. A positive and significant coefficient would mean that these states sig­
nificantly expanded their network on average after 1966.
Results are shown in columns (1) to (4) in Table 3. In line with the idea that 
states with more abundant groundwater expanded their electricity reach more with 
the start of the Green Revolution, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms 
are all positive and significant. Magnitudes for electrification remain similar, even 
in the restricted sample with state controls. Results in columns (2) and (4) refer to 
equation (2.7), where state and time fixed effects are dropped and estimates of the 
coefficients for Sa and Ps can be obtained. Only the interaction term is positive and 
significantly different from 0 in both cases. Other results seem to lose significance 
once state controls are introduced. The insignificance of (3a suggests that the mean 
agricultural reach of the electricity network was not substantially different across 
states in the years before the Green Revolution. An insignificant J3P suggests that 
the mean agricultural connections to the grid for the states with lower values of Ss 
did not change after the Green Revolution, once other factors are controlled for. This 
result can probably be explained by the great variation across states without abundant 
groundwater (which drives up standard errors.)
To see whether this wedge in the evolution of electrification according to states’ 
geographical characteristics also holds for the second stage outcome, i.e. industrial­
ization, columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 show results for a difference in difference re­
gression where manufacturing output is the explained variable. In both cases, states
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with thick aquifers observed a differential increase in industrial output. It is also in­
teresting to see in column (6) that before the Green Revolution, these states were 
on average relatively less industrialized, as the negative coefficient on groundwater 
availability shows.
Finally, a third test consists in analysing whether the progress of the electricity 
network has shown a similar pattern of divergence as the one observed for the HYV 
adoption results in the previous section. To test for this, I follow a similar methodol­
ogy as in equations (2.2) and (2.3), but instead use the number of agricultural produc­
ers’ electricity connections per 1000 people as the explained variable, and the same 
measures of geographical characteristics (i.e. access to abundant groundwater) and 
initial conditions (i.e. irrigated area in 1958).
Figure 3 shows three different specifications, all using the measure of ground­
water availability. In the first one, I use the measure of electrification on the left hand 
side, starting in 1950, with state and year fixed effects but no state controls. In the 
second regression, the data start in 1958 and I include state controls. In the third, I 
interact groundwater availability with initial irrigation, including all lower levels of 
interactions. Results show that states with more suitable geographical characteristics 
have expanded the electricity reach in rural areas after the Green Revolution. Even 
though in two out of the three sets of results the divergence seems to start just before 
1966, coefficients are not significantly different from zero and the slope becomes 
steeper after 1966 only, suggesting an acceleration in electrification in states with
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abundant groundwater. Coefficients are significantly different from 0-at least at the 
5% level, but most at the 1% level-only after the start of the Green Revolution. These 
findings provide more evidence towards establishing a link between characteristics 
that determined the innovation process in the agricultural sector and the subsequent 
evolution of the electricity supply network.
This section has shown that the period following the introduction of HYV seeds 
in 1966 is contemporaneous with a divergence in the electricity supply across states, 
especially when states are divided along a measure of groundwater availability9. Ad­
ditionally, a similar pattern emerges for a set of reduced form regressions of the out­
come of interest-manufacturing output-on the same characteristics, supporting the 
identification strategy. The next section will build on these findings in a two-stage 
least square (2SLS) strategy to obtain an estimate of the impact of electrification on 
measures of industrial development.
2.3.2 OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Results
In this section I present OLS estimates of A in equation (2.1) and for the 2SLS spec­
ifications where est is replaced by eat =  f (S s * T )(and by eat =  f ( S a * IC5qs * T) 
when I include initial conditions). That is, I instrument the electricity indicator us­
ing the measure of groundwater availability that, interacted with year dummies, has 
shown explanatory power with respect to states’ divergence in both HYV diffusion
9 Indicators of rainfall and soil quality produce the same pattern of results throughout this section, 
even though they show lower power than the measure of groundwater availability.
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and electricity expansion. Additionally, since the adoption of HYV is the channel I 
claim is at work, I also instrument eat with eat =  f(H Y V at(Sa *T)), where HYVat is 
a generated instrument. Basically, I use the cross state variation in Sa interacted with 
year dummies to predict the value of HYVat, and use these state and time-varying 
predicted values (HYVst) as an instrument for the electricity indicator.
In results presented in Table 4 ,1 first look at the effect of electrification on the 
log of real manufacturing output per capita, by using the number of farms connected 
to the electricity network per 1000 people as the explanatory (and instrumented) vari­
able. Columns (1) and (2) show the OLS result with and without state controls (re­
spectively), and find a positive and significant correlation between electrification and 
industrialization. It is reassuring to find a positive and strongly significant correla­
tion between electrification and industrial output once other time-varying factors and 
state fixed effects are controlled for. However, there are reasons to interpret this re­
sult with extreme care. As mentioned before, a source of positive bias could be the 
presence of reverse causality or unobserved state characteristics, such as the busi­
ness environment, that are positively correlated with both industrial outputs and in­
frastructure provision. Sources of bias towards zero could be any unobserved process 
driving rural electrification positively, but at the expense of industrial producers (such 
as skewed electricity pricing policies) or the presence of attenuation bias because of 
measurement error in the electricity indicator (produced by illegal connections, theft 
of electricity, etc. that tend to be widespread in rural areas, see Tongia (2003)).
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Columns (3) to (7) show the key results in this chapter, where I use the time 
varying effects of groundwater availability as an instrument for electrification. In 
Columns (3) and (4) the number of agricultural electricity connections is instru­
mented by the interactions between year dummies and the measure of abundant 
groundwater availability, controlling for state-time-varying characteristics only for 
the latter specification. In both cases, the coefficients are positive and strongly sig­
nificant. What we learn from the different magnitudes of the estimates in columns
(3) and (4) is that the nature of the bias changes if we don’t control for state vari­
able characteristics. Column (5) uses the triple interaction, adding the proportion 
of net irrigated area before the Green Revolution, and again finds a significant posi­
tive coefficient, similar in magnitude to Column (4). Additionally, in columns (3) to 
(5), I can carry out over-identification tests of the instruments that pass with a great 
margin, with p-values above 90% in all cases. This suggests that instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the second stage. In 
column (6), the number of agricultural connections is instrumented with the net pro­
portion of area cropped with HYV seeds. There is a small drop in the magnitude and 
in the significance of the estimated coefficient. But HYV adoption might suffer from 
similar endogeneity problems that could bias the results. Column (7) uses the same 
instruments as Column (4) to predict the values of HYV adoption that I subsequently 
use as a generated instrument. Results are consistent with previous findings both in 
significance and magnitude. Across specifications estimated values of A are positive
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and significant at the 1% level when electrification is instrumented. In all cases, first 
stage F-tests pass comfortably at the 1% level, in line with results in the previous sec­
tion where I found a strong relationship between states’ time-invariant geographical 
characteristics, HYV adoption and subsequent expansion of the electricity network.
The estimates of A also suggest that the impact of electrification is substantial: 
an increase in one standard deviation in the number of rural connections implies 
an increase of around 13.5% in manufacturing output. It is important to note that, 
given the great variation in electricity provision across states, a state at the mean 
of the distribution would need to double its rural electrification to observe such an 
effect. For example, Bihar in 1984 had a real manufacturing output per capita of 
Rs 1206 and 2.64 farms connected to the network per 1000 people, while Haryana 
had Rs 2694 and 19.45 connections, respectively. If Haryana’s network depth was 
reproduced in Bihar, the model predicts that the gap in manufacturing output between 
these two states would be reduced by almost 75 percentage points10. Bihar’s network 
incidence covered barely 200,000 farms in 1984, and reaching Haryana’s level would 
imply taking the number of total agricultural connections to more than 1,200,000. 
Even though serving an additional million farming units would be very expensive, 
the potential expected benefit derived only from the increase in the industrial output
10 Haryana’s manufacturing output would be 1.5 times Bihar’s, rather than the observed factor of 
2.25.
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per year would be around 45 billion Rupees11. This would constitute an increase of 
around 7.8% of Bihar’s total product per year.
2.4 Alternative Explanations and Other Robustness 
Checks
The main concern with respect to the identification strategy at hand is related to 
the exclusion restriction. This means that if the measure of rural electrification is 
strongly correlated with other rural outcomes that are actually driving the industrial­
ization process, then the results obtained in the previous section would be spurious. 
In this section I will explore whether the variation used to identify the effect of elec­
trification can also be used to explain alternative channels for the observed diveigence 
in industrial development.
2.4.1 Would the same strategy work for alternative channels?
There are many stories in the literature as to why shocks to agricultural productiv­
ity would spill over to the manufacturing sector. Johnson (1997) points out that a 
rapid increase in agricultural productivity contributed to the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, by releasing (cheap) labour for the manufacturing sector and creating the 
agricultural surplus needed to feed the growing population. This aigument could be 
linked to a process of urbanization as the agricultural sector lays workers off. Mat­
11 This is obtained by multiplying the estimated increase in real manufacturing output per capita 
times total population in Bihar in 1984 (around 74 million people). The value is in 1974 Rupees.
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suyama (1992) formalizes these mechanisms in a model where both sectors compete 
for labour and where exogenous increases in agricultural productivity benefit the 
manufacturing sector. This mechanism works only in closed economies, since com­
parative advantages in the agricultural sector might deprive industries from labour in 
open economies. In that case, effects on industrialization could go either way12. Mur­
phy et al. (1989a) propose a mechanism wherein industrialization happens because 
positive shocks to agricultural productivity boost rural income and-subsequently- 
the demand for manufactures. This result hinges on two conditions: non-homothetic 
preferences, i.e. the share of expenditure on manufactures increases with income, 
and a fair distribution of benefits from increases in agricultural productivity to sus­
tain a sizeable demand13. There is also a likely credit mechanism at work whereby 
the increase in rural incomes affects saving rates in rural areas and, subsequently, 
credit availability. This would reduce the cost of setting up firms. Finally, the instru­
mental variable strategy might be picking up greater investment in schooling after the 
Green Revolution increased returns to education (see Foster and Rosenzweig (1996)) 
or greater expenditure on development projects by the state government
In short, the shock to agricultural productivity introduced by the Green Rev­
olution might have affected industrial outcomes in different ways. In all cases, the
12 India, being a very large federal country, could be thought as a collection of open economies. In 
that case, the mechanisms described by Matsuyama might be present.
13 See also VoigtlSnder and Voth (2006). This could undermine the argument when applied to In­
dia, since it is well documented (see for example, Dhanagare (1989)) that the Green Revolution has 
increased the rift between poor and rich fanners and, in some cases, has not even increased poor 
peasants’ real incomes.
41
instruments would be correlated with the error term in the baseline regression and the 
instrumental strategy would lose validity. It follows that if these alternative channels 
are operating, variables that determined the feasibility of HYV seeds (e.g., ground­
water availability) could also be used as instruments in a similar strategy to the one I 
used to identify X in equation (2.1). To this end, I mn OLS and 2SLS specifications 
as in Table 4 and check whether the same strategy could have been used to explain 
diveigence in industrial development through other means than electrification. In 
particular, I run a similar set of regressions to the ones presented in columns (2), (3),
(4) and (7) in Table 4, using-instead of the measure of electrification-measures of 
urbanization rates, changes in the demand for manufacturing goods, and changes in 
funds available to invest via credit, in literacy or in public expenditure in develop­
ment. I am interested in testing whether the estimates show the expected sign and 
similar levels of significance for the point estimates, the first stage F-tests and the 
over-identification tests. Table 5 summarises the results.
The main conclusion is that none of the alternative stories passes all tests. In 
particular, the p-values of over-identification tests are low in all cases and in many 
cases, results don’t even show the expected signs. It follows that doing a similar 
exercise with different variables would have given inconclusive results at best. For 
example, the log of rural expenditure is never significant, does not have the expected 
sign for some specifications, and over-id tests are not strong. The same holds for 
urbanization rates, rural non agricultural credit (and other unreported measures of
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credit) and literacy. The log of development expenditure is the one with more consis­
tent results, even though the over-identification tests show a p-value of less than 1% 
in all cases. These results increase the confidence that the variation used in the instru­
mental strategy works through the proposed channel and not through others. It is in 
that sense that the implication is not that the Green Revolution had no impact what­
soever on rural expenditure or on urbanisation rates. As a matter of feet, the opposite 
is true. When I look at the first stage of the 2SLS specification reported in Table 
5 where I instrument mean rural expenditure with "Generated HYV," controlling for 
state dummies, this produces a statistically insignificant coefficient for the measure of 
HYV, but significant differences for the mean levels captured by state dummies. For 
example, the mean rural expenditure per capita in Punjab and Haryana is between 2 
and 2.5 standard deviations greater than in Bihar, and the proportion of rural popula­
tion is between 5 and 11 percentage points lower. The importance of the information 
provided in Table 5 lies in ruling out alternative explanations to electrification in the 
empirical strategy. As mentioned before, these results are not suggestive that these 
other variables are unimportant or did not reflect differences across states, but simply 
that the variation used to instrument for the measure of electrification cannot be used 
to explain variation in urbanization rates, credit availability, literacy, state expendi­
ture in development or expenditure in rural households. The use of state fixed effects 
in all specifications means that I exploit within state variation, and only in the case of
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the electricity measure does the time-varying effect of groundwater availability have 
explanatory power for understanding states’ divergence in industrial development.
2.4.2 Do groundwater and HYV adoption have a direct effect on 
industrial outcomes?
The analysis presented so far looks only at variation within states across time. A 
good reason for focusing on states’ variation is that each state has its own electric­
ity network, run at the state level by the State Electricity Board. An implication of 
the story portrayed in this paper is that the expansion of the network aims at reach­
ing areas intensive in HYV seeds, but given the network characteristic of electricity 
provision, intensity in HYV is not necessary. For example, a district whose soil or 
climatic characteristics are not suitable for HYV seeds might still benefit from this 
process of electrification if surrounded by districts intensive in HYV seeds. If this 
is not the case, then my results on industrial output could be driven by a direct ef­
fect of HYV adoption and not by electrification. An alternative story with respect 
to the placement of the electricity network might be that what actually matters is 
groundwater availability and not HYV adoption or power availability, because rural 
industries use groundwater as a part of their production process. To test these alter­
native stories, I use district level data available from the World Bank’s "Agricultural 
and Climate Dataset," gathering information on agricultural outcomes, geographical 
characteristics and input availability for 271 districts across 13 Indian states from 
1956 to 1987. I matched these with census data at the district level on employment
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in the rural manufacturing sector for every 10 years from 1961 to 1991. The mea­
sure of groundwater availability is a dummy that equals 1 if the district has aquifers 
thicker than 150 metres and 0 otherwise.
To test whether rural electrification follows groundwater availability or the 
adoption of HYV seeds, I first run a difference-in-difference estimation for a cross 
section of districts in 1974, where I use a measure of rural power availability at the 
district level14 as the explained variable and the interaction between a measure of 
groundwater availability and adoption of HYV seeds. A setback to my story would 
be to find that power availability was not driven by the Green Revolution, but by 
the thickness of the watertable. Column (1) in Table 6 shows that this alternative 
explanation does not hold. The coefficient on groundwater availability is negative, 
suggesting that districts with thick watertable that were not intensive in HYV had 
on average less rural power. This undermines the argument that what mattered for 
the placement of electricity connections was water availability exclusively. Further­
more, the coefficient on HYV is positive, showing a positive correlation between 
HYV adoption and power in districts without a watertable thicker than 150 metres15. 
Finally, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive, significant and greater in 
magnitude than the estimates for each of the levels. This shows that districts adopting 
HYV and with thicker watertables were those with greater rural power availability.
14 Collected and published for one year only by the National Commission on Agriculture, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Irrigation of India
15 Of course, water can be obtained from shallower watertables.
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Overall, total effects of HYV adoption and groundwater are positive, as expected. 
This result provides evidence in favour of the link set out in my empirical strategy 
between Green Revolution and electrification.
In Column (4), I use census data on employment in rural manufacturing to test 
whether groundwater has a direct effect on the manufacturing sector or a differential 
effect for districts with more power. I interact power availability with the measure 
of groundwater. The coefficient on groundwater is negative and not significant, i.e. 
groundwater has no positive independent effect on manufacturing outcomes. Addi­
tionally, the coefficient on power availability is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, while the interaction term is positive but insignificant. This result supports the 
idea that what matters for the increase in rural manufacturing employment is electri­
fication, and not groundwater availability.
I use a similar procedure to test the channel going from electrification to in­
dustrial outcomes against the concern that increases in manufacturing employment 
are a direct result of HYV adoption. As previously mentioned, districts that have 
not intensively adopted HYV seeds might have benefited from accessing an elec­
tricity network that expanded to serve areas intensive in HYV. By interacting power 
availability with HYV adoption, the difference-in-difference estimation allows me 
to check whether rural manufacturing employment was linked to HYV adoption in 
areas with low power availability, to power availability in areas with low HYV adop­
tion or to the interaction of both. Column (2) in Table 6 finds that only the measure
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of electrification is positively and significantly correlated with the proportion of the 
rural population working in the manufacturing sector. The sign of HYV adoption is 
negative, even though not significant. This suggests that districts intensive in HYV 
with low levels of electrification have less people working in the manufacturing sec­
tor. The interaction term is positive, but insignificant. Column (3) uses a measure 
of the proportion of rural workers employed in the manufacturing sector. The three 
coefficients have the same signs but are now all significant. Again, HYV adoption 
without electrification was linked to less employment in the rural manufacturing sec­
tor. The interaction is positive, meaning that districts intensive in HYV and rural 
power had maiginally more manufacturing workers. Measured at the mean of the 
measure of power availability (i.e. 0.15), the overall effect of HYV remains nega­
tive. The overall effect of rural electrification in the proportion of rural workers is 
again positive and significant, irrespective of whether the district was intensive on 
HYV seeds or not. These results add confidence to the claim that rural electrification 
can be linked to an increase in the importance of the manufacturing sector. It also re­
duces concerns regarding the exclusion restriction by suggesting that HYV adoption 
affected outcomes in the rural manufacturing sector only by means of electrification.
2.4.3 Is the measure of groundwater a ’’lucky draw”? A placebo 
experiment.
Another concern might be that the time invariant measure of groundwater availability 
I use as an instrument fits the data spuriously. Even though there is enough evidence
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that groundwater availability was an important component of irrigation for newly in­
troduced seeds (through the use of electrified tubewells, see Sims (1988) or Foster 
and Rosenzweig (2008), for example), it might still be the case that the results are 
driven by a lucky draw. The question that I am asking here is "What are the chances 
that a random measure of groundwater passes all tests?" To test this hypothesis, I 
run 500 Monte Carlo simulations, in each case randomly assigning a value between 
0 and 1 to each state16. I use this value, interacted with year dummies, as an instru­
ment for electrification, replicating the main specification in Column (4), Table 4. I 
collect information on the sign and significance of the estimate, on the F-test and on 
the over-identification test. These tests provide information on whether random al­
locations of the measure of groundwater can systematically predict the divergence 
in electrification across states, have power to predict the second stage and pass the 
over-identification test.
Table 7 shows that out of the 500 simulations I ran, only 8% show positive and 
significant results for the second stage. Of those 40 cases, only half of the regressions 
show a powerful first stage F-test (20 cases, i.e. 4%). Finally, only 2 regressions out 
of the 500 also pass the over-identification test with p-values above 90%. This simu­
lation exercise shows that the probability of obtaining the results obtained in Column 
(4), Table 4 by a random draw are on the order of 0.4%. This low probability in­
creases the confidence that the econometric exercise is producing meaningful results.
16 Note that the measure of groundwater availability I use in the previous section is also between 0 
and 1.
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2.4.4 Other indicators of industrial development.
Table 8 shows results for other indicators of industrial development. Columns (1) and
(2) report results for measures of value-added and fixed capital per capita. In both 
cases, the instrumented measure of electrification is positive and significant. One 
concern related to the expansion of the manufacturing sector might be that Green 
Revolution states are only expanding the food industry after the surge in food pro­
duction. To check whether this is the case, I use a measure of manufacturing output in 
non-food industries for Columns (3) and (4), available only for the years 1980-1984. 
Column (3) reproduces the baseline 2SLS specification and finds a positive and sig­
nificant effect of electrification on production of non-food manufactures. In Column 
(4) I used only cross-state variation in groundwater availability as an instrument and 
also found a positive and significant effect.
The mechanism through which the expansion of the electricity network can 
affect industrialization is a simple one: better infrastructure can lower prices and in­
duce more consumption of manufacturing goods. An alternative story could be that 
of a selection effect in a setting with heterogeneous firms, where smaller and less 
productive firms can break even only when electricity is available. To check this, I 
test whether new factories open and smaller firms produce more with the expansion 
of the electricity network. I use information on the number of factories per capita and 
small manufacturing firms’ indicators as surveyed by the Annual Survey of Statistics
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and excluded from the Census Sector17. In Columns (5) and (6) in Table 6 ,1 test for 
the number of factories with two different sets of instruments, respectively: ground­
water availability interacted with year dummies and the triple interaction, including 
also the measure of initial irrigation. Results show that electrification is significantly 
associated with more factories. F-tests and over-identification tests pass. Magnitudes 
are of the same order as for total output: a one standard deviation difference in elec­
trification is associated with at least 15% more factories. Similar results are obtained 
in Columns (7) and (8), using a measure of value-added for small firms18. This pro­
vides evidence of the presence of a selection effect where smaller firms also benefit 
by the expansion of the electricity network.
2.4.5 Other instruments and measures of electrification.
The next step is to check whether other geographic characteristics associated with 
adoption of HYV seeds can be used as instruments. In Columns (1) and (2), Table 9, 
respectively, I use a measure of soil quality and aridness interacted with year dum­
mies as instruments. Results remain similar in magnitude to those in Table 4, even 
though significance, first stage F-tests and over-id tests are not as strong. This is not 
surprising since electrification is associated not just with soil and climatic character­
17 Small firms are those with less than 50 workers (and with more than 50 and less than 100 workers 
that do not use power).
18 Unreported specifications show the results hold for other measures of the small sector, such as 
fixed capital.
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istics compatible with HYV seeds, but mainly with the availability of groundwater 
that can be obtained through electrified tubewells.
In columns (3), (4) and (5) I use different indicators of electricity availability. 
I use the total connected load in Kw per million people (i.e., maximum power avail­
able), the number of factories connected to the network and the number of factories 
using low and medium voltage only, respectively. In all three cases, the pattern of 
results hold as do the power of tests and magnitudes: a change in one standard devi­
ation in the electricity indicator explains between 10% and 15% of the difference in 
manufacturing output.
2.4.6 Groundwater at the district level.
In this section, I check the robustness of the first stage using information at the district 
level to add confidence to the use of the Green Revolution as a natural experiment. 
In particular, I run a similar set of regressions as in Section 3.1 where the level of 
HYV adoption is explained by the interaction of groundwater availability and year 
dummies. Exploiting within district variation using district fixed effects, I use the 
following specification:
1984
H Y V d s t  =  P qda +  P i t  +  ^ 2  TiO^ ds * T k )  +  6 t X d s t  +  Cst (2.8)
fc=1966
As in the analysis for the state level, S ds is a measure of groundwater availabil­
ity (a dummy that equals 1 if the district has aquifers thicker than 150 metres and 0
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otherwise) I run (2.8) with and without district controls XdstX9. A third specification 
is introduced, where I replace the explained variable in equation (2.8) by a measure 
of pumpsets available per capita. As mentioned before, there is no information on 
availability of electricity at the district level, but the anecdotal evidence suggests a 
shift from diesel to electrified pumpsets after the start of the Green Revolution (see 
for example, Bharadway (1990) or McGuirk and Mundlak (1991)).
Figure 4 plots the estimated 7 t for the three specifications. As shown for the 
state level regressions, districts with greater groundwater abundance are associated 
with a greater and increasing proportion of adoption of HYV seeds and more irriga­
tion pumpsets. Estimates for the interaction terms are positive, significantly different 
from 0 only after the Green Revolution and increasing, meaning that there is a pos­
itive marginal effect for districts with more groundwater. This set of results is con­
sistent with the findings at the state level and provides more evidence validating the 
choice of instruments.
2.5 Conclusion
The role that infrastructure provision plays in improving economic and social out­
comes in developing countries is part of the conventional wisdom among academics, 
policy makers and the population at large. Despite this consensus, the academic lit­
19 Time varying controls at the district level include literacy, population density, proportion of rural 
population, bullocks and tractors per hectare. District fixed effects are also included and standard 
errors are clustered at the district level.
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erature has not provided a substantial amount of empirical investigations aimed at 
understanding and quantifying the effects of infrastructure provision. The challenge 
of this paper is to quantify the effect of electrification in industrial output by look­
ing at a panel of Indian states from 1965-1984. To do so, I address the endogenous 
placement of infrastructure by looking at the time-varying effect of time-invariant 
geographic characteristics on electrification after the start of the Green Revolution in 
India. The need for timely irrigation that could be cheaply supplied by pumping wa­
ter from the water table using electrified pumpsets generated a growing demand for 
electricity and subsequent expansion of the electricity grid in some states. The mag­
nitude of the results suggests that expanding the electricity network-including rural 
areas-should be considered seriously as a policy option for promoting industrial de­
velopment. Two-stage least squares estimations show that between 10 and 15% of 
the differential level in manufacturing output can be explained by the extension of 
electricity provision across Indian states. The expansion of the network also helped 
the entry and performance of smaller firms. These results are robust to a series of 
tests regarding the power and validity of the instruments. The findings of this chap­
ter support the idea that the lack of infrastructure is a major constraint on economic 
activity in developing countries, including countries with large rural populations.
2.A Appendix A: Variables and Sources
Electricity indicators: All electricity indicators are taken from "Public Electricity 
Supply - All India Statistics," published annually by the Central Electricity Authority 
between 1950 and 1985. "Agricultural Connections" is the number of agricultural 
units connected to the electricity network per 1000 people. "Connected Load" is 
the maximum consumption available per consumer, measured in KW per million 
people. "Industrial Connections" is the quantity of industrial users connected to the 
network per 1000 people. "Low voltage" refers to industrial users with connection 
with voltage below 33 kV.
Manufacturing outcomes: Data for industrial development and performance 
indicators are taken from different publications from the Department of Statistics, 
Ministry of Planning, Government of India. Manufacturing output comes from "Es­
timates of State Domestic Product" and measures of the stock of fixed capital, value 
added, investment and number of factories come from "Annual Survey of Industries" 
and were gathered by the EOPP Indian States Data, STICERD, LSE.
Agricultural variables: "HYV" is the net proportion of area cropped with 
HYV seeds. "Groundwater" is the proportion of districts per state with aquifers 
thicker than 150 mts.'Topsoil" is the proportion of districts per state with topsoil 
deeper than 3 mts. "Rainfall" is the monthly average rainfall measured for 1958-60. 
Data on soil characteristics and cropped area under HYV seeds come from the "In­
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dia Agriculture and Climate Dataset", compiled by Sanghi, Kumar, McKinsey, Jr. 
(1998).
Controls: Population density, proportion of literate population, and proportion 
of rural population, mean rural expenditure and price indices used to deflate variables 
are taken from "A Database on Poverty and Growth in India," prepared by Ozler, Datt 
and Ravallion (1996). Data on credit come from "Statistical Tables relating to Banks 
in India," Reserve Bank of India. Data on expenditure on health, education and 
development come from a Ministry of Finance, Government of India publication: 
"Public Finance Statistics." Political outcomes per state were compiled by Butler, 
Lahiri and Roy in their "India Decides: Elections 1952-1995." All data are available 
from the EOPP Indian States Data, STICERD, LSE.
District level data: The measure of power availability in rural areas is in horses 
per hectare and comes from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of India (1976), 
Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, Volume X; Measures of rural 
manufacturing outcomes are taken from the Indian Census for 1961, 1971,1981 and 
1991.
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Figure 1: Changes in Rural Electrification (measured by agricultural connections per 
1000 people) and Per Capita Manufacturing Output Growth Between 1966 and 1984.
Note that rates of HYV adoption were highest in Punjab, Haryana and Tamil Nadu.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Agricultural Connections (per 4.04 5.18 0 23.24
1000 people)
HYV adoption (%, from 1966) 0.23 0.17 0 0.92
Log Manufacturing Output 7.00 0.55 5.98 8.30
per capita
Geographic Variables
Abundant Groundwater (% of 0.11 0.19 0 0.6
Districts)
Top Soil (% of Districts) 0.48 0.35 0 1
Average Rainfall (mm, annual) 292.5 137.4 66.3 557.7
Initial Conditions (year 1960)
Irrigated Area (%) 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.54
Agricultural Connections (per 0.46 0.89 0 3.54
1000 people)
Controls
Population Density 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.68
Literate Population (%) 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.82
Log Total Credit per capita 4.70 0.98 2.49 6.76
Congress Party Vote (%) 39.72 10.78 8.8 56.3
Log Development Expenditure -6.16 0.76 -8.05 -4.62
per capita
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Figure 2: Drivers o f HYV. Plot o f estimated coefficients r! t : Diffusion of HYV as a function of groundwater availability (with and
without state controls) and its interaction with initial irrigation.
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Figure 3: Instruments Power. Plot o f estimated coefficients 7 t for agricultural electricity connections as a function of groundwater 
availability (with and without state controls) interacted with year dummies. Also includes results when interacted with initial irrigation. The
vertical line denotes the start o f the Green Revolution
Table 2: Rural Electrification and Manufacturing Output Time Trends
m m m m________in_______isi
Agricultural Connections Log Manufacturing Output
Data from 1950 1950 1958 1958 1960 1960
Year-1950
-0.018
(0.012)
-0.01
(0.01)
Year-1958
0.05
(.05)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.06
(0.09)
0.014
(0.007)*
Year-1966
0.46
(0.10)***
0.34
(0.09)***
0.47
(0.10)***
0.47
(0.09)***
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.006
(0.013)
Groundwater * (Year-1950)
-0.07
(0.09)
Groundwater * (Year-1958)
0.39
(0.19)*
-0.09
(0.02)***
Groundwater * (Year-1966)
1.28
(0.20)***
1.09
(0.13)***
0.03
(0.01)**
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
State Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 405 405 375 375
Adjusted R-sq 0.70 0.81 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93
Robust s tandard  errors in parentheses, clustered a t the sta te  leveL * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t 1%. "Agricultural Connections" is 
the number of agricultural units connected to  the electricity network per 1000 people (data: 1950-1984). "Log M anufacturing O utpu t" is the log of real per capita 
manufacturing ou tpu t (data:1960-1984). "Year-T" is equal to  the number of years after T  (until 1966, unless T=1966). "G roundwater" is the proportion of 
d istricts per s ta te  w ith aquifers thicker than  150 mts. "Topsoil" is the proportion of districts per s ta te  w ith topsoil thicker than  3 mts. Controls are: population 
density, literacy, log of to tal credit pc, log of development expenditure pc, Congress P arty  vote, party  of the Chief Minister.
Table 3: Rural Electrification and Manufacturing Output After the Start of the Green Revolution for States
with More Available Groundwater
ILL M . M . i l l i£L M .
Agricultural Connections Log Manufacturing Output
Data from 1950 1950 1958 1958 1960 1960
Groundwater * Post 66 13.06
(2.41)***
13.06
(2.30)***
11.12
(1.53)***
11.75
(4.30)**
0.77
(0.19)***
0.83
(0.25)***
Groundwater 0.55
(0.21)*
0.48
(4.26)
-0.80
(0.36)**
Post 66
3.55
(1.01)***
0.13
(1.05)
-0.13
(0.08)
State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
State Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 405 405 375 375
Adjusted R-sq 0.77 0.41 0.90 0.67 0.93 0.80
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. "Agricultural 
Connections" is the number of agricultural units connected to the electricity network per 1000 people (data: 1950-1984). "Log Manufacturing Output" 
is the log of real per capita manufacturing output (data:1960-1984). "Post 66" is a dummy equal to 1 for all years from 1966. "Groundwater" is the 
proportion of districts per state with aquifers thicker than 150 mts. "Topsoil" is the proportion of districts per state with topsoil thicker than 3 mts. 
Controls are: population density, literacy, log of total credit pc, log of development expenditure pc, Congress Party vote, party of the Chief Minister.
Table 4: OLS and 2SLS
ilL (2) (3)
Agricultural Connections
Instruments
State Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 
S ta te  Controls
Observations 
Over-id P-value 
First Stage F-Test P-value
(4)
Log Manufacturing Output
J5L (6 ) (7)
O L S 2 S L S
0.029 0.026 0.037 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.028
(0.010)** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)** (0.006)***
n/a n/a Groundwater Groundwater *
Groundwater *
HYV Generated* Year Year Initial Irrigation * Year HYV
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
300 300 300 300 300 300 300
n /a n /a 0.99 0.97 0.94 n /a n /a
n /» n /« <1% <1% <1% <1% <1%
Robust standard errors in  parentbeses, clustered a t the state  level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 6%; • • •  significant a t 1%. "Agricultural Connections" is the  number of agricultural units connected to  the 
electricity network per 1000 people. "Log Manufacturing O utput" is the log of real per capita manufacturing output. "Groundwater" is the proportion of districts per state  with aquifers thicker than  150 mts. "Initi 
Irrigation" is th e  proportion of ao p p e d  area irrigated in  1950. "HYV" is the net proportion of area o opped with HYV seeds. "Generated HYV" is the predicted value of HYV on Groundwater * Year, used as a 
generated instrument. Controls are: population density, literacy, log o f to tal a e d it  pc, log o f development expenditure pc. Congress Party  vote. The First Stage F-Test is a  tes t o f the power of the instruments, 
sustained when null is rejected (low P-vslue). Over-identification tests instruments validity, where not rejecting the null (high P-value) suggests th a t instruments are correctly excluded and unoorreiated with the 
error. All data are from 1966 to  1984.
Table 5: Test for Alternative Explanations
Specification Test AgriculturalConnections
Log M ean Rural 
Expenditure
Proportion of 
Urban Population
Rural Non 
A gricultural C redit Literacy
Log Development 
Expenditure
OLS Significance (at 1% level)
*
Expected sign * * * =1=
Significance (a t 1% level) * * * *
2SLS (no state controls) Expected sign
* * * *
using Groundwater * Year F -test (p-value <1%) * * *
Over-id (p-value >  90%) * *
Significance (at 1% level) * * *
2SLS (with state controls) Expected sign * * * * *
using Groundwater * Year F -test (p-value <1%) * * * *
Over-id (p-value >  90%) *
2SLS (with state controls) Significance (a t 1% level)
*
♦ ♦ 3k
using Generated HYV Expected sign
F -test (p-value <1%) * *
■ * " when the specification in the first column pasted the test in the second Agricultural Connections is the nrnnW  of agricultural units connected to  the electricity network per 1000 people. "Log mean rural expenditure" is a 
measure of real expenditure per capita in rural households, "Rural non agricultural credit" a measure of real per capita credit in rural areas not used in agriculture and "Log development expenditure" is the log of real per capita 
expenditure by the state government in health, education and other development projects. " Literacy" and * Urban population" axe proportions of total population The First Stage F-Test is a test of the power of the instruments, 
sustained when null is rejected (low P-value). Over-identification tests instruments validity, where not rejecting the null (high P-value) suggests that instruments are correctly excluded and uncarrelated with the ecrar.
Table 6: District Level Data - Do Groundwater and HYV Have a Direct Effect on Industrial Outcomes?
Groundwater
Groundwater * HYV
HYV
Power Availability
Power Availability * HYV
Power Availability * 
Groundwater
Observations 
_______Adjusted R-sq_______
 ill____
Power
Availability
J 2 ] ______________________________(3)___________________________ (4]_
Rural Manufacturing Workers
% Rural Population % Rural Workers % Rural Population
-0.25
(.066)***
1.27
(0.26)***
0.52
(0.13)***
271
0.40
0.06
(0.09)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.0024
(0 .001)***
0.003
(0 .002)
763
0.58
-0.013
(0.007)*
0.005
(0.002)**
0.015
(0.007)**
763
0.62
-0.06
(0.11)
0.003
(0.001)***
0.002
(0.0015)
763
0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * significant a t 10%; * *  significant a t 5%; * * *  significant a t 1%. "Power availability” is a measure, in horses per 
hectare, of power in rural areas. "Groundwater” is a  dummy equal to 1 if the district has aquifers thicker than 150 mts. "HYV” is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV 
seeds. Controls are: population density, literacy, roads and bullock per hectare. Column (1) uses data for 1974. Columns (2) and (3) use Census data for 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991.
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Table 7: A Placebo Experiment
0. . ,. Cases (% out of 500Simulation .... \repetitions]
Significance (at 1% level) and .A
«  Expected Sign 40 <8%>
(2) (1) +  F-test (p-value <1%) 20 (4%)
/o\ (2) +  Over-identification test 0 ,n
(3) (p-value > 90%) 2 (0’4%)
I run 500 Monte Carlo simulations where in each case I randomly assign a value between 0 
and 1 to each state. I use this value, interacted with year dummies, as an instrument for 
electrification, replicating the main specification in Column (4), Table 4. Proportions shown 
in parentheses.
Table 8: Robustness Checks - Alternative Industrial Outcomes, No-Food Industries, Factories and Small Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (61 (7) (8)
V alue A dded Fixed C ap ital
Log M anufactu ring  O u tp u t 
(No food industries)
Factories V alue A dded-Small Sector
V alue A dded  - 
Small Sector
2SLS 2SLS
Agricultural Connect ions 0.028
(0.006)***
0.09
(0.02)***
0.08
(0.03)**
0.03
(0.01)**
0.003
(0.001)**
0.005
(0.001)***
0.014
(0.004)***
0.014
(0.002)***
Instruments Groundwater * Year
Groundwater * 
Year
Groundwater * 
Year Groundwater
Groundwater * 
Year
Groundwater * 
Initial Irrigation* 
Year
Groundwater * 
Year
Groundwater * Initial 
Irrigation* Year
S tate Fixed Effects 
Year Fixed Effects 
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations 
Over-id P-value 
F irst Staee F-Test P-value
300
0.23
<1%
300
0.97
<1%
75
0.97
2%
75
n /a
< 1 %
300
0.80
< 1%
300
0.96
<1%
300
0.69
<1%
300
0.92
<1%
Robust standard erron in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t  1%. “Fixed Capital* and *Valne Added1 are per capita for the manufacturing sector 'Log Manufacturing Output 
("No food industries' is available only for 1980-1984 and excludes all manufacturing output in food processing industries 'Agricultural Connections' is the number of agricultural units connected to  the electricity 
network per 1000 people 'G roundw ater' is the proportion of districts per state with aquifers thicker than 160 mts All outcome variables are in real terms and per capita 'Small sector' are factories with less than  60 
workers using power or more than 60 and leas than  100 workers without power. Controls are population density, literacy, log of to tal credit pc, log of development expenditure pc. Congress Party  vote, party  of the 
Chief Minister. The First Stage F-Test is a  test of the power of the instruments, sustained when null is rejected (low P-value) Over-identification tests instruments validity, where not rejecting the null (high P-value) 
suggests th a t instruments are ccrrectly excluded and uncoaelated with the error.
66
Table 9: Robustness Checks - Alternative Instruments and Measures of Electrification
Agricultural
Connections
i l l J2L M.
Log Manufacturing Output
ilL
2SLS
0.025
(0.013)**
0.035
(0.017)**
J5]_
Connected Load 0.002
(0.0006)***
Industrial
Connections
0.18
(0.07)***
Industrial Connections - 
Low Voltage
0.23
(0.07)***
Instruments Topsoil * Year Rainfall * Year Groundwater * Groundwater * GroundwaterYear Year Year
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 300 300 300 300 300
Over-id P-value 0.36 0.71 0.78 0.89 0.89
First Stage F-Test P-value 4% 4% <1% <1% <1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * significant a t 10%; ** a t 5%; *** a t 1%. "Agricultural Connections" is 
the number of agricultural units connected to the electricity network per 1000 people. "Log Manufacturing Output" is the log of real per 
capita manufacturing output. "Groundwater" is the proportion of districts per state with aquifers thicker than 160 mts."Topsoil" is the 
proportion of districts per state with topsoil depeer than 3 mts. "Rainfall" is monthly average rainfall measured for 1958-60. "Connected 
Load" is measured in KW per million people. "Industrial Connections" is measured per 1000 people. "Low voltage" is less than 33 kV. 
Controls are: population density, literacy, log of total credit pc, log of development expenditure pc, Congress Party vote, party of the Chief 
Minister. The First Stage F-Test tests instruments power, sustained when null is rejected (low P-value). Over-identification tests instruments 
validity, where not rejecting the null (high P-value) suggests that instruments are correctly excluded and uncorrelated with the error. AU data 
are from 1965-1984.
HYV Adoption and Electricity  
(Indian Districts)
Groundwater*Year (District controls) Groundwater'Year (No controls) Pumpsets per capita (x 100)
0.99 Solid block when estimated coefficient is 
significantly different from 0 at 1% level0.89
0.79
0.69
0.59
0.49
0.39
0.29
0.19
0.09
■tfr
- 0.01
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984
Year
Figure 4: Drivers of HYV and Pumpsets at the District Level. Plot of estimated coefficients 7 t : Diffusion of HYV and irrigation
pumpsets as a function o f groundwater availability.
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Chapter 3 
Coping with Bad Infrastructure: Adoption 
of Captive Power Generators Among 
Indian Firms
3.1 Introduction
The lack of adequate infrastructure is one of the main challenges that firms in devel­
oping countries face on a daily basis. Infrastructure costs for firms in the developing 
world can be up to four times higher than they are in OECD countries, making in­
frastructure one of the main concerns for entrepreneurs (Gonzalez et al. (2007)). In 
many cases, bad infrastructure stems from countries’ financial inability to invest in 
infrastructure (e.g. because of the stress or inefficiency of the tax system), but in oth­
ers, it is the consequence of direct institutional failures such as weak governance, 
lack of capacity or poor regulation (Laffont (2005), World Bank (2006)). However, 
problems associated with high tariffs and poor quality in infrastructure can be miti­
gated if firms have access to outside options for the public provision of infrastructure 
goods. In the case of electricity, in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia- 
where only 1 in 4 people and 2 in 5, respectively, have access to electricity from the 
network-firms turn to the installation of captive power generators. For example, in 
a survey of manufacturing firms in India in 2002, almost 30% of firms reported that
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the state of the electricity network was a major or a very severe obstacle for business 
and 64% owned an electricity generator. In Pakistan, firms reported 40% and 42% 
to the same questions, respectively. In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 41% and 71%, re­
spectively, reported that electricity was a major or very severe obstacle and, in both 
cases, the adoption rate exceeded 70% (Asian Development Bank (2002)). Arnold et 
al.(2008) show data from a similar survey for firms in Sub-Saharan Africa: in Kenya, 
71% of firms in the sample owned a generator; in Tanzania, 55% and almost 40% in 
Uganda and Zambia. In all countries, the average score for electricity as an obstacle 
was between "moderate" and "major".
This set of stylized facts suggests that, at least in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the inadequate provision of electricity hinders the development of the man­
ufacturing sector and that some firms can find alternative arrangements to deal with 
the problem, but some cannot. It follows that if firms that adopt captive power co­
exist with firms that do not, then this must somehow affect the configuration of an 
industry (i.e. who survives, distribution of profits, etc.) In this chapter I investigate 
these questions by analysing the underlying determinants of captive power adoption 
by firms and their effects on industry outcomes. To that end, I develop a model that 
links the regulatory process in the upstream (e.g. electricity provision) to firms’ be­
haviour in the downstream and the resulting industry equilibrium. I subsequently use 
data from firms in India to analyse their decision to set up a captive power genera­
tor to deal with inadequate provision and pricing schemes in the electricity sector. I
70
am interested in identifying not just which firms adopt a generator to back up their 
network provision but also in looking at how this phenomenon affects industry-wide 
outcomes. Furthermore, I provide some insight into the nature of different regulatory 
outcomes, by using the institutional features of the electricity sector in India, where 
each state controls the supply and decides on the pricing schedule.
Pricing schemes in Indian states are generally biased towards agricultural and 
domestic consumers, who enjoy below cost or even free energy, while the indus­
trial sector has to contend with high tariffs and unreliable supply. These regula­
tory practices have a political economy component (e.g. an agricultural voting base 
gives power to pro-agricultural political parties) and a socioeconomic component 
(e.g. keeping agricultural inputs cheap so agricultural and food prices remain low). 
They may also generate a vicious circle in which the agricultural sector, because of its
importance, controls the political lever lobbying for subsidies that affect a manufac-
(
turing sector which remains politically and economically restrained. To account for 
this asymmetry in lobbying power, I build on the analysis of the regulatory process in 
the baseline model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch. 2). The authors show 
that under the standard assumption that the regulator collects the money and makes 
transfers to the producer, optimal pricing is above marginal and below monopolis­
tic price, because transfers to the supplier can only be done at a positive cost. The 
key idea is that because transferring funds from taxpayers is socially costly, society 
is better off by allowing the regulated monopoly to charge above marginal cost, thus
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reducing the need for transfers. In this setting, I complement this model by introduc­
ing a measure of the power of lobbies in the regulator’s objective function: the price 
set will depend on the relative importance the regulator gives to the welfare of the in­
dustrial sector, the consumer of the monopolistically supplied good. Intuitively, with 
zero transfer costs, if the regulator cares fully about consumers’ well being, then the 
weight given to the consumer surplus in a utilitarian social welfare function would be 
highest and the price should be set equal to the maiginal cost. Conversely, if the regu­
lator does not care about consumers, then the price would be set at the unconstrained 
monopolistic price. Intermediate values of the pro-consumer preference would imply 
a price somewhere in between.
I analyse how regulatory outcomes affect the behaviour of firms that have ac­
cess to an electricity-cost-reducing device (such as captive power generators) in a 
setting where consumers have a taste for variety and firms are heterogeneous, as in 
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al.(2006). I am interested in characterising firms that 
adopt this technology and how changes in the environment (such as trade protection 
and licensing schemes) affect industry and firm outcomes. In particular, the model 
shows that adoption of captive power follows higher electricity prices and lower qual­
ity and is more prevalent in environments that are shielded from competition. This 
provides an interesting finding that links infrastructure regulation with the process 
of market deregulation. Since it is easier for firms to recoup the cost of setting up a
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captive generator in a more protected environment, the outside option (e.g. a captive 
generator) becomes less feasible when the sector is subject to more competition.
From the model, I derive a set of predictions that are tested using a repeated 
cross-section of manufacturing factories in India for the years 1990, 1994 and 1997. 
The data are merged with information on regulatory outcomes at the state level (such 
as prices for industrial consumers and indicators of quality) and at the industry level 
(such as protection from trade or barriers to entry, i.e. licenses). By looking at data 
from State Electricity Boards (SEB) I find that industries have to pay relatively more 
for their electricity in states where farmers use an electricity-intensive technology, 
providing evidence for the political economy mechanism of the regulatory process 
described above. Other results confirm that the mechanisms related to firm and in­
dustry outcomes described in the model are at work, such as the link between indus­
try regulation (e.g. licensing schemes and trade tariffs), and firms’ adoption, survival 
and productivity. I also find evidence that the regulatory process has heterogeneous 
effects along dimensions such as location, with rural and urban firms reacting more 
to high electricity tariffs and metropolitan firms reacting to low quality and reliabil­
ity in the electricity provision. Overall, results suggest that an industry’s equilibrium 
after a process of opening to foreign competition and deregulation varies according 
to quality and pricing policies in the provision of infrastructure goods.
This investigation adds to the literature on the impact of regulation of the in­
dustrial sector in developing countries by bringing together the regulatory process
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in the provision of an infrastructure good and the economic environment that de­
termines firm’s behaviour and industries’ performance. Others have looked at price 
formation in input markets and industrial outcomes. Besley and Burgess (2004), for 
example, analyse the drivers of labour regulation in Indian states and the effects of 
pro-labour regulation on investment and productivity. Aghion et al. (2007) find that 
pro-labour regulation has a negative effect on industrial outcomes when sectors are 
delicensed. From an infrastructure perspective, Dollar et al. (2003) analyse the "in­
vestment climate" by using indicators of performance of telecoms, electricity and 
banking sectors as perceived by firms and find that firms are affected more by inade­
quate or badly regulated infrastructure than by higher corruption or poor governance. 
In particular, they find that the performance of the electricity sector (as measured 
by power outages) takes the higher toll in terms of productivity and profitability. 
Arnold et al. (2008) show that total factor productivity in manufacturing industries is 
positively correlated with generator ownership and negatively correlated with power 
outages for eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a similar vein, but with dif­
ferent emphasis, and concentrating specifically on regulatory issues in developing 
countries, a recent strand in the regulation literature investigates how the economic 
environment affects the quality of public utilities regulation, underlining corruption 
and enforcement problems (see for ex, Guasch et al. (2003) and Laffont (2005)).
The remainder of this chapter is oiganised as follows. The next section presents 
the model and derives a set of testable predictions in the context of Indian firms. Sec­
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tion 3 discusses the data and sources of variation and Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 concludes.
The model is composed of two parts. In the first one, I investigate the captive power
for a given level of quality-adjusted price of electricity. In the second part, I model 
the regulatory process to determine the drivers of electricity pricing and how they 
affect firms’ decisions and the industry equilibrium.
3.2.1 Set up: downstream
All consumers have similar Cobb-Douglas preferences over two types of goods, 
agricultural and manufactured goods denoted by A and M, respectively. There is a 
continuum range of varieties Vt of manufacturing goods, over which consumers have 
preferences defined by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. 
The taste for variety of goods is denoted by p, such that 0 < p <  1 and the elasticity 
of substitution is defined as a =  1/(1 — p) >  1. Consumers’ utility function is
3.2 The Model
adoption decision for heterogeneous firms and the subsequent industry equilibrium
Demand
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where m(v) is the consumption of each variety of manufactured goods. Fol­
lowing Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Fujita et al. (1999, Chapter 2), the demand for a 
manufacture j  is
<3-2>
and the demand for the agricultural good is
A =  ( l - a )  — •
Pa
where Y  is a given level of income, p(j) and pa are the prices of the good j  and 
the agricultural good respectively and H is the aggregate price of manufactures such 
that
H = [ f  p(v)l~adv] I ^  (3.3)
J v e V
Firms
There is a continuum of heterogeneous firms, each producing a different variety 
using labour and electricity. For simplicity, in the short run, firms are assumed to pay 
a fixed cost F  in labour to produce I units of output and can produce in excess of I 
by using electricity with different degrees of success. In particular, heterogeneity is 
captured by a positive productivity factor with uniform density function d(ip) on 
(0, <3?) and cumulative distribution D(<p) =  </?/<£. Demand for electricity is then a 
linear function of firm’s output (qt) of the form e =  —— - if qf > I and 0 otherwise. 
I assume the demand of a variety represented in equation (3.2) is such that m(j) >  I 
and redefine q =  qf — I. It follows that total and marginal costs for variety j  increase 
with electricity price Pe and decrease with productivity <p and can be expressed as
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TC(<pj ) =  F + ^ q (3.4)
The combination of (3.2) and (3.4) gives a profit function with a variable net
optimal price equal to the marginal cost indexed by the productivity level and a fixed 
mark up 1/p. This price captures the local market power producers have, derived 
from consumers’ taste for variety p
Note that profits increase when consumers spend more on many manufactures, 
driven by preferences (a) or income (y), for example. Given these parameters, firms’ 
idiosyncratic productivity (<p) determines whether firms can cover their fixed costs 
and survive in the market. That means that less productive firms will not be able 
to remain active if productivity is below a value <p*, such that n(p*) =  0. Average 
productivity and the subsequent aggregate price and market equilibrium will be de­
termined by the pool of existing firms in the market and not by the pool of potential 
entrants. As a consequence, I need to redefine the distribution of productivity to ac­
count for the low productivity firms that will not remain active. The resulting condi-
p * p(j') arevenue of ( p  - )a Y   ^ . The first order condition for the profit-maximising
<Pj ri
G Pprice is (1 — a) H   =  0. Replacing a =  1/(1 — p) and solving for p, produces an
(3.5)
and a profit for firm j
7 r ( ^ ) = a ( l - p ) y [ ^ r 1- F (3.6)
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tional distribution of productivity is g{p) =  -— d ( ~*) =  —----- - if $  > <p* and 0
otherwise. To rule out the latter, I assume that there is a taste for variety large enough
to allow a cut-off level below the maximum, i.e. <&p > p* or 7r(y? =  <£/?) > 0. The
$ 1
aggregate price is H (</?*) =  [ /  , p{p)a~lg{p)dp] l~a • Also note that higher marginal
cost will increase firms’ profit per unit sold but, because consumers’ expenditure in
/
manufacturing goods is fixed, it will reduce demand for each variety. The role of the 
aggregate price and the electricity price will be explored further below.
Market equilibrium in a closed economy
In a closed economy, only domestic firms with a similar technology compete. 
As firms in an industry are assumed to differ only in their productivity, changes af­
fecting the marginal cost of one firm will affect symmetrically the whole industry, 
meaning that not just the final price of a firm will increase with a higher marginal 
cost, but also the aggregate price level H. Note that by combining (3.5) for all firms 
and (3.3), H  can be rewritten as
H c =  p(p )M 1=  ^ = (3.7)
pip
$ 1
where p{p) is the price of the average firm, as p(<p*) =  [J p cr~1g(p)dp] o-i is the 
weighted average productivity, and M  is the mass of surviving firms in the market. 
By combining equation (3.7) with (3.6), profits can be expressed as
(3.8)
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which is independent of the price of electricity. The fact that equilibrium profits are 
independent of changes in the marginal cost reproduces a result found in the classical 
microeconomic literature. When final goods’ markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, the supply of final goods depends on an input’s price via its demand. 
An increase in the factor’s price would simply shift upwards the supply curve. This 
means that changes in variables increasing firms’ marginal cost would simply induce 
a new market equilibrium with a higher price and lower quantity traded in the final 
good’s market. In brief, in a closed economy, changes in the marginal cost that affect 
all firms will not affect the cut-off productivity level <p*, i.e. =  0-
v i  g
Following Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006), market equilibrium will be 
characterized by a Zero Cut-off Profit Condition (ZCP) where the average profit can 
be written
* =  =  [ £ ^ l ] » - i [ a (i _  -  F  =  Fk{<p') (3.9)
J e
where k(<p*) =  — 1 is a monotonically decreasing function of <p*t
from infinity to zero under density distribution d(^)20.
The Free Entry Condition (FEC) implies that the expected net value of entry 
for the average firm (^-considering the discounted (by a factor 6) probability of 
successful entry after paying entry fee / e-should be equal to 0: ve =  l1-^  Jiff —
-( *\ $<*-! _ U)*a~x
20 Under the uniform distribution [El£-2]<7- 1 = -------—-------- - that is decreasing in tp* under thei <p J 6 ^
assumption that >  <p\
which is monotonically increasing in <p*. This is because the lower the proba­
bility of succeeding, the higher the average profit has to be. The cut-off equilibrium 
level <p* will satisfy simultaneously both ZCP and FEC: as k(<p*)[l — D(<p*)\ = 
f e8/F .  The existence of equilibrium is ensured by the fact that k decreases from 
infinity to zero and [1 -  D{ip*)\ decreases from 1 to 0.
3.2.2 Adoption of captive power generators
The following part of the model draws from anecdotal evidence on the adoption of 
captive power generators by Indian firms. In particular, this section introduces the 
possibility that firms set up a technology which allows them to reduce their marginal 
cost by reducing the price Pe they pay for their electricity of a determined quality. 
In this setting, an excessive price or reduced quality in the provision of electricity 
could increase the costs of industrial production and affect the competitiveness of 
firms when some firms have an outside option such as a captive generator and others 
do not. It is well documented (see for example TERI (1999) and Tongia (2003)) that 
Indian firms choose to set up their own electricity generator to hedge against power 
failures or voltage fluctuations, thereby ensuring adequate quality (small generators) 
or lower costs (bigger power plants), and that this practice has increased over the 
years. As Biswas et al. (2004) point out when analysing the captive generation
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in Gujarat, some industries like metal producers rely critically on the provision of 
energy. Sometimes, as in the aluminium industries, it can determine up to 40% of 
total production costs.
Assume firms can pay a fixed amount G to introduce a marginal cost-reducing 
technology that scales down the tariff paid to the electricity by 0 (P e), so that die 
price of electricity enters maiginal cost as Pe0 (P e). The idea is that firms can buy a 
generator to hedge against erratic quality in supply. A few assumptions are needed to 
characterize this technology: if the electricity supplier charges the marginal cost of 
producing a unit (adjusted by quality) of electricity c, then using a generator does not 
reduce firms’ marginal cost (0(c) =  1). The greater the price paid for electricity, the 
more effective is this technology at reducing cost (dQ(Pe) /dPe < 0), even though 
marginal cost is still increasing in Pe (0 < dPeQ(Pe)/dPe <  l)21 . An example of
c—Pe
such a function would be 0 (P e) =  9 Pm where 6 >  1 and Pm is the maximum price 
the electricity supplier can charge (i.e. monopolistic price).
Adoption and productivity cut-off
An individual firm j  will be willing to adopt this technology if the reduction in 
marginal cost that drives profits up compensates the extra fixed cost G, or if
Att( ^ )  =  7T(Pe0 (P e);< ^ )-7 r(P e; ^ )  (3.11)
=  a ( l -  -  1] -  G  >  0
e
21 Since dPeQ(Pe)/dPe  =  (dQ/dPe)Pe +  0  where dQ/dPe  <  0 and © <  1
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There is a cut-off level of productivity (p for which a firm is indifferent be­
tween adopting or not, such that Air (ft) =  0. The productivity of the marginal
firm adopting the captive power can be obtained as a function of <p* by noting that
A tt(<p ) — 7r(<p*) =  0:
F  +  GRearranging the second term, if — - — < (0(Pe))(1_<7), the productivity of
F
the marginal adopter would be lower than the productivity of the maiginal surviving
c—Pe
firm, and all firms in the market would adopt the generator. Using G(Pe) =  $ pm ,1 
can obtain a threshold
p  i +  f )
n  C +  l o g 0  ( < 7 - 1 )
such that if Pe >  Pe, all firms will adopt the technology. Note that the threshold 
is increasing in the cost of the generator (G) and decreasing on the effectiveness of 
the technology (0). The intuition is that adoption is profitable when the cost of the 
generator relative to fixed costs is lower than the extra profits obtained for reducing 
the marginal cost. If the generator was freely available, all firms would adopt it even 
when the price of electricity was at its lowest possible level, c. On the other hand, 
when Pe =  c, the technology does not reduce costs and no firm finds it profitable 
to pay a positive set-up cost. However, I assume that the most productive firms find 
adoption worthwhile for any small increase e above c, i.e. A7r($; c +  e) >  0. At the 
firm level, it follows that for values Pe ^  Pe >  c, adoption is increasing in the price
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of electricity or reductions in quality (dAn/dPe >  0), and for Pe > Pe, all surviving 
firms adopt.
I next analyse how the presence of a generator plays out at the industry level 
when some firms adopt and other don’t. The uniform distribution of productiv­
ity provides a simple way of measuring the proportion of firms adopting (A), as
$  — (2>
A =  —-------. Note that firms adopting the captive power generator (with weighted$  — ip*
average productivity y?0) will coexist with firms relying exclusively on the network 
(with weighted average productivity <£n) and the aggregate price will be
H g =  (3 12)ff. PPa
In this situation, a price change in the electricity supply will not affect all firms
symmetrically. As a matter of fact, firms that have adopted the captive generator will
suffer the price hike less and their marginal cost will increase less than firms that have
not adopted the generator. The change in profits for the marginal firm <p* will depend
on the sign of the change in the aggregate price relative to its own price, namely the 
H9quotient — . By inspection of equation (3.12) it follows that
H9
sign 8 {-j^-)/dPe =  sign d(Q(Pe)) /dPe < 0
■* 2
The marginal consumer will not be able to remain in the market and will exit. 
Whenever most productive firms have an alternative to network provision of elec­
tricity, less productive firms will be more vulnerable to changes in the input price 
and may face market exit: the productivity threshold for survival will increase, i.e.
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dp*(Pe) /dPe >  0. The intuition is as follows: when the price of electricity increases 
in the case with no captive generator it does so for all firms. This means that the mar­
ginal cost and the aggregate price move together and the marginal firm will not be 
affected. When the cost-reducing technology is available more productive firms find 
it worthwhile to adopt, and increases in the electricity price are not matched by an 
increase in the aggregate price. As a consequence, the marginal firm makes negative 
profits and exits the market.
On the other hand, whenever there is an increase in price Pe firms in the adop­
tion margin (i.e. with productivity (p) will now find it worthwhile to adopt unambigu­
ously, since the captive generator absorbs part of the increase in Pe. It follows that 
the cut-off productivity is decreasing in Pe, i.e. d<p(Pe) /dPe < 0. As a consequence, 
an increase in the price of electricity will affect the population and composition of 
firms, both by inducing the exit of firms on the margin of survival and by inducing 
more adoption of the marginal cost-reducing technology within the pool of surviving 
firms, i.e. dA/dPe >  0.
Market equilibrium
The average productivity when some firms adopt a captive generator can be 
expressed as
V  =  Vf>n ■7- 1 +  ( 0 - 1W 7- 1] ^ 1 (3.13)
By replacing (3.13) in the profit function, the new average product can be ex­
pressed as nift9) =  7r(<pn) +  7r(<£a), which is greater than 7r(<p) for a given cut-off
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productivity level <p*t since profits for users of the captive generator are greater than 
the profit they would have obtained had they not adopted. This would imply a ZPC 
shifted up with respect to the case where the captive generator was not available. 
Note that this holds even for the case when all firms adopt. As the expression for 
FEC remains the same, the new equilibrium will happen at a greater cut-off produc­
tivity22.
3.2.3 Changes in the environment
Barriers to entry: open economy and entry fees
The equilibrium outcomes in terms of survival and adoption of captive power 
depend on the economic environment that determine the parameter values in the 
model. For example, when the economy is opened to foreign competition, the en­
try of new firms will affect the aggregate price H  and, subsequently, sales and profits 
(see Fujita et al. (1999)). This would affect the Zero Cut-Off Profit Condition and 
market equilibrium, since in a more competitive environment, the required productiv­
ity increases. In a similar vein, the level of the entry fee, / e, determines the required 
probability of success needed for firms to attempt entry, and changes in its level cor­
respond to shifts in the Free Entry Condition curve.
To look at changes in H,  assume the economy is open and transport costs are 
modelled as firms having to send r  > 1 units to export 1 unit of output. For simplic­
22 This result is similar to Melitz (2003), but rather than it being exporting firms profits that push the 
ZPC up, it is the availability of a cost-reducing technology which produces the increase in profits for 
a set of more productive firms.
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ity, I concentrate on the effect of new products entering the market on domestic firms 
(abstracting from their export decision, since I am interested in looking at the reac­
tion of domestic firms to bad regulation in a more competitive environment). Foreign
firms will be able to enter the market if they can meet the equilibrium cut-off price 
Tp f  p e
of entry p(ipf) =  -^-s- < ——23. This will happen for very productive firms or 
<PfP <P*P
for firms coming from countries with cheaper or more reliable electricity provision 
(lower P /). Whatever the case, the entry of new firms will expand the set of varieties 
available to consumers and, by increasing the mass of competing firms M, a more 
open environment will reduce the aggregate price H  and the demand for all domestic 
varieties.
It follows that trade barriers are associated with greater aggregate prices and 
profits for domestic firms, while the productivity cut-off level falls:
H  =  {a -  l )a ( l  -  p )Y \^ - \a~lHa~2 >  0; B ^ /d H  <  0
The productivity needed to cover the fixed costs and to survive is greater in an 
open economy than in a protected economy, i.e. <p* < <p*0. This replicates a result 
obtained in the literature on trade liberalization (e.g., Melitz (2003)) where an open 
environment forces firms at the bottom of the productivity distribution out of the 
market, raising the average productivity. Note that this would happen both when the 
generator is not available and in the situation where all firms adopt. This finding un­
derlines the importance for domestic firms of well-functioning input markets. In such
QP
23 — if all fiims adopt the generator
<P*P
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settings, the impact of foreign competition will depend mostly on the price of elec­
tricity as follows: first, the relative efficiency of the domestic country at producing 
electricity, i.e. whether c > cf. Second, on the regulatory process that determines Pe 
relative to P /. It follows that if Pe =  c =  c*, then only very productive foreign firms 
will be able to sell their varieties and the impact on marginal firms in the domestic 
markets might be lower.
In terms of adoption of the technology, the condition represented in equation 
(3.11) shows that dA n /dH  >  0, implying that the marginal firm in the adoption 
decision has a greater productivity level in an open economy. This is explained by 
the fact that as the economy opens, a firm sells less units of output. If before, at 
a given level of productivity and Pe, there was just enough to cover the fixed cost 
of the generator, now firms need to be more productive to make up for the lower 
sales. Under the assumption of uniform productivity distribution, and considering 
that the change in the adoption maigin is greater than the change in the survival 
margin, since \d(p/dH\ =  (d<p*/dH) ( j ) ^ T[(0(Pe))1_c7 — l]- ^ 1 > \dip*/dH\ 
when Pe < Pe, it follows that the proportion of firms adopting increases in more 
protected environments, i.e. d A /d H  >  0. This stems from the fact that adopting 
the technology implies an extra fixed cost, meaning that adopting firms have to be 
proportionally more productive than non-adopting firms to compensate for reductions 
in sales after a fall in the aggregate price.
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A similar point could be made regarding the entry fee, / e, firms pay to partic­
ipate in the market. Larger fees shift the FEC to the left and equilibrium happens at 
a lower ip*, because firms need a greater probability of survival to compensate for 
the increase in fees. It follows that, using the same reasoning as with more protected 
markets, the proportion of adopting firms should increase, d A / d f e > 0.
Borrowing constraints
An additional concern is the existence of imperfections in the credit markets 
that might induce borrowing constraints. As an illustration, assume a competitive 
financial sector, i.e. where banks meet a zero-profit constraint. In the case where 
adopters and non-adopters of the generator co-exist in the market, firms seek a loan 
L  to buy the generator. Whenever a firm’s productivity is observable and there are not 
incentives to default for operating firms24, the bank will charge a gross interest rate r  
equal to the opportunity cost £ . The fixed cost for the firm will be G = Lr, defining 
a productivity cut-off for the adoption of the generator <p such that An(<p) =  0 as 
in equation (3.11). If banks cannot determine the productivity of a given firm and 
cannot recoup anything from a bad loan, their zero-profit condition requires that the 
expected value of the loan equals the opportunity cost, i.e. p(<p > ip*)Lr =  L£  or 
r  =  £/(l  — D(ip*)) >  £. In the presence of information or enforcement problems, 
loans would be more expensive, which is equivalent to an increase in the fixed cost of 
the generator G  that raises the adoption productivity cut-off. In the presence of credit
24 Assume, for example, that for operating firms the probability of getting caught is equal to 1, and 
that cheating firms pay a hefty fine. However, firms not operating could "take the money and run," 
even though that is not a problem with full information.
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market imperfections, more productive firms will still find it worthwhile to adopt, but 
firms on the margin of adoption will remain in the market, but will not use a captive 
generator, i.e. dA/dG <  0
Expenditure
Consumers derive their utility from consuming food and manufactures, and 
their shares in total consumption are captured in the model by a. When consumers 
change their preferences towards manufacturing goods (i.e. an increase in a), both 
the survival and the adoption margins are reduced. As the magnitude of the change 
is greater for adopting firms, then the ratio of adoption is greater, the greater the 
expenditure on manufacturing goods, i.e. dA /d a  >  0.
3.2.4 Upstream
This section of the model builds on Laffont-Tirole (1993) and analyses how the reg­
ulator of the electricity sector determines Pe. I assume that the electricity market is 
run by a state monopoly whose decisions are affected by the political process. Fol­
lowing India’s example, the regulator can price discriminate between different types 
of consumers-agricultural and industrial-and that the farmer’s lobby is such that an 
agricultural electricity tariff is always set equal to the marginal cost. The regula­
tor is left with a Utilitarian Social Welfare function equal to the sum of industrial 
consumers and producer utilities in the electricity market (V and U, respectively):
W  =  V +  U (3.14)
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Consumer surplus is weighted by a "sector-specific consumer bias" (A € [0; 1]) 
that captures the relative lobbying power of industrial consumers. The monopolist’s 
utility is simply the revenue from selling to both sectors, less a separable cost func­
tion. The cost of producing a unit of electricity is C =  cq +  Fm. Combining firms’
qt — I
technological use of electricity, e =  -------, and equations (3.2) and (3.5), an indi-
<P p - a
vidual demand for electricity can be defined, as e f  — a V  p . rre X1 l /p-.  This
expression shows that demand for electricity will depend on the level of productivity. 
Additionally, demand price elasticity of electricity is greater than 1.
The regulator can use transfers to expand the set of possible outcomes by tax­
ing consumers and compensating the monopolist for low levels of prices that do not 
meet the participation constraint, namely U > 0. When such transfers are allowed, 
consumers are liable to be taxed in order to fund the transfer. I assume linear pric­
ing and define S(Pe\ p)  as the net surplus obtained by an industrial consumer with 
productivity ip, where the surplus is 0 for the cut-off level of productivity p*, i.e. 
S(Pe; p*) =  0. Equation (3.15) defines the consumer surplus
S(Pe; p)g{p)dp  -  (1 +  7 )£ (3.15)
i*
where t is the gross transfer (t >  0) and 7  the cost of transferring public funds. The 
monopolist’s utility is U =  t +  (Pe — c) e(Pe; p)g(p)dp — Fm . By replacing t  in
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(3.15), adding up U, and replacing in (3.14), social welfare is:
W  =  A [ *  S{Pe;<p)g(tp)&p+ (3.16)
J (p*
(1 +  7 )[(Pe-c) f  e(Pe; <p)g(ip)d<p -  FM] -  7U
The regulator chooses the price that maximizes (3.16) subject to the monopo­
list’s participation constraint, U > 0. As the transfer of funds to the monopolist is 
socially costly, the utility of the monopolist will be kept at U =  0. The regulator also 
considers that the price set might affect the cut-off productivity, i.e. ip* can be written 
as<p*(Pe).
The first order condition is
-A  /  e(Pe;ip)g(<p)d<p+( 1 + 7 ) f e(Pe’,ip)g{<p)dtp (3.17)
J  ip* J  tp+
+(1 +  l ) {P &-c)[ J  ^ - ( P e;ip)g(<p)d<p -  e(Pe;
=  0
By defining E(Pe] ip*) =  J*, e(Pe; ip)g{<p)d<p, the price elasticity of demand
for a given cut-off level of productivity <p* as rjj25, and the price elasticity of partici-
dp>* Pe .pation — , the Lemer index becomes
* p dPe ip*
25 Where r)d =  - P e ^ - ( P c; ifi)g(<p)dtp)/ e(Pe; ip)g{ip)dp
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1 +  7  — A (3.18)
Condition (3.18) is a general expression for the Lemer index for cases with anti­
consumer bias, consumer heterogeneity and transfer costs.'When setting prices with 
consumer heterogeneity, the regulator has to include in the maximization programme 
the fact that price changes result in shifts for the maiginal consumer; specifically 
by adding to the price elasticity of the demand (rjd), the sensitivity of the frontier 
(t]p) weighted by maiginal consumer’s relative importance in aggregate demand. In 
the absence of these three features, the price cho>sen by the regulator will be equal 
to maiginal cost. Deviations from maiginal cost pricing come from low levels of A 
(i.e. industries’ well-being in the electricity market does not enter fully in regulator’s 
objective function), or from high levels of 7  (i.e. as the cost of government transfers 
increases, it becomes optimal to recoup provision costs by charging electricity users 
more). As previously shown, in a closed economy the productivity of the marginal
the well being of consumers does not enter regulator’s objective function (A =  0), 
or when transfers are extremely expensive (7  —► 0 0 ) such that the regulator sets the 
monopolist price, either because it would be simply maximizing the monopolist’s
dip*
consumer is independent of the price of electricity (-^ 77  =  0). From (3.18), it follows
C /1  0e
There are two extreme cases: whenthat the regulator would set Pe
profits or because avoiding costly transfers implies choosing the highest possible
pnce.
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Firms, industries and regulation
This result links to the firm and industry analysis in a very simple way: the 
parameters that determine the price level of electricity,. namely c, 7  and A, will deter­
mine whether a firm adopts, as well as the composition of survival and adoption at the 
industry level. Everything else equal, the proportion of firms adopting will be greater 
in places where the monopolist is less efficient at producing electricity (dA/dc >  0) 
or the government is less efficient at taxing and redistributing {dA/d7  > 0) or where 
the regulator sets prices with less regard for the well-being of industrial producers 
(dA/dX <  0). The introduction of the latter constitutes the most important mech­
anism in linking the political economy of regulation and industry outcomes. This 
relationship is explored further below, when applied to the Indian experience.
Quality
The discussion of prices could be extended to consider quality issues as well. 
In its simplest interpretation, and following the Laffont-Tirole framework (2003, see 
Section 2.5, Chapter 2), the results obtained above would remain the same when 
price and quality are perfect substitutes for consumers and the electricity producer. 
I could redefine Pe as the quality adjusted price such that Pe — pe — s, where pe 
is the actual tariff and s is quality (normalized to 0  for a standard service) and c =  
ct +  s, where ct is the technological marginal cost. In that sense, predictions related 
to increases in the price of electricity and reductions in its quality should be the 
same. If quality is not verifiable, it provides the regulator with more freedom to
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set her preferred policies. For example, if the regulator has a big anti-industry bias
(A =  0) and no transfer costs in a closed economy, then the optimal price for the
regulator would be the monopolistic price PeM =  - C^-d—. If additional constraints
V d -  1
arise, such as a price cap pe from the central government (or pressures for a maximum 
price from industrial producers, for example), the regulator would have to maximise 
W  =  (pe — Ct +  s)Q(pe — s ; (p*) subject to pe <  pe. By setting negative (i.e. below 
standard) quality s =  pe — PeM, the regulator can avoid complying with the price cap 
and behave as if unconstrained.
3.2.5 Predictions in the Indian context 
Electricity prices
The model predicts that regulatory outcomes are linked to industrial outcomes 
by means of the determinants of Pe. To test this in the context of Indian provision of 
electricity, it is important to understand the institutional framework. The Electricity 
Supply Act in 1948 created agencies like the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), in 
charge of formulating national policies and assessing the technical and economic vi­
ability of power projects, and the State Electricity Boards (SEB), whose board mem­
bers are appointed by the state government (Chapter III, 5.2). The SEBs are fully 
vertically integrated, owning the four segments of the industry-generation, transmis­
sion, distribution and commercialization- and set their own pricing and investment 
policies.
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In terms of linking the electricity tariffs to the government’s anti-industry bias 
(A) and inefficiency (7 ), sectorial analysis for Indian SEBs deemed the energy provi­
sion as "more of a social service than a business. Prices do not reflect costs and state 
institutions are dependent on allocations from the public budget" (TERI (1999)). 
Also, "the SEBs became bastions of political patronage rather than true business 
enterprises (...) Reformers faced political opposition from farmers, who had come 
to rely on enormous quantities of low-cost electricity for pumping water" (Tongia 
(2003)). Overall, subsidies to farmers and domestic consumers by states via the 
electricity provision have been estimated to be in the order of 1 to 1.5% of India’s 
GDP (World Bank (2000)). In all circumstances described by the previous model(e.g. 
availability of a generator, open economy, borrowing constraints), other than a closed 
economy, an increase in the price of electricity would induce the exit of firms at the 
margin (rjP >  0). The loss of consumers would reduce the monopolist’s revenue re­
gardless of the weight assigned to industrial consumers and would reduce the price 
set by the regulator. In all cases, states with more anti-industry bias and with less ef­
ficient governments should show higher electricity prices. Unfortunately, there is not 
enough information to test whether prices set by SEBs are sensitive to changes in the 
cut-off level for firms’ survival.
The model predicts that cross-subsidization should be more prevalent in states 
with a stronger rural lobby. In particular, the measure of rural lobby I use reflects the 
adoption of high yield varieties (HYV) after the start of the Green Revolution. HYV
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seeds are known to be high-cost/high-yield because they multiply agricultural pro­
ductivity if timely irrigation, among other inputs, is provided. The cheapest way for 
farmers to secure water is by means of electric pumpsets that suction water from the 
water table viatubewells. The importance of food production for reducing the possi­
bility of famines gives farmers, in particular larger and richer ones, the upper hand. 
Dhanagare (1989) estimates that "the prosperity unleashed by the Green Revolution 
was distributed differentially, putting the small and maiginal farmers at a relative dis­
advantage. The high cost/high yield technology called for capital investments beyond 
the means of a majority of small and marginal formers." With a stronger economic 
position, rural rich formers also developed political leverage that was translated into 
further subsidies. In particular, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) show how what they 
call "the subsidy syndrome in Indian agriculture" after the introduction of the new 
seeds in late 60s, became a fundamental instrument of economic policy that was 
mainly channelled through available and affordable fertilizers, irrigation and elec­
tricity. Dhanagare also points out that "only the needs of rich farmers were catered 
by the electricity boards," since while the unit price was heavily subsidized, con­
nection charges were so expensive that only rich farmers could afford them. For 
example, in the case of Punjab, the state at the forefront of HYV adoption, Simms 
(1988) describes a situation in which "farmers are aware of the power they hold due 
to their strategic importance in the national economy (...) Political action has led to 
extensive changes in rural Indian Punjab." Describing a rally organized by one or­
96
ganization of fanners, Simms points out that "the state government was thrown off 
balance by their show of force and conceded many of their demands." This descrip­
tion of the Indian context Combined with the upstream section of the model laid out 
earlier suggests that the power of rural lobbies and government’s efficiency should 
be linked to the pricing strategy of the regulator, i.e. states with more adoption of 
HYV seeds and more budget deficits chaige a higher price to industrial consumers of 
electricity (Prediction 1).
Adoption: individual characteristics
Poor regulatory decisions resulting in excessive prices or reduced quality nec­
essarily increase the costs of industrial production and affect the competitiveness of 
firms, ultimately distorting their choice of technology or industry. As a consequence, 
firms set up their own electricity generator to hedge against power failures or voltage 
fluctuations to ensure the adequate quality or to reduce costs. This practice has in­
creased over the years in India. As mentioned earlier, Biswas et al. (2004) point out 
that some industries like metal producers rely critically on the provision of energy 
and electricity is often a sizeable part of their total production cost. To ensure the 
quality of the provision and to remain competitive in the market, firms tend to install 
captive power plants. The installed captive capacity varies considerably across states 
and industries. An infrastructure report produced by Price Waterhouse Coopers for 
the government of Chhattisgarh shows that in 1998, the average captive capacity was 
around 17%, with significant variation. In some states-like Karnataka (30.5%) and
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Haryana (38%)-captive power is significant while in others-like Jammu & Kash­
mir and Himachal Pradesh- firms use exclusively SEB’s electricity. Industry-wise, 
there is considerable variation as well, with industries like electronics producers us­
ing self-provision of energy just up to a 0.5% of total captive generation capacity, 
while engineering or metals and minerals industries surpass 2 0 %.
The model predicts adoption of the captive generator according to a set of pa­
rameters that varies across firms. For example, as noted earlier, the electricity price 
Pe could be understood as a quality-adjusted tariff. In that case, some characteris­
tics of the firms, such as their location (urban vs. rural), might be correlated with the 
quality of supply received and have an impact on their decision to adopt a generator. 
Additionally, measures that could be capturing an idiosyncratic productivity (<p) or 
access to finance (G)-such as whether a firm is public or multiproduct-should also 
be positively correlated with adoption. The model also predicts that if adopting firms 
coexist with non-adopting firms, measures of output and size (e.g., workers) should 
be greater for adopting firms. It follows that firm characteristics, including exposure 
to lower quality of electricity, greater productivity, access to credit and size are all 
correlated with more adoption of captive power (Prediction 2).
Adoption: state characteristics
As previously mentioned, regulatory outcomes vary only at the state level. As 
the model predicts that adoption of captive power increases with the price of elec­
tricity and decreases with quality, in-house generation of electricity should be more
98
prevalent in states where industries are charged relatively more for electricity and 
where the quality of provision is poorer. Additionally, the model identifies variables 
that drive pricing policies. In particular, the lobbying power of farmers and govern­
ment’s inefficiency should be positively correlated with adoption. Finally, I use data 
on urbanization rates to proxy for the share of consumption in manufacturing goods ( 
represented by a  in the model) and test whether it is positively correlated with adop­
tion. The incidence of adoption of captive power should be greater in states where 
the SEB charges higher electricity tariffs to industrial consumers or provides lower 
quality. Adoption should also be positively correlated with farmers’ lobbying power 
and measures of government and SEB inefficiency (Prediction 3).
Adoption: industry characteristics
The impact of the regulatory context for the adoption decision in Indian in­
dustries can also be captured by some features of the model. In particular, adoption 
should be greater in sectors more protected from international competition via trade 
tariffs. This comes from the finding that in industries where some firms adopt and 
others do not, the margin for adopting firms is more sensitive to changes than the 
margin for surviving firms. Even though India considerably reduced its trade tar­
iffs in 1991, there is significant variation in tariff levels across industries both before 
and after the reforms. Another widespread industrial policy in India after indepen­
dence was the establishment of a licensing scheme that was dismantled progressively
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from 1985 onwards26. The license system can be understood in the framework of this 
model as the entry fee f e firms have to pay before knowing whether they will survive 
or not. As with tariffs, greater fees should be correlated with a greater proportion of 
firms adopting the power generator. In short, the fourth prediction is that the inci­
dence of adoption of captive power should be greater in industries that are protected 
by greater trade tariffs and subject to licenses (Prediction 4).
Productivity
The prediction regarding productivity is in line with the trade literature where 
protection allows for the survival of less productive firms. This paper also links pro­
ductivity with the adoption of an in-house generator of electricity. In particular, firms 
which adopt are expected to be more productive and bigger, on average. The model 
also predicts that the margin of survival and adoption will be lower for more pro­
tected sectors. Industrial sectors that are more protected (whether by trade tariffs or 
licensing) should also produce less and be less productive, on average. Additionally, 
within an industry, the average productivity and output should be greater for firms 
adopting the captive generator (Prediction 5).
26 For a information on the delicensing process and its effects, see Aghion et al. (2007)
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To test the predictions laid out above, I use data on the adoption of captive power 
generators at the factory level. Tests on the effect of regulatory outcomes are done at 
the state level, while measures of openness vary at the industry level.
Factories: The dataset is a repeated cross-section of factories for the years 
1990, 1994 and 1997 collected by the Annual Survey of Industries, Department of 
Statistics, Government of India. The basic sample consists of more than 145,000 
observations, but is lower when combined with state or industry measures. Since 
the sample includes firms in the "census sector" (i.e. with more than 100 workers) 
and firms that are sampled (the sampling design adopts 3-digit-industry groups per 
state as stratum and covers all the units in a span of three years), all regressions 
weigh units of observation accordingly. Table 1 provides some summary statistics, 
where it can be seen that around 1 in 3 firms have a captive generator of electricity. 
Some factory characteristics capture features of the model. For example, location 
(around 30% rural firms, 58% urban and the rest, in one of the metropolitan areas, 
i.e. cities with more than 1 million people as defined by the 1991 Indian census) 
might reveal information about the quality of the electricity that firms are exposed 
to (e.g. blackouts, pilferage, technical losses, power surges). Other characteristics 
might reveal idiosyncratic productivity, such as whether the factory produces more 
than one good (61.8% do) or size (25% are in the census sector). Finally, credit 
constraints might be captured by whether the firm has access to credit (a large number
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of firms-74%-have access to some kind of credit). Moreover, if firms are public 
(around 14% are), we should expect them to access formal (i.e. cheaper) sources of 
funds.
States: The variables capturing State Electricity Boards’ regulatory outcomes 
include data on prices such as tariffs chaiged to industries and agricultural users, 
average tariffs (the sum of prices paid by industries, farmers, households and com­
mercial users, weighted by their share in total sales). Quality measures include trans­
mission and distribution losses (as a percentage of total electricity traded) and out­
ages in thermal plants. Table 1 shows significant variation in both measures. Other 
relevant information related to SEBs efficiency is captured by variables such as a 
measure of network extension (i.e. the number of consumers connected to the elec­
tricity network), unit cost of electricity production, quantity of employees per Kwh 
produced and subsidies received from the central government. Other state-level vari­
ables, aimed at capturing the relative power of farming lobbies (A), government ef­
ficiency (7 ) and consumers’ preference for manufacturing goods (a) are proxied by 
the incidence of the Green Revolution (the proportion of cultivated land cropped with 
HYV seeds), state governments’ budget deficits and the proportion of urban popula­
tion, respectively.
Industries: India-wide industrial policies are captured by measures of trade 
tariffs at the 3-digit industry level and by a dummy at the 4-digit industry level equal 
to one if firms require a license to enter that industry. The reduction process of
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barriers to entry for foreign products and new domestic producers started slowly in 
1985 and accelerated after 1991. However, the process affected different industries 
at different points in time and in different degrees (in particular, in terms of trade 
tariffs reduction). Table 1 shows that factories were exposed to different degrees of 
protection. For example, around 76% of the firms in the sample were subject to a 
licensing process in 1990 while in 1994 and 1997, it was only around 37%. The 
mean imports tariff also dropped considerably, from around 1.3 in 1990 to 0.89 in 
1994 and 0.47 in 1997.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Pricing
The model predicts (Prediction 1) that in states where the anti-industry bias is stronger, 
the price for industrial consumers will be higher. The anecdotal evidence points to 
regulators having a pro-farmer bias and an anti-industry bias across the board in In­
dian states. However, the intensity of that bias could be associated with farmers’ 
need for electricity. A measure of this can be obtained by looking at the adoption 
of an agricultural technology that is intensive in electricity. In particular, the use of 
high yield variety (HYV) seeds that were introduced with the Green Revolution re­
quired timely irrigation and electric pumpsets were the cheapest way of accessing 
groundwater.
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Table 2 compares measures of relative prices and quality for states where HYV 
seed adoption was above the median 27, and the rest of the states. The first measure 
is the ratio between average tariff and unit cost, available from 1974 to 1997. Even 
though all SEBs struggled in that period to recoup their production costs, states in­
tensive in HYV had a significantly lower proportion of their costs covered by sales 
revenue. All other measures are only available for the period 1990-1997, and show 
that states intensive in HYV charged higher tariffs for industrial producers, relative to 
the average tariff or the unit cost. Additionally, the tariff charged to farmers was much 
lower for both groups, relative to the average tariff or the industrial tariff respectively, 
but both ratios are significantly lower for states intensive in HYV. Table 2 suggests 
that states where formers relied more on electricity tended to set pro-farmer pric­
ing schemes in the electricity sector, and that industrial users tended to be charged 
more. However, measures of quality, such as thermal outages or transmission and 
distribution losses were similar, on average, for both groups of states.
To test whether this pricing policy started right at the beginning of the Green 
Revolution, I use data on the ratio of tariffs charged to industrial users of electric­
ity over the tariff charged to farmers and a continuous measure of the proportion 
of land under HYV seeds for three years in the 70s (1973-1975). Column (1) in Ta­
ble 3 shows that industries were charged relatively more, the greater the proportion of
HYV seeds, even when controlling for other time varying state variables such as pop­
27 High HYV states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar 
Pradesh. These states were above the median of adoption both in 1974 (at least 27%) and in 1984 (at 
least 41%).
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ulation, governments’ real development expenditure and the party of the state Chief 
Minister. The model also predicts that electricity tariffs will be affected by gov­
ernments’ efficiency at transferring resources The intuition is that as governments 
become less efficient, the cost of transfers increases and the regulator has to rely 
on higher prices to recoup costs. Column (2) shows that states with higher budget 
deficits tended to charge higher prices to industrial producers, keeping HYV adop­
tion fixed. One concern is that of reverse causality: i.e. because some states provided 
cheaper electricity, then HYV adoption follows. To mitigate this concern, in Col­
umn (3) I instrument HYV adoption with the proportion of districts with abundant 
groundwater, a geographical characteristic associated to the successful adoption of 
HYV (as in the previous chapter), and find that results hold. Columns (4) to (6 ) use 
1 1-year information for 15 states on average electricity tariff relative to average cost. 
Results show a similar pattern: states intensive in HYV seeds and with larger bud­
get deficits tended to have less sustainable pricing policies. That suggests that even 
if industries were carrying the burden of pro-farmer pricing, SEBs had a harder time 
recouping electricity production costs. Column (6) uses the same instrument as in 
column (3), this time interacted with year dummies to capture divergence in HYV 
adoption across states. Overall, the data shows that Indian industries faced steeper 
prices in states with more powerful farming sectors and less efficient governments.
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3.4.2 Adoption
The adoption of a captive generator in the model is driven by characteristics that can 
vary at the firm, industry and state level. In particular, the model predicts (Predic­
tion 2 ) that factory characteristics that capture exposure to low quality of electricity, 
more access to credit and greater size and productivity are all associated with greater 
adoption of a generator. To look at firm level characteristics that capture each of 
these phenomena and see whether they are correlated with adoption, I run a linear 
probability model of the form
A f i g y  & i s y  A" "1”  S f i s y
where A =  1 if factory /  in industry i in state s in year y generates in-house 
some of the electricity it needs to produce and 0 otherwise. Individual characteristics 
are captured by X f  and state-industry-year fixed effects are captured by a. This 
means that the variation comes from firms producing in the same 3-digit NIC industry 
located in the same state and producing at a given point in time.
Anecdotal evidence shows that the supply of electricity in rural areas tends to 
be subject to more blackouts, power surges and erratic tension. Urban and metropol­
itan areas tend to suffer this problem less, in particular cities. This means that I 
should expect factories in rural areas to adopt more generators than those in urban 
and metropolitan areas. Column (1) in Table 4 shows that a rural firm is around 6 % 
more likely to use a generator. Column (2) also includes a dummy for urban firms and
106
shows that both rural and urban factories are respectively 11% and 6 % more likely to 
own a generator than firms in metropolitan areas (defined as cities with a population 
of 1 million people or more).
The ownership structure of a firm can provide information on both its pro­
ductivity and its access to external finance at a relatively cheap cost. Column (3) 
shows that factories belonging to a public company are around 24% more likely to 
adopt generators than firms that are privately (whether by individuals or societies) or 
state-owned. Another characteristic that might be linked to productivity is whether a 
factory produces many products or just one. Column (4) shows that the probability 
of owning a generator is around 9% greater for multiproduct factories. As predicted 
in the model, more productive firms tend to produce more. More productive firms, 
according to the model, should also be larger. To tell apart large and small firms, I 
use a dummy variable equal to 1 for factories that employ more than 100 employ­
ees (and are included in the census sector). Column (5) shows that the probability of 
owning a generator is 14% greater for those firms. The coefficient on public compa­
nies has dropped, suggesting that it was previously capturing some of the size effect, 
since around 60% of public firms are also in the census sector. Another measure of 
access to credit is also associated with more adoption of captive power. Column (6 ) 
shows that factories that have outstanding loans are 7% more likely to produce some 
of their consumed electricity. Finally, Column (7) shows that the larger the number 
of workers, the larger the rate of adoption even when controlling for whether a firm is
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in the census sector or not. In short, as predicted by the model, adoption of a captive 
generator of electricity is more likely for firms whose characteristics are associated 
with more exposure to lower electricity quality, greater productivity, larger size and 
access to credit.
An important feature of the model is the link between the upstream regulatory 
process and downstream behaviour, as reported by Prediction 3. The model predicts 
that a firm’s decision to set up a captive power generator is positive in electricity 
prices and negative in quality. Table 5 presents results of the impact of State Electric­
ity Boards’ regulatory outcomes on the adoption decision, controlling for industry- 
year fixed effects and for all individual characteristics examined in Table 3. Column
(1) shows that states that charge industries relatively more than other electricity con­
sumers observe significantly greater levels of adoption. In terms of magnitudes, a 
standard deviation increase in the tariff charged to industries is associated with an in­
crease in the probability of adoption of 4 percentage points. Column (2) finds a sim­
ilar result using a measure of anti-industry bias relative to agricultural and domestic 
consumers only. Column (3) includes a measure of the average quality provided by 
the SEB, namely Transmission and Distribution losses as a proportion of total elec­
tricity sent into the network. The coefficient is positive and significant, meaning that 
a worse-performing electricity network is associated with more factories turning to 
self-provision of at least some of their electricity. Note that the coefficient on pric­
ing remains similar, meaning that lower quality is not necessarily working through
prices. Also note that among individual characteristics, there is a significant drop 
in the coefficients associated with rural and urban dummies only. When SEB qual­
ity provision is controlled for, the difference in adoption between metropolitan areas 
and rural and urban areas is smaller, suggesting that location was indeed picking up 
exposure to lower quality (unreported). Overall, the magnitude is also significant: 
an increase of one standard deviation in the measure of transmission and distribution 
losses is associated with additional 8 percentage points in the probability of adop­
tion. Column (4) uses a more restrictive measure of quality (percentage of outages 
in thermal plants only) and again obtains a positive correlation between lower qual­
ity and adoption. Column (5) includes a measure of network extension that might be 
driving the ability to price or to provide good quality. More electricity connections 
per capita are negatively correlated with the adoption of captive power. The coeffi­
cient on prices is slightly larger and the coefficient on transmission and distribution 
losses drops slightly, and both remain strongly significant.
Column (6) includes the percentage of HYV adoption, which proxies for the 
anti-industry bias parameter in the regulator’s objective function. Its coefficient is 
strong and positively correlated to adoption. The channel linking HYV to adoption 
of captive power through the electricity price seems to be at work since the coefficient 
on the electricity tariff charged to industries drops by almost 50% in column (6 ) with 
respect to column (5). With the thought that areas with a greater urban population 
might consume more manufacture-in turn affecting the margins for adoption and
survival-Column (7) includes a measure of urban population at the state level and 
finds, as predicted by the model, that adoption increases with urbanization. The last 
column in Table 5 includes some measures of government and SEB efficiency that 
should affect adoption through price, according to the model. All variables remain 
significant and similar in magnitude, except the electricity tariff for industries, which 
drops in both. Factories in states with a greater budget deficit and with SEBs that 
require more subsidies from the state government tend to adopt generators more. 
Firms in states with larger electricity unit costs tend to adopt less, suggesting that is 
not the productive efficiency of the SEB that drives the results, but its anti-industry 
bias.
In the next set of regressions in Tables 6 and 7 ,1 include an interaction between 
regulatory outcomes and firms characteristics, controlling for 3-digit industry-year 
fixed effects. If the predictions of the model are correct, then firms should react to bad 
regulatory outcomes when they are able to do so. Additionally, interactions can be 
used to identify who is most affected by regulatory outcomes. Table 6 looks at the two 
measures of pricing, namely the ratio between industrial and average tariffs and the 
burden on industries relative to the agricultural and domestic consumers. Columns
(1) and (2 ) interact these measures with the dummies for urban and rural location. 
In both cases, the positive coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that adoption 
is more likely in rural and urban areas than in metropolitan factories, but only if 
the price is greater for industries. The negative coefficients on the rural and urban
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dummies suggest that if SEBs’ pricing policy is not biased against them, then there is 
less adoption in those regions than in metropolitan areas, if any at all. Additionally, 
the negative and significant coefficients on the measure of pricing suggests that the 
larger the price, the lower the adoption in metropolitan areas. That suggests that 
pricing policies seem to influence the adoption decision only in non-metropolitan 
areas.
All interactions with other individual characteristics are not significant for the 
ratio of industrial tariff over average tariff (see, for example, Column (3)). How­
ever, in the remaining regressions shown in Columns (4) to (6), the interaction of 
individual characteristics with the measure of relative burden on industries vis-a-vis 
the domestic and agricultural sectors is positive and significant. Larger firms, mul­
tiproduct firms and firms with access to credit seem to be adopting more, the worse 
the anti-industry bias. This result suggests that factories’ indicators of productiv­
ity and access to credit allow firms to react to bad regulatory outcomes, in line with 
Predictions 2 and 3. Note that as the generator take-up among public firms and cen­
sus sector firms is very high (above 50%), there is not enough variation to obtain a 
significant coefficient in the interactions.
Table 7 looks at firms’ characteristics interacted with measures of quality, i.e. 
transmission and distribution losses and outages in thermal plants. Columns (1) and
(2) look at interactions with urban and rural dummies. With both measures of quality 
a similar pattern emerges: quality seems to matter more for metropolitan firms, since
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the coefficients on the quality measures are positive and significant. And even though 
rural and urban firms tend to adopt more captive generators, they adopt slightly less 
in areas with lower quality. As in Table 6 , Columns (3) to (5) show that larger firms, 
multiproduct firms and those with access to credit tend to adopt more when the qual­
ity provided is lower, suggesting again that productivity and credit help firms deal 
with bad regulatory outcomes. Two patterns emerge from the last two tables: first, 
metropolitan firms react more to quality in the electricity supply and urban and rural 
firms react more to prices. Second, as predicted by the model, productivity, size and 
access to credit are positively correlated with adoption, especially when regulatory 
outcomes are more unfavourable.
To test Prediction 4-i.e. adoption increases with protection-I look at how the 
competitive environment affects the adoption decision by using a measure of whether 
the sector (at the 4-digit industry level) is licensed or not, and the average trade tar­
iff (measured at the 3-digit industry level). In all cases, 2-digit industry-state-year 
fixed effects are included and all individual characteristics are controlled for. As pre­
dicted by the model, Column (1) and (2) in Table 8 show that adoption is more likely 
in more protected environments. The first column shows that firms in licensed sec­
tors are 9% more likely to adopt. The coefficient drops to 7% when the trade tariff is 
included in the second column, but both measures are positive and significant. Col­
umn (3) controls for a measure of technological needs of electricity (at the 3-digit 
industry level), to check that results in previous columns are not capturing a corre­
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lation between protection and technology. The coefficient is positive and significant 
but barely affects the coefficients on license and tariffs. Columns (4) and (5) include 
some interactions with factory characteristics. Column (4) shows that the licensing 
scheme only affects non-metropolitan firms’ decision to adopt. Rural and urban firms 
in non-licensed sectors are more likely to produce captive power than their metropol­
itan counterparts, but the probability is significantly higher in licensed industries. 
Column (5) finds that larger firms tend to adopt more in licensed industries. As pre­
dicted by the model, for a given characteristic such as size, adoption increases with 
protection.
To see how protection interacts with regulatory outcomes, I split the sample be­
tween licensed and delicensed sectors and run the linear probability model of adop­
tion on price and quality measures, controlling for 3 digit industry-year fixed effects 
and individual characteristics. Table 9 shows that the effect of higher electricity 
prices and lower quality are very similar in magnitude and the statistical significance 
for both licensed and unlicensed industries.
3.4.3 Production and Productivity
The model predicts that average output and productivity of observed firms should be 
lower in more protected environments (Prediction 5). Column (1) in Table 10 shows 
that the log of real output is lower, on average, for firms in licensed sectors and in 
industries with greater trade tariffs, controlling for firms’ characteristics. Column
113
(2 ) isolates a rough measure of total factor productivity by controlling for the log of 
skilled and unskilled workers, the log of real fixed capital and the log of real materials 
consumed. Firms in licensed sectors tend to be less productive, even though the result 
loses significance for the measure of trade protection. Columns (3) and (4) include 
a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a captive generator. The prediction of the model 
that firms which adopt are on average larger and more productive also holds. In 
Columns (5) and (6 ), I split the sample between firms with captive power and firms 
without and find that for both sets of firms, productivity tend to be lower in sectors 
that are licensed. The model also predicts that the average product and productivity 
of adopting firms should be greater in sectors that are more open to the entry of new 
firms. To test this idea, I split the sample between firms in licensed and unlicensed 
sectors. Columns (7) and (8) show that output is greater for adopters in both sectors. 
However, the difference between adopters and not adopters is significantly higher in 
unlicensed sectors. Columns (9) and (10) look at the effect on residual productivity 
and show that factories that have captive power are significantly more productive 
than non-adopting firms, but only in delicensed industries. This result suggests that 
protection reduces average productivity for adopters, as predicted by the model.
3.5 Conclusion
Developing countries aiming at increasing their industrial base have often disre­
garded the importance of infrastructure provision. By analysing how the regulation
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of a monopolistic supplier of a fundamental input in production affects producers of 
manufactures, this paper explores a specific mechanism that explains how firms re­
act to the inadequate provision of infrastructure. This chapter shows that only firms 
with high productivity and access to credit can actually reduce the negative effects 
of expensive and erratic electricity, by adopting a captive power generator. The In­
dian data also suggests a heterogeneous impact of regulation according to location. 
Firms in metropolitan areas appear to be more sensitive to quality while firms in rural 
and urban areas react more to prices and protection. On average, firms find it eas­
ier to cope in more protected environments-e.g. ones with high trade tariff and entry 
fees-where less competition raises their profits and makes the outside option afford­
able. Otherwise, in a more competitive environment, firms that could have survived 
with cheaper and better inputs will exit the market, while firms that were better pre­
pared to cope with provision failure by adopting a captive generator will not be able 
to afford it any more. It follows that countries undergoing a process of opening to 
foreign competition and deregulation should pay particular attention to the negative 
impact of low quality and biased pricing policies in the provision of infrastructure 
goods and to the distributional effects that follow.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Adoption of Captive Generator 30.5% 0.46 0 1
Rural 30.6% 0.46 0 1
Urban 57.8% 0.49 0 1
Public Company 14.1% 0.35 0 1
Multiproduct 61.8% 0.49 0 1
Census Sector 25.1% 0.43 0 1
Access to Credit 73.9% 0.44 0 1
Log Workers 3.63 1.35 0 10.75
Log Output 15.98 2.09 0.35 24.74
Ind. Tariff /  Avg. Tariff 1.83 0.40 0.97 2.89
T&D Losses 20.8% 4.43 15.3 33.4
Licensed 48.7% 0.50 0 1
Trade Tariff 0.86 0.45 0 3.44
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Table 2: Differences in Electricity Pricing Schemes According to Green Revolution intensity at the State Level
Incidence of Green Avg. Tariff / Ind.Tariff / Ind. Tariff / Agr. Tariff / Agr. Tariff / T&D
Revolution Unit cost Avg. Tariff Unit Cost Avg. Tariff Ind. Tariff Outages Losses
Low 0.76 1.46 1.05 0.28 0.24 15.5 24.7
High 0.71 1.80 1.28 0.17 0.09 18.4 22.7
Difference 0.05** -0.34*** -0.23*** 0.11** 0.15*** -2.9 2
Significance level of differences: * significant a t  10%; ** a t 5%; *** a t  1%. D ata  for colum n (1) is for the  period 1974-1997. All o ther colum ns use years 1990-1997. A ll tariffs and  unit 
costs are in  Paise (cents of rupee) per K W h. "T& D losses" are Transm ission and  D istribution lasses as  a  % o f to ta l electricity traded . "O utages" are forced outages o f therm al s ta tions 
(%). S ta te s  w ith  high incidence of G reen Revolution: A ndhra Pradesh, Bihar, H aryana, Punjab , Tam il N adu, U tta r  Pradesh.
Table 3: Electricity Pricing and Green Revolution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind Tariff /  Agr Tariff Avg Tariff /  Unit Cost
OLS IV OLS 2SLS
HYV Adoption 0.85 1.21 0.66 -0.54 -0.73 -1.28
(0.31)*** (0.35)*** (0.35)* (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)***
Budget Deficit 82.1 59.5 -122.1 -159.1
(36.7)** (28.3)** ( 17.2)*** (19.1)***
Observations 45 45 45 165 165 165
Adj. R square 0.66 0.71 0.69 0.54 0.62 0.55
F-test P-value <1% <1%
Over-id test P-value 0.31
Robust s tandard  errors in parentheses, * significant a t 10%; * *  a t  5%; *** a t  1%. All tariffs and unit costs are in Paise (cents of rupee) per KW h. "HYV Adoption" is 
th e  net proportion of cropped area under High Yield Variety seeds. "Budget deficit" is the deficit as a  proportion of s ta te  s product. Colum n (3) uses the "proportion of 
distric ts  w ith abundan t groundw ater" as an instrum ent and  Column (6) uses the same instrum ent interacted w ith year dummies. Low F-Test P-values suggest a  strong 
correlation between in s trum en ts^ ) and  instrum ented variables. Low Over-id P-values suggest th a t the instrum ents are correctly excluded from the second stage. S tate  
controls include developm ent expenditure, proportion of rural population, credit availability, proportion of votes to  th e  Congress P arty  and the party  of the Chief 
M inister. Colum ns (3)-(6) include year dummies.
Table 4: Firm Characteristics and Adoption of Captive Generator
(l) -------7 ^ -  - (3) (4) (5) (6) (ri
Adoption of Captive Generator
Rural 0.06
(0.006)***
0.11
(0.008)***
0.09
(0.008)***
0.09
(0.008)***
0.09
(0.008)***
0.09
(0.008)***
0.07
(0.008)***
Urban 0.06
(0.006)***
0.05
(0.006)***
0.05
(0.006)***
0.05
(0.007)***
0.05
(0.007)***
0.04
(0.007)***
Public Company 0.24
(0.007)***
0.23
(0.007)***
0.18
(0.007)***
0.19
(0.006)***
0.12
(0.007)***
Multiproduct 0.09
(0.007)***
0.08
(0.006)***
0.07
(0.007)***
0.04
(0.006)***
Census Sector 0.14
(0.007)***
0.14
(0.006)***
0.07
(0.006)***
Access to Credit 0.07
(0.005)***
0.06
(0.005)***
Log Workers 0.08
(0.003)***
Observations 146251 146251 146251 146251 146251 146251 143797
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.42
R obust s tandard  errors in parentheses clustered a t  the state-industry  level, * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%. T he regressions are 
linear probability model where the dependent variable "Adoption" is equal to  1 if the firms produces some of the electricity used in  production. A ll variables are 
dumm ies, except "Log W orkers." For location, the excluded category is "M etropolitan." "M ultiproduct" is equal to  1 if the factory produces more than  1 product. 
"Census sector" includes factories w ith more th a n  a  100 employees. The sample sector follows a  sam pling design adopting  S tate- 3 dig it industry  group as s tra tum  
so as to  cover all th e  un its  in a  span of three years. "Log workers" refers to  unskilled workers. State* 3-digit industry * year fixed effects are included in all cases.
Table 5: Regulatory Outcomes at the Stale Level and Adoption of Captive Power
 01_______ a _______ 01________01_________a _________ ®_________ 01_________ L«L
________________________________ Adoption of Captive Generator_______________________________
Ind. T a riff /  Avg. T a riff 0.095 0.094 0.121 0.116 0.067 0.069 0.018
(0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)
R elative B urden on Industries 0.20
(0.014)***
T& D  Losses 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.015
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0 .001)*** (0 .001)*** (0.001)***
O utages 0.010
(0.001)***
E lectricity  Connections -0.039 -0.045 -0.051 -0.078
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
H YV A doption 0.67 0.68 0.63
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***
U rban  P opu la tion  0.23 0.84
(0.12)* (0.13)***
Budget Balance -0.91
(0.17)***
U nit C ost -0.02
(0.002)***
N et Subsidies 0.02
(0.002)***
F irm  C h aracteristics Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes
O bservations 133186 133186 133186 127940 133186 133186 133186 133186
R-squared 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.32
Robust standard error* in parentheses, clustered a t the state-industry level * significant at 10%; ** at 6%; **• a t  1%. The regressions are a linear probability model where the dependent variable 'A doption1 is equal to 
1 if the firms produces some of the electricity used in production and includes 3-digit industry * year fixed effects. All tariffs and unit costs are m Paise (cents of rupee) per KWh. 'Relative Burden on Industries' is 
percentage sales revenue to percentage sales for industries relative to  agriculture and domestic sectors only 'T&D Losses' are Transmission and Distribution losses as a % of total electricity traded. 'O utages' are 
forced outages of thermal stations (%) 'Electricity Connections” are per capita. 'HYV Adoption' is the net proportion of cropped area under High Yield Variety seeds. 'Urban Population' is % of to tal population. 
'Budget Balance” is the budget superavit as a proportion of a state s product' 'N et Subsidy' is the percentage of subsidies from State Government over revenues
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Table 6: Interactions Between SEB Pricing Policies and Firm Characteristics
w w w («) w w
A doption o f C ap tive  G enerator
Ind. T a riff /  Avg. T a riff (IT /A T ) 
R elative Burden on Industries (RBI)
-0.062
(0.03)**
-0.67
(0.11)***
0.075
(0.02)***
0.11
(0.02)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.02)***
T& D  Losses 0.016
(0.002)***
0.10
(0.001)***
0.017
(0.002)***
0.10
(0.001)***
0.10
(0.001)***
0.10
(0.001)***
R ural 
IT /A T  * R ural 
RBI * R ural
-0.14
(0.05)
0.16
(0.03)***
-1.27
(0.18)***
0.82
(0.11)***
0.12
(0.01)***
0.12
(0.01)***
0.12
(0.01)***
0.12
(0.01)***
U rban 
IT /A T  * U rban 
RBI * U rban
-0.19
(0.05)***
0.17
(0.03)***
-1.35
(0.18)***
0.85
(0.11)***
0.09
(0.01)***
0.09
(0.01)***
0.09
(0.01)***
0.09
(0.01)***
Log W orkers 0.07
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.06
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
IT /A T  * Log W orkers 0.01
(0.01)
R B I * Log W orkers 0.015
(0.006)**
M ultip roduct 0.05
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
0.05
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
-0.04
(0.03)
0.04
(0.01)***
RBI * M ultip roduct 0.04
(0.01)***
Access to  C redit 0.06
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
0.05
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***
-0.02
(0.03)
RBI* Access to  C redit 0.03
(0.015)**
Public  C om pany 
C ensus Sector
0.13
(0.01)***
0.06
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
0.14
(0.01)***
0.07
(0.01)***
Observations 133186 133186 133186 133186 133186 133186
____________________ R-tqmiad__________________________ 026_____________0 26_____________ 024____________ 0 26___________ 0 26____________ 0 26
R o b u it ctandard  irror*  in p*r«nthM«€, e lu f tm d  a t th«  a ttt« -indu«try  lava! * iigm ficant a t  10%; “* a t 596; *** >t l t t  Th« r«gr«Miona ar« ■ tinaar p robability  modal vh«r« th i  dapandant 
variable "A doption” ia equal to  1 if the  firms produces some of th e  electricity used in production and includes &-digit industry  * y w r  fixed sffeots All ta riffs and un it ooets are in Paise (oente 
of rupee) per KWh. aRelative Burden on  Industries ' is percentage sales revenue to  perosntage sales for industries relative to  agriculture and dom estic sectors only T f c D  Losses” a r t  
T ransm ission and D istribution looses as a  K  of to ta l e lectricity  traded .
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Table 7: Interactions Between SEB Quality Provison and Firm Characteristics
0)____________ (2)____________(3)_____________(4)_____________W
A doption o f C ap tive G enerator
Ind . T ariff /  Avg. T ariff 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
T& D  Losses 
O utages
0.05
(0.002)***
0.03
(0.002)***
0.01
(0.003)***
0.01
(0.001)***
0.01 
(0.001 )♦♦♦
Rural 0.79 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.12
T& D L * R ural 
O utages * Rural
(0.06)***
-0.04
(0.003)***
(0.03)***
-0.02
(0.001)***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
U rban 0.69 0.31 0.09 0.09 0.09
T& D L * U rban  
O utage * U rban
(0.06)***
-0.034
(0.002)***
(0.03)***
-0.014
(0.002)***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Log W orkers 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.07
T & D L  * Log W orkers
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*
0.002
(0.0001)**
(0.01)*** (0.01 )♦♦*
M ultiproduct 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.04
T& D  L * M ultiproduct
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.04)
0.004
(0.001)***
(0.01)***
Access to  credit 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.14
T & D L  * Access to  C redit
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)***
0.009
(0.001)***
P ublic  C om pany 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
C ensus Sector 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Observation* 133186 127940 133186 133186 133186
R-aquared 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
R obust standard  errors in parentheses, clustered a t  the  sta te*industry level. * significant a t 10%; ** a t 5%; *** a t 1% Th« regressions arc a linear probability  model where 
the  dependent variable "Adoption" is equal to  1 if th e  firms produoee nmi of th e  e lectricity  used in production and  includes S-digit industry  * year fixed effects. All ta ri fb  
and  un it costa are in Paise (cents of rupee) per KWh. "T icD  Looms" are T ransm ission and Distribution looses a s a % of to ta l electricity traded . "O utages' is forced outages 
of thsrm al sta tions (ft).
122
Table 8: Competitive Environment and Adoption of Captive Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adoption of Captive Generator
Licensed 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.01
(0 .01)*** (0 .02)*** (0 .01)*** (0.01) (0 .01)
Trade tariff 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0 .02 )*** (0 .02)*** (0 .02)*** (0 .02)***
Electricity intensity 0.005 0.005 0.005
-
(0 .003)* (0 .003)* (0 .003)*
Rural 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.016)** (0.01)***
Licensed * Rural 0.09
(0.02)***
Urban 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)***
Licensed * Urban 0.04
(0.01)***
Log workers 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Licensed * Log workers 0.02
(0.006)***
Public Company 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Multiproduct 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Census Sector 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Access to Credit 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Observations 119054 119054 119054 119054 119054
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state-industry level. * significant a t 10%; ** a t 5%; ♦** at 1^. The
regressions are a linear probability model where the dependent variable "Adoption" is equal to 1 if the firms produces same oi the 
electricity used in production and include state * 2-digit industry * year fixed effects. "Licensed" is a dummy equalt to  1 if the 4- 
digit industry is licensed. "Trade tariff" is the ad-valorem impart tariff (%). "Electricity intensity" is a measure of electricity needs 
of a 3-digit industry, as a  proportion of total inputs.
Table 9: Effect o f SEB Regulatory Outcomes in Licensed and Unlicensed Industries.
J l ) ______________(2)____________ (3)___________ (4)_
Adoption of Captive Generator 
if Licensed =  0 if Licensed =  1
Ind. Tariff /  Avg. Tariff
T&D Losses
0.097
(0.02)***
0.093
(0 .02)***
0.018
(0 .002)***
0.093
(0 .02)***
0.094
(0.02)***
0.016
(0.002)***
Observations
R-squared
67745
0.17
67745
0.20
65441
0.21
65441
0.26
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered a t the state-industry level. * significant a t 10%; ** a t 5%; *** a t 1%. The 
regressions are linear probability model where the dependent variable "Adoption" is equal to 1 if the firm produces some of the 
electricity used in production and includes 3-digit industry * year fixed effects. All tariffs and unit costs are in Paise (cents of 
rupee) per KWh."T&D Losses" are Transmission and Distribution losses as a % of to tal electricity traded.
Table 10: Product and Productivity
UJ ( * ) (M (!>J I'/) — m — — ro— — pnj—
Log Real Output
if A=0 if A=1 if L=0 if L=1 if L=0 if L=1
Licensed (L) -0.11 -0.07 -0.17 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.04)** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Trade Tariff -0.32 -0.01 -0.38 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.10)*** (0.03) (0.10)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Adoption of Captive 0.98 0.04 0.97 0.86 0.05 0.01
Generator (A) (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)
Log Unskilled Workers 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.09
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Log Skilled Workers 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.09
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Log Fixed Capital 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Log Materials 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.78 0.84
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 96448 96448 96448 96448 62678 33770 62674 53547 59725 51689
R-squared 0.44 0.90 0.44 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.51 0.53 0.92 0.92
Robust standard errors in parentheses, dusUred a t t h a  state-industry level * agnificant at 10%; M at 8%; *** a t  1% 'Adoption* is equal to  1 if the firms produces some cf the electricity used in production columns 
indude state * 2-digit industry * year fixed effects and Columns (7)-(l0), state * 3-digit industry * year fixed effects 'Licensed* is a dummy squall to 1 if the 4-digit industry is licensed. "Trade tariff" is the ad-valorem impart 
tariff (%). Individual controls are the same as used in all other tables.
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Chapter 4 
Literacy and Female Status in Green 
Revolution India
4.1 Introduction
The introduction of High Yield Varieties (HYV) during the Green Revolution in In­
dia in the mid-1960s significantly increased food production in a short period of time. 
In just five years, all India foodgrain production increased by almost 50% and aver­
age yields increased by around 30%. However, the heterogeneous effects associated 
with the introduction of the new technology generate conflicting evidence in terms 
of whether it brought sizeable benefits to the rural population. In particular, many 
authors (see, for example, Sharma and Dak (1989) for a review) argue that only rel­
atively well-off farmers and large landowners benefited, while the many poor and 
small farmers, tenants or agricultural labourers might only have experienced mar­
ginal benefits at best. As the new technology was intensive in irrigation, fertilizers 
and mechanization, a successful introduction of the new seeds required not just an ini­
tial level of prosperity, but also an adequate level of education. That means that even 
if the states provided subsidised seeds, fertilizers and machinery to farmers-relaxing 
the financial constraint to adopt the new technology-educated farmers would still be 
better prepared to process information and enjoy the advantages of technical change.
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In the context of the Green Revolution in India, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) 
suggest that more educated farmers become aware earlier or simply were more able 
to manage the new technologies. They show that, in a sample of around 4,000 rural 
households, the likelihood of adoption of HYV seeds was significantly larger for 
households with at least an adult that had completed primary education, controlling 
for measures of wealth such as land size. Additionally, after showing that profits 
were greater for educated households, controlling for other inputs such as access to 
irrigation and machinery, the authors found that enrollment rates in primary schools 
increased in areas that experienced a larger increase in agricultural yields. In short, 
Foster and Rosenzweig show that because returns to primary education increased, 
private investments in schooling also increased. On the other hand, returns to educa­
tion increased at a much faster pace for areas or individuals that started off relatively 
better, sending them into a path of more growth and higher incomes. This relation­
ship between technical change and inequality raises the concern as to whether the 
increased returns to education at the micro level generated effects of any significance 
at the aggregate level, considering that a majority of the rural population might have 
been excluded from the process of technical change, where inputs were complemen­
tary to education28.
28 Arora et al.(l 989) show that between 1971 and 1981, the average operational holding increased 
from 2.89 hectares to 3.79 hectares. In particular, small and marginal holdings (up to one hectare) were 
37.63% in 1971 and 19.21% in 1981, while large holdings (between 3 and 10 hectares) increased from 
26.11% to 37.01% of all holdings. The authors suggest that "small and marginal holders were leasing 
out or selling their lands, (...), since farming on a small scale had become an uneconomic proposition."
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In this chapter, I test the relationship between HYV adoption and aggregate lit­
eracy at the district level in India, using census data for 254 Indian districts in 13 
major Indian states for the census years of 1961 (pre-Green Revolution), 1971 (less 
than five years after its start) and 1981. The use of pre-Green Revolution data, cen­
sus information and actual data on HYV adoption (as opposed to agricultural yields) 
are the main differences with Foster and Rosenzweig’s paper. The main specifica­
tion I use is similar to the one developed by Duflo (2001) to test the impact of school 
construction in Indonesia in schooling outcomes, i.e. a difference in difference re­
gression where I compare the change in literacy for rural cohorts that were in primary 
schooling age during the Green Revolution in HYV intensive districts, with respect 
to the same cohort in 1961 and in districts less intensive in HYV. The identifying as­
sumption is that there are no omitted time-varying district characteristics correlated 
with HYV adoption and rural literacy that would generate spurious results. To deal 
with this concern in the identification strategy, in addition to controlling for district 
and state varying characteristics, I use two control groups: older rural cohorts that 
would capture pre-Green Revolution trends in literacy and the same cohorts in ur­
ban areas to capture contemporaneous district-wide trends in literacy. In short, I look 
both at the average treatment effect on the treated (where the treatment is districts’ 
HYV intensity) and at the average treatment effect on the untreated (older rural and 
urban cohorts) to test whether the treatment is picking up other unobserved phenom­
ena that could have improved literacy even in the absence of the Green Revolution.
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I find robust evidence that the increase in adoption of HYV seeds is associ­
ated with substantial increases in literacy levels. Literacy increased in all districts on 
average, but a district at the mean of the HYV adoption distribution would have pro­
duced an extra increase in rural literacy of around 2 percentage points per cohort. The 
reduced form estimation means that I cannot tell the different channels driving the in­
crease in rural literacy apart. It could be the case that local governments built schools 
or hired more teachers in HYV intensive areas, increasing the supply of education. 
Additionally, higher returns to education could have increased demand. However, I 
do find evidence that when controlling for state supply of education, HYV adoption 
predicts greater literacy. My results suggest that a greater complementarity between 
economic activity and educational levels is an effective way of creating demand-side 
incentives for education. This can be of particular importance in rural areas, where 
the presistence of traditional farming might be associated with low returns to educa­
tion.
I subsequently explore an additional dimension that can affect investments in 
education, related to the effect of the Green Revolution on gender issues and the 
status of women. Evidence here is somewhat conflicting. Some authors, such as 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) and UNDP (2003), for example, show that women 
employment actually increased with HYV adoption, sometimes at a faster pace than 
men’s. Others, in contrast-such as Boserup (1990), Harriss (1989), Mencher (1988) 
and Mazumdar and Sharma (1990)-have argued that the technological change had
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a pro-male bias, because of the complementarity between mechanization and male 
labour. If that is the case, then the advent of the new seeds should have been associ­
ated with a reduction of women in the workforce or, at least, in the agricultural sector. 
Displacement from the agricultural sector would also imply that returns to education 
for women were lower, and that educational improvements should have been lower 
for girls than for boys in rural areas. In the paper mentioned above, Foster and Rosen­
zweig (1996) found that the effect of HYV on education was significantly larger for 
boys than for girls in their sample. This would suggest not just that the benefits of 
the Green Revolution created an additional wedge in gender status in rural India, but 
that technical change had heterogeneous effects on education along other dimensions 
than initial economic prosperity. Employing a similar empirical strategy to my ear­
lier analysis on literacy, I find no evidence of a Green Revolution-related increase in 
the gender gap but quite the opposite: a greater intensity in HYV is associated with 
a decrease in the literacy gap between boys and girls and with more women in the 
labour market, in the agricultural sector in particular. The interesting story the results 
show is that in rural areas there is an average increase in the literacy gender gap and 
a decrease in female labour participation. However, a more intensive level of HYV 
adoption mitigates these negative effects, without offsetting them completely. These 
findings could shed some light on the conflicting evidence regarding gender issues 
and the Green Revolution: research looking at a small number of districts over time 
might conclude that the rural gender gap has increased with and because of the Green
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Revolution, without noting that the trend in most Indian districts was the same and 
even worse in areas with lower or no HYV adoption.
The data for this chapter are presented in Table 1. There is a great variation in 
the intensity of HYV adoption across districts and across time. The mean proportion 
of cropped area under HYV seeds was around 10% in 1971, only four years after 
the introduction of the new seeds and rose to above 25% ten years later. Still, some 
districts never introduced the new technology, while others did so very quickly and 
deeply. Rural literacy overall also increased over time, for both the male and female 
populations, even though the levels of literacy were much higher for men than for 
women, and the gap in literacy rates evaluated at the mean increased from 24 to 27 
percentage points by 1981, compared to the pre-Green Revolution gap. This suggests 
a deteriorating gender gap in rural areas that is also showing in the participation of 
rural women in the labour force. It is striking to see that, on average, almost 80% 
of the women in rural areas in 1971 were not in the labour force, jumping from 6 6 % 
in 1961. At first glance, the last two described patterns in the data would seem to 
support the idea that there was an increase in the gender gap in rural India after the 
start of the Green Revolution. However, I show below that districts intensive in HYV 
were not generating this process.
4.2 Literacy and the Green Revolution
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4.2.1 Difference in differences analysis by cohort
As a first step in identifying whether the introduction of HYV brought about an in­
crease in literacy, in this section I carry out a difference in difference analysis of the 
evolution of literacy before and after the start of the Green Revolution. The census 
data provide information on rural literacy for different age groups at different points 
in time which can be used to distinguish those cohorts that went through the educa­
tional age during the Green Revolution years, from those cohorts of individuals who 
did not. Additionally, I use information on the proportion of area that was cropped 
with HYV seeds at the district level to distinguish districts that were intensive in 
HYV (above the median) and those districts that were not.
The baseline year I use is 1961, five to six years before the first HYV seeds 
were introduced. For 1971,1 use as the treated cohort those children between the age 
of 5 and 14—i.e. that were at most 10 years of age when the Green Revolution started. 
Table 2, Panel A shows that areas which were above the HYV adoption median in 
1971 had significantly higher levels of rural literacy in 1961 (3.5 percentage points). 
In line with the idea that education was an important input for the successful adop­
tion of the new seeds, this first difference suggests that the Green Revolution was 
introduced more rapidly in areas with better initial education. By comparing the dif­
ference in 1961 between high and low HYV intensity areas to the difference in 1971, 
Column (3) shows that the wedge not just persists, but experiences a significant in­
crease, both statistically (at 1% level) and in magnitude (the difference is more than
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65% larger). It is interesting to note that literacy increases over time for both groups 
of districts. This approach controls for group characteristics with time-invariant ef­
fects (by comparing the same group at two points in time) and common time shocks. 
However, this approach relies on the identifying assumption that there are no time- 
varying district specific effects that are correlated with literacy other than by HYV 
adoption, i.e. that rural literacy would not have improved more in these districts if 
the HYV seeds were never introduced.
To test whether the pattern of increase in literacy is driven by systematic dif­
ferences across both groups of districts, I carry out two placebo experiments within 
the simple difference in difference framework. In the first one, I look at the liter­
acy levels in the cohort of rural individuals aged 15 to 24-who were not exposed to 
primary education under the Green Revolution. Given the breakdown in age groups 
provided by the census data, this measure is very conservative, since many children 
in this group were 11 or 12 when the Green Revolution started and might have been 
able to improve their educational efforts at that time. In the second control exper­
iment, I run a similar difference in difference approach by looking at the cohort of 
urban children aged between 5 and 14. In both cases, if regional trends were at work 
and were confounded with the adoption of HYV, I should observe a similar pattern of 
literacy increases in either older rural cohorts, in urban children or in both. The sec­
ond part of Panel A and Panel B in Table 2 show that there is no systematic difference 
between high and low HYV areas in literacy changes for rural individuals aged 15 to
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24 and for urban children aged between 5 and 14. For the former, there is a signifi­
cant difference between high and low HYV intensity regions in 1961 ( supporting the 
idea mentioned previously, that HYV was more successful in better educated areas), 
but this difference does not change after the start of the Green Revolution (see Col­
umn (6 )). This suggests that the results obtained for the younger rural cohort were 
not picking up pre-existing trends in rural literacy in areas that ended up adopting 
more HYV seeds29. A difference in difference across cohorts in a given year shows 
that in 1971, the difference between high and low areas in the treated cohort is signif­
icantly higher than the difference for the older cohort. Interestingly, the cross-cohort 
difference in difference was negative in 1961 and turned positive after the start of 
the Green Revolution. Overall, Column (7) shows that the change between 1961 and 
1971 is 2.1  percentage points (significant at the 1% level).
For the cohort of urban children aged 5 to 14, Panel B shows three interesting 
features. First, there is no difference in literacy before the Green Revolution in urban 
areas for regions high and low in HYV adoption. Second, urban literacy has increased 
between 1961 and 1971 by similar magnitudes to the ones I found in rural areas 
(around 5 or 6 percentage points). This suggests that increases in literacy, were not an 
exclusively rural phenomenon at the time. Finally, however, this increase over time 
is very similar in both high and low HYV districts. In short, for children aged 5 to 
14, I don’t find any evidence that the increase in literacy in urban areas was more
29 Unreported results show that the same pattern of no difference in high and low HYV areas holds 
for the group of people older than 25.
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prevalent in districts intensive in HYV. In terms of the identifying assumptions, it 
is encouraging to find that changes that affect treated cohorts are not found in non­
treated cohorts.
In Table 3, I carry out a similar exercise, this time comparing data for 1961 
and 1981. This time, the cohort that grew up after the Green Revolution started 
includes those aged between 5 and 24 in 1981, and I compare them with the same 
group in 1961. Districts are again sorted according to whether the proportion of HYV 
adoption is above or below the median, measured in 1981. Panel A shows that the 
difference in rural literacy for those aged between 5 and 24 between both regions is 
2.9 percentage points greater (at the 1% significance level) in 1981 than in 1961.
As in the previous table, I look for systematic differences across regions by 
testing whether the same difference in difference approach can explain the evolution 
of two groups that are not treated under my identifying assumptions: i.e. rural popu­
lations aged over 25 and urban populations aged below 25. Results in Panels A and B 
in Table 3 show that the increasing levels of rural literacy found for the treated group 
are not present for the other two control groups. The difference in literacy between 
high and low HYV areas for the group that had their educational years after the start 
of the Green Revolution is significantly greater than the difference in literacy for the 
same group in 1961, the older age group in 1981 and the same age group in urban 
areas30.
30 The results hold when comparing the 15 to 24 age group in 1971 (not treated) and 1981 (treated), 
showing that the change in literacy in HYV intensive districts between 1971 and 1981 is on average 
1.5 percentage points greater (significant at 1% level) than in low HYV areas. Older rural and urban
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This section has provided evidence that rural literacy significantly improved in 
HYV intensive areas. The claim that the difference in difference results are identify­
ing causal effects seems more robust when results for untreated cohorts in rural and 
urban areas do not follow the same pattern, alleviating concerns that the results are 
driven by time-varying regional characteristics. In the following section, I extend the 
analysis to use a continuous measure of HYV adoption and to control for district- 
specific and time-varying characteristics that could be correlated with HYV adoption 
and literacy and might be biasing the difference in difference results in Tables 2 and 
3.
4.2.2 Effect of HYV adoption by cohort
In this section, I turn to a regression framework to introduce a continuous measure of 
HYV adoption and control for district characteristics that might be driving the surge 
in rural literacy. I first consider the average effect on literacy of the Green Revolution 
by running an OLS regression of the following form
Ldst =  a ds +  fit + iHYVdst +  ftX-dst +  £dst (4.1)
where L$st is the proportion of literate people in district d, state s and year t  for 
a cohort c in location I (i.e. rural or urban), and HYVdat is the time varying proportion 
of cropped area cultivated with HYV seeds at the district level. I also include district
fixed effects to control for time-invariant district characteristics and year dummies
cohorts don’t show any significant difference.
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to control for average changes in literacy between census years. I also include a 
set of district controls X ^ t that capture demographic changes (e.g. proportion of 
female population, proportion of rural population, log of population) and economic 
characteristics (e.g. proportion of rural workers in the manufacturing sector, log of 
roads per square kilometre) that could be correlated with both HYV adoption and 
literacy. To account for autocorrelation of the error term, I cluster standard errors in 
all regressions at the district level.
Even though the previous section has shown that the successful adoption of 
HYV seeds was more prevalent in areas with higher literacy, these estimates are not 
capturing this reverse causality. The fact that the variable HYVdst is only positive 
and different from 0 from 1971, implies that district fixed effects are absorbing the 
differences in initial levels of literacy across districts and that the estimated coeffi­
cient 7  only captures the additional improvement in literacy associated with increases 
in HYV. Note that the estimation is a reduced form regression, without being able to 
delineate specific mechanisms, such as an increase in demand for education or a 
Green Revolution-induced increase in the supply of schools in high HYV areas. As 
suggested by Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), both likely happened to some extent. 
However, the main econometric concern would be that, in the absence of technolog­
ical change, these districts would have experienced supply or demand shocks at that 
time specific to rural areas. In the absence of a clean counterfactual, the use of a 
continuous measure of HYV adoption allows me to compare districts with different
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treatment intensity over time, controlling for district fixed effects and time-varying 
characteristics. Additionally, running similar specifications for non-treated cohorts 
in rural and urban areas allows me to check whether the literacy changes were hap­
pening only at the right time and in the expected areas.
Panel A in Table 4 shows results for three cohorts, with and without district 
controls in each case. In columns (1) and (2), increases in HYV adoption are pos­
itively associated with greater literacy rates for the group of rural children aged 5 
to 14. The inclusion of district controls reduces the magnitude of the coefficient, 
but not its significance. Additionally, the year dummies are positive and significant, 
capturing an average improvement in rural literacy among the youngest cohort. The 
magnitude is sizeable: an increase in one standard deviation in HYV results in around 
1.4 percentage points increase in rural literacy for children aged 5 to 14. Taken at the 
average district in the sample, that means having almost 5400 more literate children 
in that cohort. For the whole sample, this is equivalent to an increase in the number 
of literate children aged 5 to 14 by an extra 1.4 million, as a result of the introduction 
ofHYV seeds.
It is important to note that the cohort of children aged 5 to 14 were of educa­
tional age in both HYV years (1971 and 1981). That means that I expect the effect 
ofHYV on this cohort to be stronger than for the cohorts analysed in the subsequent 
columns. In columns (3) and (4), I run regression (4.1) using the cohort of individu­
als in rural areas aged 15 to 24. Given that the Green Revolution started in 1966/7,
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I expect many people in the 1971 cohort to be beyond educational age, probably in 
the labour market already. However, all individuals in the 1981 cohort were bom 
(and then were eligible to receive primary education) after the start of the Green Rev­
olution. Because the cohort in 1971 includes many people that were not treated, I 
expect the effect ofHYV on literacy to be smaller than for the youngest cohort. Re­
sults in Columns (3) and (4) show that this is the case, with coefficients remaining 
strongly significant. When pooling both cohorts together in columns (5) and (6 ) and 
running on rural literacy for individuals aged 5 to 24 ,1 include all treated individu­
als (aged 5 to 14 in 1971 and aged 5 to 24 in 1981) and some that I expect not to be 
treated (aged 15 to 24 in 1971). The estimates are positive and strongly significant 
(at the 1% level) and, as expected, the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller than 
the estimates in columns (1) and (2), but greater than in columns (3) and (4).
Panel B in Table 4 looks at the correlation between literacy and some district 
controls to shed some light on some of the drivers of rural literacy. The proportion 
of population that is female is strongly correlated with higher levels of literacy while 
more rural districts don’t seem to perform worse. However, more densely populated 
areas do have lower literacy rates across cohorts. As expected, measures of rural 
economic development and infrastructure-such as the proportion of rural workers in 
manufacturing jobs and road density-are both positively correlated with higher levels 
of literacy.
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In Table 5 ,1 reproduce regression (4.1) but this time using the control groups, 
as in the previous section. As in Table 4 ,1 include regressions with and without dis­
trict controls. In columns (1) and (2) the left hand side variable is the rate of literacy 
for the rural cohort of individual that was of educational age before the start of the 
Green Revolution, i.e. those aged 25 or more. As expected, the coefficient on HYV 
adoption is not significantly different from 0. The year dummies are positive and sig­
nificant, suggesting an increasing improvement in rural literacy across generations 
that predates independence, but that was not associated with the Green Revolution. 
Columns (3) to (6) use the groups aged 5 to 14 and 5 to 24 in urban areas to see 
whether districts’ intensity in HYV is correlated with urban literacy among the co­
horts that were of educational age after the introduction ofHYV seeds. A positive 
and significant coefficient would imply that HYV adoption was correlated with omit­
ted district developments which were driving literacy up in both rural and urban areas 
and that the results are capturing a spurious correlation between HYV adoption and 
rural literacy. The failure to produce statistically significant coefficients for urban 
literacy alleviates these concerns somewhat.
Next, I combine the baseline OLS regression and the difference in difference 
approach to look at the additional effect per year of HYV adoption with respect to 
1961 in a regression of the following form:
L d s t  — a ds + P t  + l l l H Y V d s f i  + ~ f g i H Y V d s 8 l  + d X d s t  + ZdLst (4.2)
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where 7 rl and 7 81 respectively capture the differential increase in literacy as­
sociated with higher HYV intensity in 1971 and 1981 with respect to 1961. The 
previous OLS specification provided information on the average effect of HYV on 
literacy. Equation (4.2) allows me to deal with at least three concerns. The first, re­
lated to the magnitude of the effect of the Green Revolution on rural literacy, is to 
deal with the possibility that in order to get sizeable improvements in literacy, the 
adoption ofHYV seeds should increase beyond the bounds of the data at a point in 
time. I can check that by having a measure of the effect per year. A second concern 
is that a cohort that was treated shows significant results because the same cohort 
in another year is pulling the average up. For example, if all literacy improvements 
for rural children aged 5 to 14 are significant only in 1981, and insignificant or neg­
ative in 1971, this could raise doubts as to whether the improvements came from 
other sources than HYV adoption, which only became active many years after the 
start of the Green Revolution. Similarly, this specification shows whether a cohort 
that was not supposed to be treated (e.g. individuals aged 15 to 24 in 1971) produces 
significant results. A third concern is that the effects observed in the OLS regres­
sion were short-lived, thus capturing a pre-Green Revolution trend in districts that 
ended up adopting more HYV, rather than its effects. If that is the case, the differ­
ential increase in rural literacy associated with HYV intensity with respect to 1961 
could be greater in 1971 than in 1981 (where HYV adoption was greater). In short, 
since HYV adoption increased steadily over time, finding an unbalanced distribution
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of the effects of HYV on rural literacy overtime might raise some concerns about the 
described channel: specifically, it might be revealing that the measure of HYV in a 
given year is capturing some other omitted time-varying district-specific effects that 
are driving rural literacy up.
Table 6  shows results for the same three cohorts analysed earlier, with and 
without district controls. Columns (1) and (2) show that for rural children aged 5 
to 14, a greater proportion of HYV seeds is associated with an additional increase 
in rural literacy over and above the average increase captured by the year dummies. 
As expected, the effect holds both in 1971 and 1981, meaning that the effects of the 
Green Revolution on literacy are present from the beginning. In terms of magnitude, 
a district at the mean of HYV adoption in 1971 has a 1.1 percentage points extra 
increase in rural literacy (on top of the average increase of 3.7 percentage points) 
with respect to 1961. When comparing 1981 with 1961, a district at the mean of the 
adoption distribution has increased between 2.3 and 3.2 percentage points more than 
the average increase of 9 percentage points. Note that even though the point estimates 
are similar, the fact that HYV was more prevalent in 1981 increases the mean effect 
and alleviates the concern that the effects on literacy were not distributed over time 
in a similar way to HYV adoption. Columns (3) and (4) show interesting results 
regarding the cohort of rural individuals aged between 15 and 24. Since most of the 
individuals in this cohort were not supposed to be treated in 1971,1 expect the effects 
to be insignificant or small at best. This is what the results show: I find no effect
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in the specification without district controls, and I find a coefficient significant at the 
10% level only when I control for district characteristics. If present, the magnitude of 
the effect is low (0.5 percentage points, less than half the effect found for the younger 
cohort). This contrasts with the positive, sizeable (around 2 percentage points) and 
significant (at the 1% level) effect found for this cohort in 1981. These results are 
good news in terms of the identifying assumptions, since the effects on rural literacy 
seem to come not just from districts that were more intensive in HYV, but also from 
the cohorts that were supposed to be affected by the Green Revolution. Columns 
(5) and (6) show that the results hold when pooling together the two cohorts, i.e. 
individuals aged 5 to 24, and that the magnitudes are very similar to those found in 
the first two columns.
The same exercise is done for control groups, namely rural people that were in 
schooling age before the Green Revolution and younger urban cohorts. A concern 
with respect to the OLS results for these control groups might be (again) that OLS 
is averaging out some opposing effects that might happen in HYV-intensive districts 
over time, revealing some unobserved phenomena that have affected different cohorts 
at different points in time. If during the first years of the Green Revolution, adopting 
districts were drawing resources from urban areas to serve rural areas, then we should 
expect intensity in HYV to be associated with a drop-or less than average increases- 
in urban literacy. Alternatively, resources generated by HYV in the late stages might 
have been used to fund a district-wide schooling programme that would affect both
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uiban and rural children. If stories of this sort happened over time, it could be the 
case that an OLS estimation would show an insignificant effect of HYV on urban 
areas, but a difference in differences approach might show a positive effect for 1971, 
and a negative effect for 1981, for example. Results in Table 7 alleviate the concern 
that a more complex non-linear story was generating insignificant results in urban 
or older rural cohorts. Even though the year dummies capture increasing literacy in 
all groups, there is no strong evidence that intensity in HYV was associated with 
heterogeneous effects for the untreated population at any point in time.
Finally, I check whether the estimates are confounding the effects of other phe­
nomena that could be generating a spurious correlation between HYV adoption and 
rural literacy31. The first alternative story is one related to migration: the initial dif­
ference in difference tables showed that HYV adoption was more successful in areas 
with greater levels of literacy. It might well be the case that, as a result, areas suitable 
for HYV adoption were attracting more literate farmers. If that were the case, the 
increase in average rural literacy would not be the consequence of increased returns 
to education generating incentives to younger generations to get more education, but 
instead the consequence of a selection of better educated migrants arriving in the 
HYV-compatible districts. Column (1) in Table 8 controls for the interaction of the 
proportion of rural migrants in the district with year dummies. The estimates for
31 I present results for the cohort of children aged 5 to 14, even though the following results hold for 
the other cohorts as well.
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HYV adoption in 1971 and 1981 remain positive, significant and similar in magni­
tude, suggesting that HYV was not capturing the effects of migration.
Another concern is that HYV adoption was correlated with the proportion of 
population belonging to Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST). Dhana- 
gare (1989) points out that the benefits for these groups were smaller, in particular 
because it was poorer farmers that on average benefited less from the introduction of 
agricultural change. The story I am testing here is one where the evolution of literacy 
in a district is linked to the economic and social composition of the population, rather 
than to HYV. The presence of a poorer or more disenfranchised population could be 
correlated both with less HYV adoption and with a deteriorating trajectory for rural 
literacy. Columns (2 ) and (3) check whether the effect of HYV vanishes when con­
trolling for the proportion of population belonging to either group, interacted with 
year dummies. Since the proportion of people belonging to either group in a district 
tends to be very stable, the interaction with year dummies will capture the time evo­
lution of rural literacy for a level of SC/ST population. The effects of HYV remain 
positive and significant, even though the magnitude drops a little, in particular when 
the proportion of population belonging to Scheduled Tribes increases32.
Finally, the increase in literacy might come as a consequence of improved pro­
vision of education supplied by the state government and unrelated to the adoption of
32 Interestingly, the unreported coefficients on the interaction of the ST measure with year dummies 
are negative and significant. This implies that the upward bias comes from a negative correlation 
between successful adoption of HYV and more population classified as Scheduled Tribe, as suggested 
by the anecdotal evidence.
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the new technology. In column (4), I include as a control the log number of schools 
per capita at the state level33. In Column (5), I also include state time-trends to check 
whether changes in literacy were actually driven by state-wide policy trajectories. In 
both cases, results on the interaction terms are positive and significant, and the mag­
nitude of the coefficients does not drop much. These specifications reduce concerns 
that literacy improvements were not driven by HYV adoption but by other district or 
state phenomena that would have improved rural literacy in the absence of the Green 
Revolution.
4.3 Gender, literacy and the Green Revolution
In this section, I analyse whether the improved literacy associated with HYV inten­
sity had heterogeneous effects by gender. It is generally argued that women lost out 
in the process of technical change associated with the Green Revolution in India, ei­
ther by being displaced from wage earning opportunities or by receiving even lower 
wages than before (see FAO (1997), for example). Theoretically, if the new tech­
nology was a substitute rather than a complement to female labour, I should observe 
fewer women employed in rural areas or, if employed, that they moved away from 
the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, the data available does not allow me to in­
vestigate whether women with particular characteristics (e.g. landowners or from 
wealthier households) benefited more. But the data do allow me to investigate if the
33 I alternate this measure with the log of expenditure in primary education per capita and the log of 
primary teachers per capita, without major changes in the results.
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claims that female labour in general-and in agriculture in particular-was displaced 
in areas intensive in HYV, hold on aggregate. The existing evidence is not conclu­
sive about whether women were displaced by the introduction of technical change 
(as suggested by Harriss (1989) or Mencher (1988)) or whether female employment 
actually increased (as in UNDP (2003) or Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), for ex­
ample). Kaur and Sharma (1989) suggest that there are heterogeneous effects from 
mechanization for women based on socioeconomic characteristics. They find that the 
overall effect is a displacement of female labour in rural areas in two districts in the 
state of Haryana.
Additionally, if HYV reduced female opportunities in rural areas and their 
wages were depressed, relative to male wages it follows that their returns to edu­
cation should have been lower as well. If so, I should find that the interactions of 
HYV and year dummies in equation (4.2) are negative or insignificant when the ex­
plained variable is rural female literacy for a treated cohort. After checking labour 
market outcomes for women, I test whether improvements in literacy were gender 
specific by looking separately at the effects on gender cohorts and the gap between 
male and female literacy.
4.3.1 Labour market and gender
The effect of the Green Revolution on female labour could theoretically go either 
way. A simple mechanism for increasing female labour is that the new technology
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increased female wages and raised the opportunity cost of not working. However, if 
the technology was intensive in inputs that were not complementary to female labour, 
then women’s wages would have dropped. Unless rural women were in a backward- 
bending part of the labour supply schedule, a drop in wages should have reduced the 
supply of female labour. However, other mechanisms might have been at play if the 
decision to work was made at the household level or depended on other characteris­
tics, such as land ownership. For example, if HYV adoption increased the income of 
male household members, women might have stopped working altogether-or moved 
away from the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the adoption of the new seeds 
by the household might only have been possible if women raised some extra cash to 
buy seeds, fertilizers, etc. The district data do not provide enough detail to tell these 
alternative mechanisms apart. However, a reduced form regression of employment 
outcomes on HYV adoption might be informative in terms of labour market out­
comes, particularly since the data set includes districts with little or no HYV adop­
tion. To that end, I use information on the proportion of women not working and, 
among those who did work, the proportion employed in agriculture as a proportion 
of total rural females and working females.
In column ( 1), Table 9, the year dummies in the OLS regression show that the 
proportion of women that were not part of the working force in rural areas was greater 
in 1971 than in 1961, but not in 1981. However, a greater level of HYV adoption was 
associated with a reduction in the proportion of women that did not participate in
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the labour market. Note that the proportion of HYV adoption that offsets completely 
the effect captured by the year dummy should be above 1. That means that HYV 
adoption could at best mitigate average changes in female employment. This suggests 
that following a district intensive in HYV before and after the introduction of the new 
technology would show that female employment dropped but would not reveal what 
is apparent from results in column ( 1): that the effect was actually lower than it would 
have been in the absence of the new technology.
Column (2) looks at the interaction of HYV adoption with year dummies and 
finds that a greater part of the effect of HYV adoption in column (1) happened by 
1971. However, even though the 1981 dummy is still insignificant, intensity in HYV 
was associated with a slight increase in female participation in the labour force. The 
magnitude of the coefficients and the distribution of HYV adoption per year suggest 
that, with the exception of a small number of districts, female participation in labour 
markets dropped significantly between 1961 and 1971, but the effect was increasingly 
mitigated by a greater adoption of HYV seeds. By 1981, the proportion of women 
not working fell again, but the increase in female labour (when compared to 1961 
levels) came from districts with greater adoption of HYV only.
In columns (3) to (6) I look at the participation of women in the agricultural 
sector. When measured as a proportion of the total female population, columns (3) 
and (4) show that intensity in HYV attracted more women into the agricultural sector. 
The HYV coefficient in column (3) is positive and significant and column (4) shows
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that the effect was stronger in 1971. It is apparent again that HYV adoption mitigated 
the decrease in the proportion of women in the agricultural sector, as captured by the 
1971 dummy. Not including a proper counterfactual (i.e. evolution of districts with 
less HYV or without HYV altogether) might lead to the conclusion that HYV was 
associated with a displacement of female force from agricultural labour. Columns
(5) and (6 ) look at the proportion of rural women in agriculture, conditional on being 
in the labour force, to check the sectorial allocation of female workers. Over time, 
there seems to have been almost no significant movement towards or away from agri­
culture among female workers. However, an increase in HYV adoption was strongly 
associated with women working in the agricultural sector. This time, the effects are 
not just strongly significant but also within the bounds of the data: the increase in 
the proportion of female workers in the agricultural sector was 2.3 percentage points 
higher for a district at the mean of the HYV adoption distribution in 1971, and 5.6 
percentage points higher in 1981 than in a district with no HYV.
4.3.2 Literacy
Table 9 provides evidence that the Green Revolution not just attracted women to the 
labour market but to the agricultural sector, in particular. To test whether the in­
crease in female employment was associated with increasing returns to education for 
females, in the absence of information on wages for female agricultural workers, I 
can only run a reduced form regression and check whether literacy among females
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increased with HYV. If an increase in the labour market gap between males and fe­
males resulting from the Green Revolution was not captured by Table 9, but was 
present and affected the returns to education, then it should be reflected in the evolu­
tion of the literacy rates by gender.
To analyse whether the literacy results found in previous sections were gen­
der specific, I again ran regression (4.1), this time for men and women separately. 
Information on literacy rates per age groups and per sex allows me to test the hy­
pothesis that the Green Revolution induced a gender bias in educational outcomes. 
Columns (1) and (2), Table 10 present results for the OLS estimation of HYV adop­
tion on literacy for rural individuals aged 5 to 24 for males and females, respectively. 
An increase in 1 percentage point in the proportion of land cropped with HYV seeds 
was associated with an increase in rural literacy of 0.06 percentage points for males 
and 0 .1 0  percentage points for females. As the average effect obtained in the OLS 
estimate for this cohort was 0.08, it follows that there were heterogeneous effects in 
rural literacy associated with HYV adoption, but, if anything, in a pro-female direc­
tion. To check whether this differential impact in literacy came from gender specific 
trends, I will again use the two control groups (rural population older than 25 and the 
population aged 5 to 24 in urban areas). The average effect in these groups was not 
significantly different from zero in the OLS estimation. But it could be the case that 
female literacy was following a different trajectory in rural and urban areas at the dis­
trict level (through a catch up effect, for example, since rural male literacy was more
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than two times greater than female literacy, on average, or through a district-wide 
programme that also reached urban girls). So it could be that column (2 ) was sim­
ply reflecting these effects. Columns (3) and (4) show that for the older rural cohort 
HYV was associated with changes in literacy that are insignificantly different from 
zero. Similarly, results for the urban cohort in columns (5) and (6 ) are also insignif­
icant. In both cases, the results on HYV in the first two columns do not seem to be 
picking up a gender-specific rural or generational effect.
As pointed out before, looking at the average effect of HYV on rural literacy 
might be hiding some heterogeneous gender effects behind the positive and signifi­
cant estimates within cohorts. The steady increase in HYV adoption overtime should 
be reflected in the year specific effects in order to reduce concerns that the measure 
of HYV adoption is correlated with year and region-specific shocks. To test this, I 
ran a set of difference in difference regressions as in equation (4.2), but this time for 
male and female cohorts, to see whether the gender effect on literacy found in the 
OLS specification followed the deepening of the Green Revolution. For the cohort 
of rural individuals aged between 5 and 24, the point estimates confirm that the ef­
fect of HYV was stronger in 1981 than it was in 1971, for both men and women. In 
particular, intensity with HYV was associated with a larger and increasing effect on 
female literacy. In a district with a mean level of HYV adoption, the increase in rural 
literacy was similar for men and women in 1971 (i.e. 0.8 and 1 percentage points, 
respectively), but larger for females in 1981 (1.6 percentage points for males, 2.6 for
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females)34. When looking at the control groups, columns (3) to (6) show no results 
that could suggest that omitted characteristics at the district levels were driving the 
general improvement in literacy or the relatively improved performance of female 
literacy in rural or urban areas.
The positive and significant coefficients for year dummies across generations 
and locations show that literacy did improve for men and women. Moreover, im­
provements above the average in areas with higher HYV intensity only happened for 
the cohorts that were supposed to be affected by the change, i.e. individuals that 
were educated after the start of the Green Revolution in rural areas. Additionally, the 
improvements in literacy seem to be evenly distributed between men and women; if 
anything, with a tilt towards larger benefits for girls. In the next set of regressions, I 
check whether these differences are statistically significant, by running a regression 
of the form:
ALfat =  ctds +  Pt +  l7\HYVds7\_ +  ~l%\HYVdssi +  SX-dst +  £dst (4.3)
where A L^t is the literacy gap between men and women of cohort c in location 
I for a district d in state s and year t. The difference should cancel out all district 
characteristics that had a similar effect on male and female literacy (e.g. teacher 
availability or quality), but would not deal with characteristics that had a differential 
impact on literacy, even if these characteristics were fixed (e.g. cultural gender bias). 
To account for this possibility, I use district fixed effects that would take care of
34 Unreported estimates show a very similar pattern for the cohort of rural children between 5 and 
14, suggesting that the choice of cohort is not relevant in identifying gender effects.
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gender-varying effects of district fixed characteristics. Similarly, year dummies will 
capture the change in the gender gap with respect to 1961. Additionally, I replace 
the left hand side variable with the difference between the gender gap in rural areas 
with the gender gap in urban areas, to account for the possibility that the adoption of 
HYV seeds might have been correlated with some unobserved district-wide changes 
in gender attitudes.
The positive and significant estimates for the year dummies in column (1) in 
Table 12 suggest that the rural literacy gap increased between males and females 
aged between 5 and 24. However, the gender gap increase was mitigated in districts 
with more HYV adoption, i.e. the increase in the literacy gap was lower, the greater 
the incidence of HYV seeds. Only in a few cases was the level of HYV adoption 
laige enough to offset the overall increase in the literacy gap. Column (2) shows the 
gender gap in literacy for the same cohort in urban areas. The year dummies show 
that, on average, the gap decreased with respect to 1961. If anything, in 1971 the gap 
decreased slightly less in districts more intensive in HYV, even though the magni­
tude of the coefficients is small and a reversion in the decrease captured by the year 
dummy is beyond the bounds of the HYV adoption distribution. Columns (3) and (4) 
show results for the rural and urban cohort of people aged over 25 and prove inter­
esting: as in the previous two columns, the gender gap decreased in urban areas and 
increased in rural areas. Most notably, districts intensive in HYV showed a reduc­
tion in the gender literacy gap. This would be bad news in terms of the identification
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strategy, since there was an effect in HYV-intensive districts in a cohort that should 
not have been affected. However, column (4) shows that a similar phenomena was 
happening in urban areas, suggesting that districts intensive in HYV were closing the 
gender literacy gap in rural and urban areas at the district level, probably capturing 
pre-Green Revolution trajectories. The next four regressions use the difference be­
tween rural and urban gender gaps as the explained variable, with the objective of 
absorbing common trends in gender gap literacy in urban and rural areas. In columns
(5) and (7) I run an OLS regression using HYV intensity as the explanatory variable 
and in columns (6) and (8), I run regression (4.3). Column (5) shows that the gender 
gap in rural areas increased over time vis-a-vis urban areas (as shown by the point 
estimates of the year dummies), but the coefficient on HYV adoption is negative and 
significant. This means that the difference between the rural and urban gender gaps 
decreased with the Green Revolution. Column (7) shows that this was not the case 
for the older cohort which grew up before the Green Revolution started. Columns
(6) and (8) show the same pattern: the relative increase in the gender gap in rural ar­
eas was mitigated in areas with greater HYV adoption for the cohort that was treated, 
i.e. of educational age after the start of the Green Revolution, and not for the older 
cohorts.
In conclusion, results in this section suggest not just that the intensity of the 
Green Revolution was associated with an increase in literacy in rural areas for both 
men and women, but that the effect was significantly stronger for women. The ev­
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idence suggests that HYV adoption actually mitigated the increasing gap between 
male and female rural literacy. This observation is at odds with the widespread belief 
that the Green Revolution worsened the status of women, at least in terms of access 
to education (see FAO report on "Women and Food Security" (1997) and Mazumdar 
and Sharma (1989)). Since the gender literacy gap in rural areas seems to have wors­
ened over time, looking at the evolution of districts intensive in HYV only might lead 
to the conclusion that the increase in HYV was driving this phenomenon. However, 
by looking at a laige sample of Indian districts over time and using control groups 
in rural and urban areas, I can distinguish the general direction of gender differences 
in rural areas and the performance associated with a deeper incidence of the Green 
Revolution across India.
4.4 Conclusions
The economic and social changes in rural areas associated with the introduction of 
high yield seeds in mid-1960s in India-known as the Green Revolution-still gener­
ate conflicting evidence and controversy. The overarching concern is that in the pres­
ence of strong heterogeneous effects, only the more prosperous or the more educated 
farmers benefited from the introduction of a new technology and many remained ex­
cluded. In particular, the prerequisites for successful adoption of the new technology, 
such as mechanization, irrigation and fertilizers, seemed to be very restrictive for a
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country with more than 70% rural population and high levels of poverty, landlessness 
and illiteracy.
This paper shows that, despite the possibility of heterogeneous effects within 
districts, the Green Revolution was associated with sizeable aggregate effects on rural 
literacy at the district level. Even though pre-HYV means show that adoption was 
more prevalent in districts with higher levels of rural literacy, the effects identified 
capture changes over and above the average increase in rural literacy experienced 
between census years. A district at the mean of the distribution of HYV intensity ex­
perienced an extra increase in rural literacy of around 1 percentage point in 1971 and 
more than 2 percentage points in 1981 with respect to pre-Green Revolution levels. 
Some identification concerns regarding the link between literacy and HYV adoption 
are alleviated by the lack of evidence that cohorts whose educational decisions should 
not have been affected by the level of HYV intensity experienced the same changes 
in literacy. I find no evidence of pre-Green Revolution trends in rural areas (as cap­
tured by older rural cohorts) or simultaneous district wide changes (as captured by 
the cohort of young urban individuals). Additionally, the identifying assumption-i.e. 
that these changes would not have happened by other means in the absence of the 
Green Revolution-is robust to the inclusion of time-varying district characteristics, 
state investment in primary schools and time trends.
The concerns that the female population might have been left out of the ben­
efits of technological change are not supported by the data in terms of literacy rates
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and labour participation, on aggregate. Even though there is evidence that the aver­
age number of rural women excluded from labour markets increased after the Green 
Revolution, I find that this phenomenon was less prevalent, the greater the intensity 
in HYV. Similarly, the gender gap in rural literacy rates increased over time since the 
introduction of HYV seeds, but the gap widened less in districts that adopted more 
HYV seeds. Without dismissing the possibility of heterogeneous effects among rural 
women, the aggregate data presents a picture that reconciles the conflicting evidence 
around the status of women after the start of the Green Revolution.
In many cases, the provision of infrastructure such as schools and teachers 
may be the leading constraint to education and its provision could spur increases in 
educational levels (see Duflo (2001), for example). But in other cases, low education 
may be the natural consequence of economic activities with low returns to education, 
such as traditional farming. The improvement in literacy for men and women and 
the reduction of the gender gap associated with the adoption of a new agricultural 
technology in rural areas suggest that improvements in human capital can be obtained 
in rural areas, if the returns to education increase through technological change.
4.A Appendix A: Data
The census data for years 1961-1981 comes from the Indian District Database pre­
pared by R.Vanneman and D.Bames (2000), Indian District Data, 1961-1991: data 
file and codebook, College Park, Maryland: Center on Population, Gender, and So­
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cial Inequality, available at www.infoim.umd.edu/~districts/index.html. I merged the 
data with the India Agriculture and Climate Data set, prepared by Apurva Sanghi, 
K.S. Kavi Kumar and James W. McKinsey, Jr. for the World Bank (available at 
chd.ucla.edu/dev_data/datafiles/india_agric_climate.htm), accounting for changes in 
districts’ boundaries that left me with 254 districts in 13 states (Andhra Pradesh, Bi­
har, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal).
"HYV adoption" is the proportion of area under HYV seeds and "HYV inten­
sity" in the difference in difference tables is a dummy equal to 1 for all districts with 
HYV adoption above the median in a particular year. "Rural literacy" for all age 
groups, gender and location is the proportion of literate people within that group. 
"Female population" and "Rural population" are the proportion of women and in­
dividuals living in rural areas in total population, respectively. "Rural workers in 
manufactures" is the proportion of main workers in rural areas working in the man­
ufacturing sector, and "Log Roads" is the log of roads per square kilometre. "Rural 
migration" is the proportion of population in a district that has come to rural areas 
from other districts. "Scheduled Caste" and "Scheduled Tribe" are the proportion 
of population that belongs to either group. I also include "Primary schools", which 
is the log of primary schools per capita at the state level, and I alternate it with the 
log of number of primary school teachers per capita at the state level and the log of 
state expenditure on primary schools per capita. Finally, "Rural women not workers"
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is the proportion of women that are not employed in any main or marginal activity. 
"Rural women in agriculture" is the number of women working in the agricultural 
sector taken either as a proportion of rural female or of rural female workers.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Year M ean Std. Dev. , Min Max
1961 0 0 0 0
HYV Adoption (%) 1971 0.102 0.111 0 0.678
1981 0.255 0.160 0 0.767
1961 0.196 0.075 0.044 0.547
Rural Literacy (%) 1971 0.248 0.094 0.062 0.651
1981 0.308 0.108 0.085 0.699
1961 0.310 0.099 0.070 0.637
Male Rural Literacy (%) 1971 0.366 0.111 0.096 0.720
1981 0.439 0.118 0.132 0.752
1961 0.077 0.059 0.009 0.456
Female Rural Literacy (%) 1971 0.122 0.085 0.014 0.580
1981 0.168 0.109 0.019 0.645
1961 0.655 0.154 0.394 0.979
Rural Women Not Workers (%) 1971 0.798 0.117 0.445 0.991
1981 0.750 0.143 0.472 0.994
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Table 2: Mean Rural Literacy by Cohort and Year (1961-1971)
Panel A: Rural Literacy Panel B: Urban Literacy
Aged 5 to 14 Aged 15 to 24
HY V  in te n s ity  (in 1971) HYV in tensity diffe rence  in  
d ifference across
Aged 5 to 14
HYV in ten s ity  (in 1971)
High Low Difference High Low Difference cohorts High Low Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) =  (3) - (6) 0 ) (2) (3)
1971 0.299(0.010)
0.241
(0.008)
0.058
(0.013)***
0.385
(0.011)
0.336
(0.011)
0.049
(0.016)***
0.009
(0.005)** 1971
0.550
(0.010)
0.548
(0.008)
0.002
(0.011)
1961 0.239
(0.008)
0.204
(0.007)
0.035
(0.010)***
0.273
(0.008)
0.226
(0.008)
0.047
(0.012)***
-0.012 
(0.003)* ♦* 1961
0.489
(0.008)
0.495
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.011)
Difference 0.060(0.013)***
0.037
(0.004)***
0.023
(0.006)***
0.112
(0.014)***
0.110
(0.014)***
0.002
(0.006)
0.021
(0.004)*** Difference
0.061
(0.012)***
0.053
(0.010)***
0.007
(0.005)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1%. "HYV intensity" is the net proportion oI  area cropped with HYV seeds. "High" is for districts above the 
median and "low" for those below. "Rural Literacy" and "Urban literacy" are the proportion of literate people in rural and urban areas, respectively, for different age groups.
Table 3: Mean Rural Literacy by Cohort and Year (1961-1981)
Panel A: Rural Literacy Panel B: Urban Literacy
Aged 5 to 24 Aged 25 to 59 Aged 5 to 24
H Y V  in ten s ity  (in 1981) HY V  iin tensity Difference in H Y V  in te n s ity  (in 1981)
High Low Difference High Low Difference
difference across 
cohorts High Low Difference
(1) (2) (3) W (5) (6) (7) =  (3) - (6) (1) (2) (3)
1981 0.403(0.012)
0.336
(0.011)
0.066
(0.016)***
0.252
(0.008)
0.232
(0.007)
0.020
(0.011)*
0.046
(0.008)*** 1981
0.643
(0.010)
0.650
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.011)
1961 0.250(0.008)
0.213
(0.008)
0.037
(0.011)***
0.169
(0.005)
0.154
(0.006)
0.015
(0.008)*
0.022
(0.004)*** 1961
0.536
(0.008)
0.535
(0.007)
0.001
(0.010)
Difference 0.153(0.014)***
0.123
(0.013)***
0.029
(0.008)***
0.084
(0.009)***
0.079
(0.009)***
0.005
(0.004)
0.024
(0.006)*** Difference
0.108
(0.012)***
0.115
(0.010)***
-0.008
(0.006)
Robust standard err ore in parentheses, * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1%. "HYV intensity" is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds. "High" *  for districts above the 
median and "low" for those below. "Rural literacy" and "Urban literacy" are the proportion of literate people in rural and urban areas, respectively, for different age groups.
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Table 4: Literacy and HYV Adoption (OLS)
(i) (2) (a) (4) (6) 
Panel A: HYV Adoption and Year Effects
(6)
Rural Literacy
Aged 5 to 14 Aged 15 to 24 Aged 5 to 24
HYV Adoption 0.121 0.093 0.069 0.063 0.105 0.084
(0.029)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.024)*** (0.028)*** (0.025)***
1971
0.035 0.061 0.104 0.109 0.059 0.077
(0.004)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.012)***
1981 0.091 0.125 0.144 0.149 0.110 0.134
(0.009)*** (0.025)*** (0.008)*** (0.025)*** (0.008)*** (0.024)***
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
Panel B: Controls
Female Population (%) 1.49
(0.55)***
1.52
(0.54)***
1.56
(0.52)***
Rural Population (%) -0.02
(0.12)
-0.03
(0.12)
-0.02
(0.12)
Log Population -0.17
(0.06)***
-0.15
(0.06)***
-0.16
(0.06)***
Rural workers in 1.76 1.63 1.75
Manufacturing (%) (0.25)*** (0.23)*** (0.23)***
Log Roads 0.03
(0.006)***
0.02
(0.008)**
0.03
(0.006)***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered a t the district level. * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t 5%; * * *  significant a t  1%. 
"HYV intensity" is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds a t the district level. "Rural literacy" is the proportion of 
literate people in rural areas for different age groups. "Female Population" and "Rural Population" are the proportion of women and 
individuals living in rural areas in total population, respectively. "Rural W orkers in M anufacturing" is the proportion of main workers 
in rural areas working in the manufacturing sector and "Log Roads" is the log of roads per square kilometre.
Table 5: Literacy and HYV Adoption in Untreated Cohorts
m ____________ (3)_____________(4)_____________(5)_____________ (6)
HYV A doption 
1971 
1981
District Fixed Effects
District Controls
Observations
R-squared
R ural Literacy U rban Literacy
Aged 25 to  59 Aged 5 to  14 Aged 5 to  24
0.007
(0.012)
-0.0003
(0.012)
0.027
(0.021)
0.011
(0.021)
-0.019
(0.018)
-0.028
(0.021)
0.031
(0.002)***
0.035
(0.007)***
0.054
(0.004)***
0.062
(0.011)***
0.074
(0.003)***
0.081
(0.010)***
0.079
(0.004)***
0.084
(0.014)***
0.095
(0.007)***
0.100
(0.022)***
0.117
(0.005)***
0.122
(0.020)***
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No Yes
762
0.97
762
0.97
762
0.93
762
0.94
762
0.95
762
0.96
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
"HYV intensity" is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds at the district level. "Rural Literacy" and "Urban Literacy" are 
the proportion of literate people in rural and urban areas, respectively, for different age groups. District controls are Female 
Population, Rural Population, Rural Workers in manufacturing and Log Roads.
Table 6: Literacy and HYV Adoption (Year Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Literacy
Aged 5 to 14 Aged 15 to 24 Aged 5 to 24
HYV * 1Q71 0.110 0.104 0.026 0.045 0.086 0.089XX I V  I J 7 I  X
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.027) (0.026)* (0.026)*** (0.026)***
H W  * 1QR1 0.125 0.089 0.081 0.069 0.110 0.082XX I  V X i70X
(0.031)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.026)***
1 071 0.037 0.060 0.108 0.110 0.061 0.077I « 7 I  X
(0.004)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.012)***
0.091 0.126 0.141 0.147 0.109 0.135
1981
(0.009)*** (0.025)*** (0.008)*** (0.026)*** (0.008)*** (0.024)***
Additional effect of 1971 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.9
mean HYV (in
percentage points) 1981 3.2 2.3 2.1 1.8 2.8 2.1
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
R obust s ta n d a rd  e rrors in parentheses, clustered  a t  th e  d is tric t level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%. 
"H Y V " is th e  n e t p roportion  of a rea  cropped w ith HYV seeds a t  th e  d is tric t level. "R ura l L iteracy" is th e  p ropo rtion  of lite ra te  people 
in  ru ra l a reas  for d ifferent age groups. D istric t contro ls a re  Fem ale P o pu la tion , R ura l P opu la tion , R ura l W orkers in M anufac tu ring  an d  
Log R oads.
Table 7: Literacy and HYV Adoption (Year Effects, Untreated Cohorts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Literacy U rban Literacy
Aged 25 to  59 Aged 5 to  14 Aged 5 to  24
HYV * 1971 -0.018
(0.012)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.057
(0.030)*
0.052
(0.030)*
-0.004
(0.023)
-0.006
(0.026)
HYV * 1981 0.014 0.003 0.019 -0.0003 -0.023 -0.035
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)*
1971 0.034 0.036 0.051 0.059 0.073 0.079
(0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.010)***
1981 0.078
(0.004)***
0.082
(0.014)***
0.097
(0.007)***
0.106
(0.022)***
0.118
(0.005)***
0.126
(0.019)***
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations
R-squared
762
0.95
762
0.96
762
0.93
762
0.94
762
a.95
762
0.96
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
’'HYV” is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds at the district level. "Rural Literacy" is the proportion of literate people 
in rural areas for different age groups. District controls are Female Population, Rural Population, Rural Workers in Manufacturing and 
Log Roads.
Table 8: Literacy and HYV Adoption (Year Effects, Additional Controls)
i l l -IHL J2L L JSL
Rural Literacy: Aged 5 to  14
HYV * 1971 0.098
(0.030)***
0.085
(0.029)***
0.078
(0.030)***
0.098
(0.029)***
0.045
(0.027)*
HYV * 1981 0.092
(0.027)***
0.086
(0.027)***
0.072
(0.030)**
0.085
(0.029)***
0.064
(0.023)***
1971 0.041 0.053 0.068 0.056
(0.025)* (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
1981 0.074 0.124 0.135 0.128
(0.033)** (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)***
Additional Controls Rural Migration * year
Scheduled 
Caste * year
Scheduled 
Tribe * year
Primary
Schools
(State)
State Time 
Trends +  
Schools 
(State)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97
R obust s tandard  errors in parentheses, clustered a t  th e  d istric t level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  
1%. "HYV" is th e  n e t proportion of area cropped w ith HYV seeds a t  the  d istric t level. "R ural L iteracy" is th e  proportion  of lite ra te  
people in rural areas for different age groups. D istrict controls are Fem ale Population, R ural Population , R ural W orkers in 
M anufacturing and Log Roads. "R ural M igration" is the  proportion of population in a  d istric t th a t  has come to  rural areas from 
o ther districts. "Scheduled Caste" and "Scheduled Tribe" are  the  p roportion  of population th a t  belong to  e ither group. "P rim ary  
Schools" is th e  log of prim ary schools per cap ita  a t  the s ta te  level.
Table 9: Rural Women and Labour Market Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Women Not Rural Women in Agriculture
Workers ( %) (% of rural females) (% of rural female workers)
HYV Adoption -0.086
(0.030)***
0.085
(0.029)***
0.218
(0.070)***
HYV * 1971 -0.193
(0.046)***
0.187
(0.045)***
0.206
(0.079)***
HYV * 1981 -0.055
(0.030)*
0.056
(0.030)*
#
CN 
*
3 
£
 
© 
°.O
1971 0.099 0.107 -0.071 -0.078 0.040 0.041
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.023)* (0.023)*
1981 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.015 0.013 0.011
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.043)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.87
R obust s tandard  errors in parentheses, clustered a t  the  d istric t level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** 
significant a t  1%. "HYV" is the  net proportion o f area cropped w ith HYV seeds a t  th e  d istric t level. D istric t controls are 
Fem ale Population , Rural Population, Rural workers in M anufacturing and  Log Roads. "R ural W omen Not W orkers" is the  
proportion of women th a t  are not employed in any main or marginal activity , "Rural W omen in A griculture" is the  num ber 
of women working in th e  agricultural sector taken either as a  proportion of rural female o r of rural female workers.
Table 10: Literacy and HYV Adoption (Effects by Gender)
m  in in in in in.
Rural Literacy U rban Literacy
Aged 5 to  24 Aged 25 to  59 Aged 5 to  24
Male Female Male Fem ale Male Female
HYV A doption 0.064 0.101 -0.018 0.014 -0.020 -0.036(0.023)*** (0.033)*** (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
1971 0.062 0.090 0.035 0.041 0.052 0.113(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
1981 0.118 0.147 0.096 0.079 0.084 0.166(0.022)*** (0.031)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
istrict Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762 •
R-squared 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.96
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. "HYV" 
is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds at the district level. "Rural Literacy" and "Urban Literacy" are the proportion of 
literate people in rural and urban areas, respectively, for different age groups and genders. District controls are Female Population, Rural 
Population, Rural Workers in Manufacturing and Log Roads.
Table 11: Literacy and HYV Adoption (Year Effects by Gender)
111_____________£2)____________ £3]_____________£4]____________ £5}___________ £ a
Rural Literacy Urban Literacy
Aged 5 to 24 Aged 25 to 59 Aged 5 to 24
Male Female Male Female Male Female
HYV * 1971 0.074 0.101 -0.022 -0.001 0.006 -0.016
(0.021)*** (0.030)*** (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.027)
HYV * 1981 0.062 0.102 -0.017 0.018 -0.028 -0.041
(0.023)*** (0.035)*** (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022)*
1971 0.061 0.091 0.036 0.042 0.050 0.111
(0.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)***
1981 0.119 0.147 0.096 0.077 0.088 0.169
(0.022)*** (0.032)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.023)***
Additional effect of 1971 0.8 1.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2
mean HYV (in 
percentage points) 1981 1.6 2.6 -0.4 0.5 -0.7 -1.1
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.94
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered a t  the district level. * significant a t  10%; * *  significant a t  5%; *** significant a t 1%. "HYV" 
is the net proportion of area cropped with HYV seeds a t the district level "Rural Literacy" and "Urban Literacy" are the proportion of 
literate people in rural and urban areas, respectively, for different age groups and genders. District controls are Female Population, Rural 
Population, Rural Workers in Manufacturing and Log Roads.
Table 12: Gender Gap in Rural and Urban Areas
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gender Gap Rural Gender Gap - Urban Gender Gap
Aged 5 to 24 Aged 25 to 59 Aged 5 to 24 Aged 25 to 59
Rural Urban Rural Urban
HYV Adoption -0.074
(0.024)***
-0.024
(0.019)
HYV * 1971 -0.042
(0.023)*
0.027
(0.016)*
-0.042
(0.012)***
-0.039
(0.015)**
-0.068
(0.025)***
-0.003
(0.020)
HYV * 1981 -0.059
(0.027)**
0.017
(0.015)
-0.052
(0.017)***
-0.022
(0.017)
-0.076
(0.025)***
-0.030
(0.020)
1971 0.011
(0.005)**
-0.063
(0.004)***
0.025
(0.003)***
-0.018
(0.004)***
0.074
(0.0051)***
0.073
(0.005)***
0.045
(0.005)***
0.043
(0.005)***
1981
0.051
(0.010)***
-0.079
(0.006)***
0.074
(0.006)***
-0.018
(0.007)**
0.130
(0.009)***
0.130
(0.009)***
0.090
(0.009)***
0.091
(0.009)***
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
R-squared
762
0.83
762
0.93
762
0.95
762
0.90
762
0.90
762
0.94
762
0.90
762
0.94
R obust s tan d a rd  errors in  parentheses, clustered a t  th e  d istric t level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%. "HYV" is the  
n e t proportion  of a rea  cropped w ith  HYV seeds a t  th e  d istric t level. "G ender G ap" is th e  difference between the  p roportion  of m ale and  female th a t  
are  lite ra te  far different age groups and in  ru ral and  u rban  areas. D istrict controls are Fem ale Population , R ural Popu lation , R ural W orkers in 
M anufacturing and  Log Roads.
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